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Abstract
Title: Three Essays on Economic Inequality
Author: Gustavo Nicolas Paez Salamanca
This PhD dissertation studies how market structures and economic incentives transform
heterogeneity at agent levels into unequal economic outcomes.
The first chapter studies the economic incentives that lead a country to specialise its
production in specific segments of a supply chain, and how these incentives transform
heterogeneity at the productivity level into wage differences between countries. This chapter
presents an innovative framework that incorporates production networks to the Ricardian
trade model. It describes the price formation mechanism that occurs along supply chains
and how it induces countries to focus on the production of specific goods. Moreover, the
model highlights the role of the network structure in the determination of prices, and uses it
to explain how changes in the productivity of a country have consequences in the production
decisions and wages of the other countries that produce goods in the supply chain.
The second chapter studies the effects that the heterogeneity of income flows has over
the implementation of collective agreements. Collective agreements are the primary mecha-
nism by which communities cope with market failures. However, the lack of enforcement
mechanisms generates coordination challenges. This chapter presents a theoretical frame-
work that studies how inequality among individuals affects the participation incentives of
the individuals and explains why agreements that balance the rent-seeking behaviour of
wealthy individuals with the redistribution interests of the poor reduce the adverse effects of
heterogeneity, and can even use it to create more robust agreements.
The third chapter studies heterogeneity at the level of academic journals. This chapter
models the interaction between authors and journals as a platform market and uses this
model to explain how general interest journals compete against field-specific journals. The
model provides new insights into the way in which general interest journals link the different
publication incentives of journals across fields. The theoretical results explain why general
interest journals tend to attract higher quality publications and how changes in the publication
capacity of a journal, or the volume of research in a field, can affect the quality of ideas
published in both field-specific and general interest journals. Finally, this chapter applies the
previous theoretical results to understand how the Top 5 journals in economics obtained their
central role, and how their influence has changed between 1980 and the present.
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Chapter 1
On Global Supply Chains and Inequality
1.1 Introduction
Global supply chains are central to understanding production choices and income differences
across countries. Over the last few decades, new technologies have reduced the transport
and coordination costs of international trade, allowing firms to both obtain inputs from
and allocate production to geographically distant regions. Due to supply chains, market
interdependencies are increasing between regions over time. Therefore, the price formation
mechanisms within a country depend on the prices at which other countries are willing to sell
inputs as well as the prices at which other countries are willing to buy goods. The objective
of this paper is to develop an original framework that explains the price formation mechanism
by which countries decide which goods to produce in a given supply chain and use it to
understand the emergence of wage inequality between countries.
In contrast to the rich empirical literature on global supply chains, theoretical explanations
are still insufficient to understand the interactions between inequality and the network
structure of a supply chain. On the one hand, most of the research associated with trade
use models with very simplified supply chains; these models often reduce supply chains to
certain factors, some intermediate goods and a final good that aggregates the previous goods.
On the other hand, the literature that theoretically models production networks currently
focuses on the spread of shocks across different sectors of the economy without including an
international trade component. A few authors, such as Costinot et al. (2012) and Baldwin
and Venables (2013), have bridged the gap between trade and production networks. However,
these studies represent supply chains using two specific types of input-output matrices, and
their policy implications are limited to these settings.
2 On Global Supply Chains and Inequality
Moving beyond the previous models, this paper extends a Ricardian international trade
framework to incorporate a wide range of production networks. It describes how countries
with heterogeneous levels of overall productivity decide which goods to produce given the
size of their respective labour forces. The model accurately describes the economic incentives
that allocate countries to different parts of the supply chain and explains how the network
structure determines the equilibrium prices and wages. Finally, it specifies how changes in a
country’s productivity induce income inequality by changing the equilibrium wages along
the supply chain. The model simultaneously solves two theoretical puzzles that are at the
intersection of trade and production structures for which previous models offered limited
solutions.
First, it explains why countries with the lowest productivity levels usually produce raw
materials, whereas countries with the highest productivity levels do not necessarily produce
the final goods. Due to their linear structure, models such as the one developed by Costinot
et al. (2012) are not able to explain this non-linear effect in the allocation of production. The
model presented in this paper explains what model assumptions sort countries by productivity
and how countries allocate themselves when these assumptions do not hold. In particular,
it describes how location decisions depend on the revenue per worker of each good. Ergo,
in cases where final goods are labour intensive, countries with high productivity prefer to
produce intermediate goods that require less labour per unit of output.
Second, this paper explains why productivity shocks can affect countries that are down-
stream, but it also studies under which cases there are also upstream effects, and in which
cases there are no effects on the wages or production decisions of other countries. Not all
productivity shocks are equal, and understanding which shocks reduce inequality is crucial
for international trade policies. This paper characterises productivity shock spillovers and
provides new insights into the mechanisms by which shocks flow across the supply chains.
In particular, it argues that shocks propagate if they affect the price ranges of the goods that
the countries produce. Depending on the network structure, the changes in the productivity
of a country can affect only the prices of downstream goods, or affect also prices of upstream
goods. In the latter case, that shock will also have consequences over the production decisions
and wages of upstream countries.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 embeds this work in the broader literature on
international trade and supply chains. A concise account of the onset of the relevant research
is provided, and recurring principles and premises across models are described. The results
and limitations of closely related works are also discussed to reveal the gap that this study
attempts to fill. Section 1.3 presents the model. First, the basic setup is introduced, and the
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necessary notation is established. Second, the properties of the competitive equilibrium are
characterised, and the resulting income distributions across countries are discussed. Third,
the implications of acyclic supply chains and constant within-country productivities across
sectors are explored to elucidate the effects of idiosyncratic productivity shocks on the chain
as a whole. Last, the assumptions required to render the model comparable to existing work
are explained, and the plausibility and implications of said restrictions are discussed. Finally,
Section 1.4 concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
As the globalisation of production has progressed over recent decades, several economists
have recognised its relevance to international trade and built theoretical models to explain the
offshoring and outsourcing decisions of firms (Antras and Helpman, 2004). Articles building
on this framework frequently assume that the world consists of two generic areas, a Global
North and a Global South. From the perspective of the North, the South possesses cheaper
resources that are accessible via offshoring or outsourcing. While offshoring incurs transport
and coordination costs (Grossman and Helpman, 2002; Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008),
outsourcing reduces the benefits and poses coordination problems (Kohler, 2004).
Fig. 1.2.1 Production network: fragmentation models
Based on Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2012), Figure 1.2.1 represents the basic produc-
tion network underlying these models. The final good requires n tasks, and the firm decides
which tasks to offshore/outsource and which to produce locally. Thus, this framework limits
global supply chains to the analysis of two regions and a production structure in which all
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tasks are performed in parallel. Baldwin and Venables (2013) extended previous works to
allow for sequential production structures in which task i is the input of task i+1. However,
Markusen (2006) illustrated how, under the two-region approach, conclusions related to
production decisions depend entirely on the characteristics associated with the regions a
priori (e.g. only the North can produce the final product, or only the high-skilled sector has
location externalities). Although such simplifications are useful to study firms’ decisions,
they provide a limited understanding of income differences at the country level and produc-
tion allocation decisions, as most of them are already predetermined by the model. Moreover,
the role of the supply chain in these models is minimalistic. Therefore, the effect of the
structure of the supply chain on price formation along the chain cannot be studied. Finally,
some of these models presume market failures and externalities that make them unable to
distinguish between the effects of supply under perfect equilibrium and the effects of market
power on trade.
Costinot et al. (2012) developed a different approach to describe the international frag-
mentation of production processes. Based on Kremer (1993) O-Ring theory, the authors
model production as a sequential process that only generates value if it proceeds without
failure. The model thereby assumes an exogenous probability of production failure for each
country. The authors equate these probabilities to the productivity of the country: given
the same amount of inputs, some countries can produce a smaller or a larger amount of
high-quality output. Their model concluded that low-performance countries focus their
labour on the early stages of production. As a consequence, their wages are systematically
lower than those in high-performance countries. Regarding the price formation mechanism
along the supply chain, the model infers that even without market imperfections, sequential
production networks increase economic inequality in the world. Finally, productivity shocks
only have downstream spillovers that reduce the income of countries with higher productivity
and reduce the dispersion of wages.
Costinot et al. (2012) provide first-order insights into the relationship between production
structures, productivity, and income. However, their model has two main limitations. First,
their conclusions rely on a stylized linear production network, and therefore, most of the
economic implications only apply to this specific production structure. Second, the model
assumes a continuum of goods, which means that there is no single good produced by two
countries at the same time. These constraints lead to predictions that are inconsistent with
empirical observations. In particular, the implications of the model collide with two key
empirical facts. On the one hand, productivity shocks can also substantially affect upstream
producers. On the other hand, the most productive countries are not necessarily final good
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producers, which contrasts with the main conclusion of their model. Due to the limitations of
both the Costinot et al. (2012) framework and the foregoing fragmentation models, this paper
takes a step back and proposes an alternative bridge between production networks and trade.
In the post-Second World War period, production networks were a central topic in
economics. After Leontief (1953) formalised the interactions between intermediate goods
using input-output matrices, several authors used the concept to measure how to promote
development via production linkages. However, the popularity of the topic waned thereafter.
Only recently, authors such as Acemoglu et al. (2012) have recovered this idea to demonstrate
how shocks to particular firms can have first-order impacts on the overall economy, depending
on the respective firm’s location in the broader production network. Their model uses
the input-output matrix of an economy to explain how different arrangements along the
production structure induce a ripple effect that promulgates idiosyncratic shocks. This
approach is more suitable for this paper because it couples an input-output structure with a
perfect competition framework. This characteristic allows the effects of production structures
on prices to be separated from the effects of market failures. However, Acemoglu et al.
(2012) did not incorporate trade between countries. Instead, perfect factor mobility across
different sectors was assumed. Therefore, perfect competition implies price equalisation;
in particular, there is no variation in wages. Hence, to understand income inequality, it is
necessary to restrict labour mobility between countries. Thus, this approach needs to be
complemented with a trade theory that includes the limited mobility of factors.
Many trade theorists have considered it sufficient to study final goods to understand
trade dynamics (Markusen, 2006). However, the main trade models are very sensitive to the
inclusion of production structures. For instance, Ethier (1984) indicated that the principal
results of Hecksher-Ohlin-Vanek (HOV) do not hold in economies with more than two goods
and two factors. As another example, Samuelson (2001) demonstrated how the inclusion
of intermediate inputs has significant effects on the production possibility frontier of the
Ricardian model. Whereas the main classical results in the trade literature originate from
these two models, their limitations do not allow them to explain supply chain mechanisms.
Recently, Shiozawa (2007) extended the Ricardian model to accommodate input-output
relations and proved that specialisation occurs under general production networks. This
adaptation offers a new path to connect trade and supply chains because it provides the
mathematics required to treat both phenomena with similar tools. Therefore, this paper
adopts Shiozawa (2007) methods to study price formation in supply chains and merges
them with a network analysis that characterises the role of production structures in the
dispersion of productivity shocks and the emergence of income inequality between different
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countries. Using this approach, this paper overcomes the limitations of the previous studies
and examines supply chain price formation for a broader range of production structures.
1.3 Supply Chain Model
The goal of this section is to develop a theoretic framework that integrates both general
global supply chains and international trade. The first subsection thereby introduces the basic
elements, such as the decision problem of individual countries in the global economy and the
notational conventions used throughout the chapter. The second subsection solves for the
general equilibrium of the model and discusses the relationship between specialisation and
income distribution in a supply chain. The third subsection focuses on the price formation
mechanism and the flow of productivity shocks in the economy. Lastly, in the fourth
subsection, the paper’s framework is compared to existing models by making explicit the
assumptions that render them comparable and the model implications of these assumptions.
1.3.1 General Environment
The world economy consists of c = {1,2, . . . ,C} indexed countries. Each country has access
to a fixed number of workers. The positive vector q ∈ RC represents the total number of
workers in the economy, where qc is the number of workers in country c. Finally, the world
economy, in which all the countries participate, produces m = {1,2, . . . ,M} indexed goods,
where good 1 is known as the final good.
The workers, who are also consumers, maximise their utility solely by consuming the
final good. They have a unit of labour that they inelastically supply to firms in exchange for
their wages. Finally, workers are immobile between countries but perfectly mobile among
industries within their own country.
A production function, or production technique, describes the way in which a firm
transforms a bundle of inputs and a unit of labour into a certain quantity of output. Each
country possesses a specific production technique for each of the M different goods. These
techniques must satisfy the following conditions:1
Assumption A1 Each technique is Leontief and produces a single good.
Assumption A2 The final good is not an input of any other good. Furthermore, to produce
one unit of the final good, all the other goods are required directly or indirectly.
1The first three conditions are adapted from Shiozawa (2007).
1.3 Supply Chain Model 7
Assumption A3 In autarky, each country is capable of producing the final good.
Assumption A4 Each country requires the same amount of inputs to transform one unit of
labour into a given output. However, different countries obtain different quantities of output.
Firms are profit maximisers and work under perfect competition. Each firm produces
a single good based on the technique available to it in the country. Therefore, a firm that
produces a particular good in a given country is wholly identified with the technique that
produces that good in that country. This direct link allows the terms firm and technique to be
used interchangeably in the context of this model.
Assumptions (A1) to (A4) specify the types of production techniques that this paper
examines. For this reason, the remainder of this subsection formalises each assumption and
explains their scope and limitations. After the four assumptions are presented, Example 1.1
illustrates how these building blocks represent supply chains.
Assumption A1:
The fact that the production techniques are Leontief is not a substantial restriction.2 More-
over, it provides a clear intuition of a supply chain: firms work under protocols in which
predetermined inputs are required to obtain a desired output. In this way, a technique is
represented by a vector τ ∈ RM, where τi > 0 (≤ 0) denotes that τ produces (requires) |τi|
units of good i as an output (input) for each unit of labour used. The fact that each technique
produces only one good implies that there is a unique i such that τi > 0. Finally, to identify
each production technique, two auxiliary functions G and C are defined. If τ is the technique
used by country c to produce m, then C(τ) = c and G(τ) = m. When specificity is needed,
τ(m,c) denotes the technique that c uses to manufacture m.
Given the previous notation, let Ξ be the set of all techniques available in the economy,
and γ ⊆ Ξ. A(γ) ∈R|γ|×M is defined as a matrix whose rows represent each of the techniques
of γ . For this framework, matrix notation is useful to measure production quantities.3 For
example, let xi be the number of workers that the countries employ for each Ai. ∈ γ . Then,
A(γ)T x is a vector in which the i-th component is equivalent to the net production of good i.
Similarly, I(γ) ∈ R|γ|×C is defined such that I(γ)i. = e(C(A(γ)i.))T , where e(i) is the
canonical vector that has a 1 at entry i and 0 in the rest of the entries. Hence, I(γ) represents
2Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2014) showed that the Leontief model is equivalent to a first order Taylor
approximation of a homothetic production function.
3This paper bases its notations and proofs on linear algebra. Appendix 1.A introduces the main notation
used throughout the paper.
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a matrix in which all the components are 0 except for the one associated with the country
that produces each technique. In this case, I(γ)T x is a vector in which the i-th component is
the total labour that country i employs across all the different techniques that it produces.
Assumption A2:
The core characteristic of a supply chain is that goods are used to produce goods. However,
because the final good is a consumption goods, it is not used as an intermediate input of any
other good. This assumption can incorporate economies with multiple final goods. As Trefler
and Zhu (2010) proved, in a scenario in which all consumers have homothetic and identical
taste and there is a given a set of prices, each person will invest fixed proportions of each
of the final goods. Under this result, assumption (A2) is equivalent to claiming that there is
a final good that requires fixed proportions of the consumption goods as inputs, where the
labour required to produce it represents the utility for leisure.
Assumption A3:
Underlying perfect competition in trade is the idea that countries can be self-sufficient, but
they can achieve better results with trade. For that reason, in autarky, each country can
produce the final good. This implies that if a country has spare workers, it can produce
positive quantities of each good without having a net loss of any good. Formally, this
means that for each country c, there exists γ ⊆ Ξ where |γ|= M such that C(γ) = {c} and
∃x ≥OC×1, for which A(γ)T x ≫OM×1, where O denotes a 0-vector.4
Assumption A4:
Consistent with Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001), countries acquire the same knowledge about
the inputs needed for a given production. However, they differ in how much output they
can produce. In other words, given the same inputs, countries obtain more or less output
depending on how productive they are in that sector. Formally, for all goods m, and countries
c,c′, it holds that τ(m,c)−m − τ(m,c′)−m =O(M−1)×1.
Input-output matrices that define the production structures can be represented as a network.
In this case, there is a link from good n to good m (denoted as n → m) if there is a technique τ
such that τm > 0 > τn. Moreover, the network is weighted via the amount of inputs required
for one unit of labour. Assumption (A4) implies that these weights do not depend on the
4This condition is the primary building block for Arrow (1951) seminal paper on general equilibrium in
input-output structures.
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country that produces the technique. Furthermore, in the network representation, assumption
(A2) implies that for all i ∈ {2, . . . ,M}, there is a path between i and 1. Finally, it also implies
that the node representing good 1 (i.e. the final good) has outdegree 0.
Example 1.1 clarifies the abovementioned notation and illustrates how they represent
supply chains.
Example 1.1 (Production structures)
Consider an economy of four goods (1, 2, 3, and 4) and two countries (c and c′). Both
countries are endowed with one unit of labour. The four production techniques available to
country c form the set γ and are represented by the following matrices:
A(γ) =

1 −2 0 −2
0 1 −2 0
0 0 1 0









In this example, c requires one unit of labour and two units of goods 2 and 4 to produce
one unit of good 1, as represented in the first row of A(γ). I(γ) has two columns; the first
corresponds to c, and the second corresponds to c′. Given that all techniques in γ belong
to country c, I(γ) only has 1’s in the first column. Finally, each of the four techniques is
Leontief and produces a single good, which is consistent with assumptions (A1) and (A2).
Country c can allocate its unit of labour to produce the final good. For example, it can
schedule its workers in the following way: first, produce 4/9 of good 3 and use it to produce
2/9 of good 2; then produce 2/9 of good 4 and use it, with the 2/9 of good 2, to produce 1/9
of good 1. In the end, all intermediate goods have net production 0, and the final good has




1 −2 0 −2
0 1 −2 0
0 0 1 0
































Now, contrast the production techniques of country c against the techniques of country c′
described by the set γ ′:
A(γ ′) =

1.5 −2 0 −2
0 1.2 −2 0
0 0 0.8 0
0 0 0 0.4

This new matrix also fulfils assumptions (A1), (A2), and (A3). Moreover, any two
techniques that produce the same good in countries c and c′ only differ by the amount of
output, as required by assumption (A4). In this case, c is more productive than c′ in the
production of {1,2}, and c′ is more productive than c in the production of {3,4}.
Finally, Figure 1.3.1 represents the corresponding production network that is derived
from the input-output matrix. It is important to highlight that, due to assumption (A4), its
representation is independent of the country.
Fig. 1.3.1 Production network, Example 1.1
■
1.3.2 General Equilibrium
This subsection explores the price mechanism that emerges from competitive markets under
general equilibrium. Let p,w denote the vector of prices and wages in the economy, where
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pm represents the price of good m, and wc represents the wage of c.5 Hence, the profit vector
of all the techniques is calculated via A(Ξ)p− I(Ξ)w. Using this notation, Definition 1.1
states the general equilibrium conditions of the economic problem:
Definition 1.1 (Equilibrium) Under general equilibrium, there is a vector x ∈ R|Ξ| (where
xi is the number of workers assigned to A(Ξ)i.), a vector of prices p ∈ RM and a vector of
wages w ∈ RC such that:
Non-positive profits for any firm A(Ξ)p− I(Ξ)w ≤O|Ξ|×1 (1.1)
Zero profit for active firms xi > 0 ⇒ A(Ξ)i.p−A(Ξ)iw = 0 (1.2)
Market clears for each intermediate good A(Ξ)T.−1x =O(M−1)×1 (1.3)
Market clears for final good xT A(Ξ)p = qT w (1.4)
Labour market clears I(Ξ)T x = q (1.5)
The previous five conditions define the general equilibrium as a situation where markets
clear, the firms that produce goods have no profits, and those that are not producing goods
have non-positive profits if they decide to produce. Definition 1.1 displays the general
equilibrium as a system of linear equations that Theorem 1.1 uses to translate the economic
problem to a linear optimisation program.6















The optimisation problem is feasible, and x is a solution of the linear program with p (shadow





, and w define the workers allocation, prices, and wages of the general
equilibrium.7
Theorem 1.1 provides a bijection between supply chains under perfect competition and
linear programming. Given that the optimisation is feasible, this theorem implies that the
5This paper uses the words income and wage interchangeably.
6All the proofs for this chapter are presented in Appendix 1.B
7The "only if" requires prices to be normalized by p1 = 1.
12 On Global Supply Chains and Inequality
equilibrium exists. In addition to making explicit that the outcome of the economy is efficient,
this theorem provides new analytic elements to study supply chains.
Central to this bijection is the fact that the solution to the linear program determines
the set of basic constraints of the problem. These are the constraints that are binding in the
optimum. On the other hand, restrictions are associated with the profit of a firm. Hence,
the bijection implies that there is a set of techniques (hereafter known as basic techniques)
that contains only those firms that are active in equilibrium (i.e. those that are represented
by restrictions that bind). Furthermore, Proposition 1.1 shows how income emerges and is
defined by these basic techniques.
Proposition 1.1 In equilibrium,
(a) The wage of a country is equivalent to the marginal product of its workers in the final
good.
(b) Conditional on the set of basic techniques, wage is independent of the population size.
Theorem 1.1 and Proposition 1.1 present three characteristics of the economy. First, the
equilibrium allocates workers in such a way that maximises the world’s production of the
final good given the labour constraints. Second, the income of the workers of a country equals
its marginal productivity in the final good. This result extends the neoclassical idea that the
price of a factor is equal to its marginal product to supply chains, where it is relevant to
analyse the marginal product with respect to the final good rather than the marginal product of
an intermediate input. Finally, Proposition 1.1 explicitly shows how the production structure,
via the basic techniques, determines wages.
Theorem 1.2 provides a deeper understanding of the characteristics of the basic techniques
and their relationship with income ordering.
Theorem 1.2 (Income ranking and interdependency) Consider an equilibrium where γ
is a set of basic techniques and {τ(m,c),τ(m′,c′)} ⊆ γ . Then,
(a) τ(m,c′)m > τ(m,c)m ⇒ wc′ > wc.




(c) τ(m,c′) ∈ γ ⇒ wc′ = wc + pm(τ(m,c′)m − τ(m,c)m).
The first part of Theorem 1.2 implies that, at equilibrium, the country with the i-th highest
income is at least the i-th most productive country for each of the goods that it produces.
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Hence, underlying the allocation of production is a mechanism of comparative advantage
in which countries specialise in a given set of products. Along these lines, the second part
of the theorem redefines comparative advantage for the context of supply chains. It states
that countries allocate their workers to those sectors that have the highest revenue differences
with respect to the other countries.8
The last part of the theorem describes the interdependency of workers’ incomes across
the production structure. The wage differences among countries that manufacture the same
goods depend on the prices of these common products. For example, consider an equilibrium
where γ is a set of basic techniques and {τ(m,c),τ(m,c′)} ⊆ γ . If there is a shock in the
economy where τ(m,c), τ(m,c′) are still basic techniques, but pm increased, Theorem 1.2
implies that the wage gap between c and c′ countries widens.
In summary, this model formalises four key characteristics of supply chains. First,
under perfect competition, supply chains generate equilibrium solutions that maximise the
world’s production of the final good. Second, the wage of a country is equivalent to the
marginal contribution of its workers to the final good. Additionally, prices are independent
of small demographic changes. Third, the ranking of productivity of the goods that a
country manufactures is strongly related to its income level. Furthermore, a comparative
advantage mechanism explains why countries do not produce the goods at which they are the
most productive but prefer those with the highest revenue difference. Finally, goods whose
production is shared by multiple countries directly determine the wage differences among
them.
1.3.3 Acyclical Structures and Constant Productivities
The previous subsection discussed the most general characteristics of supply chains. This sub-
section incoporates two additional constraints that accentuate the price formation mechanism
that takes place along supply chains. These assumptions are as follows:
Assumption A5 The production network is a directed acyclical graph.
Assumption A6 The productivity of a country is constant between sectors.
Assumption (A5) excludes production networks that contain cycles. Due to the framework
presented in subsection 1.3.1, this paper considers that cycles can be omitted. There are two
8The determination of a generalized comparative advantage measure for production structures has been a
challenge due to the multidimensionality of the comparison across countries and goods (Deardorff, 2005), still
Theorem 1.2 defines it in such a way that is suitable for supply chains.
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reasons for this. First, the goods described in this model are those in which the inputs are
incorporated into the output. For example, buttons, yarn, and cloth are required to produce
a jacket. All three inputs are embedded in the output. A sewing machine can certainly be
used, but it is not in the same category as the previous inputs: while a button used in a jacket
is already part of it and cannot be used again without destroying the final good, a sewing
machine can be used to produce several jackets. More than being an input, the machine
reflects a productivity improvement. On the one hand, the inputs required for a jacket are
the same independent of whether it is sewed by hand or with a machine. On the other hand,
having machines allows for more jackets to be produced within an hour of work and wastes
less input. For these reasons, the machine is not an input, but it is part of the productivity of
the technique. Based on this reasoning, when the concept of input focuses on incorporated
goods, acyclic processes are a good representation of the reality of production. The other
reason to validate assumption (A5) is that it allows upstream and downstream goods to be
distinguished from each other in relation to the production structure. This view focuses the
model in the relationship between the early and late production stages, and has been used by
authors such as Baldwin and Venables (2013) and Ostrovsky (2008) to explain the underlying
mechanisms of shocks that spread across the providers and consumers of an intermediate
good.
Under assumption (A5), the network characteristics of the production structure become
more relevant to the supply chain framework. In particular, three new concepts emerge.
First, good m is a raw material if it does not require any input other than labour, i.e. it has
0 in-degree. Second, the production structure of m, denoted by Prod(m), is defined by the
subgraph formed by all the goods with a path leading to m, including m itself. Consistently,
the set of nodes of Prod(m) are denoted as Nodes(Prod(m)). From the previous definition,
two production structures are equal if their subgraphs are isomorphic. Third, the raw distance
of a good is defined as rd(m) := max{d(m,n) : n ∈ Nodes(Prod(m))} where d(m,n) is the
unweighted directed length of the path between m and n.9
Figure 1.3.2 illustrates the definitions above with an example.
While assumption (A5) focuses on the network structure, assumption (A6) focuses on
the differences between countries. It simplifies the productivity of a country by assuming
homogeneity between sectors. Recall that the indicator of productivity in good m is τ(m,c)m
because it represents, with one unit of labour and a given quantity of inputs, how much
output the country can produce. In the seminal O-ring model (Kremer, 1993), this parameter
represented the amount of good quality output. Later, Costinot et al. (2012) associated
9All the relevant paths are well defined as only members of Prod(m) are considered.
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Fig. 1.3.2 Production network: definitions
an equivalent measure with the total factor productivity. These authors assumed that each
country has only one productivity parameter to identify the effect of the supply chain without
confounding its effect with the heterogeneity of productivity within the sectors of a country.
This section follows this idea, which formally implies that for all c,m,m′, it holds that
τ(m,c)m = τ(m′,c)m′ = kc.
Without loss of generality, under assumption (A6), countries’ indices are sorted so that
productivity is decreasing in a country’s index (i.e. country 1 is the most productive, while
country C is the least productive). Theorem 1.2 implies that if kc < kc′ , then wc > wc′ . Thus,
this assumption implicitly predetermines the wage to be sorted along with the productivity of
countries. For this reason, in the remaining results, the research focus shifts from the wage
formation and wage ranking of countries to the mechanisms that determine the production
allocation and to how changes in productivity affect the income gaps between workers of
different countries.
Assumption (A6) also allows normalization of the production techniques. Assume that
under ideal production conditions (following Kremer’s interpretation), one unit of labour
produces one unit of output (i.e. a unit of merchandise is defined in terms of the amount
obtained by one unit of labour under ideal technologies). Thus, for every country c, 1 ≥ kc,
where kc can be interpreted as the percentage of output that the country achieves relative to the
ideal situation. To better illustrate this normalization, Example 1.3 displays the implications
of the previous assumptions and provides the key insights of the next set of results.
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Example 1.2 (Jacket production; part 1)
Consider a supply chain for the manufacture of jackets: wool is needed to produce cloth,
and cloth is required to create jackets. Under the best available technologies, one hour of
labour shearing sheep can produce xkg of wool. Hence, a unit of wool weighs xkg. Country
c’s production protocols and know-how are such that its wool production technique can only
obtain 0.95× xkg of wool from a unit of labour. Thus, kc = 0.95.
The second stage uses spinning machines to transform wool into cloth. Under ideal
conditions, one hour of labour transforms 10xkg of wool into ym2 of cloth. Hence, the ideal
production technique requires ten units of wool and one unit of labour to produce one unit
(ym2) of cloth. Assumption (A6) implies that on average, c obtains 0.95ym2. Finally, the
technology of weaving is very labour intensive, and in one hour, a worker can only weave
y
10m
2. In this case, the ideal production technique for one hour of labour produces 1 unit of
jackets from 0.1 units of cloth.
If country c is in autarky and its income is normalized to 1, the price of a unit of wool is
1




0.95 +1)≈ 12.13, and the price of a unit




0.95 +1)+1)≈ 2.33. The price of a jacket is less than the
price of cloth due to normalization: The amount of cloth needed to produce a jacket costs
less than the jacket (otherwise, the technique would not be profitable), yet the amount of
cloth produced by one unit of labour has a higher value than the amount of jackets produced
with one unit of labour. Finally, if the world’s technology improves (e.g. a very good sewing
machine is invented) and now 2ym2 of cloth can be processed with one unit, the price of a






Given assumptions (A1) to (A6), the model describes two fundamental trade mechanisms:
specialisation patterns and structure-price equalisation.
Theorem 1.3 (Prices and structures) Let p, w be the price and income vectors of an equi-
librium. Let γ be a set of basic techniques and {τ(m,c),τ(m′,c′)} ⊆ γ . Then,
(a) Structure-Price equalisation: If Prod(m) = Prod(m′), then pm = pm′ .
(b) Price specialisation: If c′ < c, then pm′ ≥ pm.
Theorem 1.3 reveals the main economic mechanisms that determine prices and speciali-
sation in a supply chain. The first result is analogous to the factor price equalisation theorem
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(Samuelson, 1948). Theorem 1.3 part (a) proves that isomorphic structures have the same
prices, independent of the production country. The underlying mechanism comes from the
same notion in Samuelson’s theorem. The value of a good depends on its inputs and factors.
Then, if two equivalent production structures incorporate the same amount of labour, the
price must reflect this fact.
Theorem 1.3 part (b) explains that countries allocate themselves along price ranges.
However, specialisation in price ranges is not equivalent to specialisation along the supply
chain. For Costinot et al. (2012), countries sort themselves by their productivity along the
supply chain. Thus, low-income countries always produce raw materials, and developed
countries produce the final good. Nevertheless, there are many examples, such as the
maquiladora industry in Mexico, where highly technological countries produce intermediate
goods, and the final goods are assembled in countries with lower productivity levels (Bergin
et al., 2009).
This model overcomes the previous inconsistency between theory and evidence by
explaining that countries organise themselves along price ranges; independent if the goods
are downstream or upstream. Hence, if the most productive countries realise that the volume
of an intermediate good that they can generate per unit of work generates more revenue than
the volume of the final good that can be produced per unit of work, then these countries will
produce the former good.
Example 1.3 (Jacket production; part 2)
Consider the jacket production scenario in the previous example, but in this case, there are
three countries, each with 100 workers and with respective productivity levels of 95%, 90%,
and 85%. In the first scenario, the ideal technology can process ten units of wool for a unit of
cloth and 1/10-th of a unit of cloth for a unit of jackets.
In this case, the equilibrium is given by Table 1.3.1.
Table 1.3.1 Basic equilibrium, Example 1.3








Jacket 2.70 86 43 0
Cloth 13.64 14 0 0
Wool 1.18 0 57 100
Workers 100 100 100
Income 1.19 1.06 1.00
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Consistent with Theorem 1.3, country 1 works on the products with the highest prices
(cloth and jackets); country 2 works on the two products with the lowest prices (jackets and
wool); and country 3 produces only the raw material, which has the lowest price.
In this case, the most productive country is not only producing the final good but also
producing cloth. In contrast, country 2 produces both the final and the raw material but has
no production in the intermediate stage. This ordering illustrates how, in a basic example,
countries are not sorting themselves along the chain, as Costinot et al. (2012) would suggest.
In contrast, and aligned with empirical observations, price specialisation exhibits patterns
that can easily represent processes such as maquiladoras.
Consider a change in the world’s technology that improves sewing machines, and now,
two units of cloth can be processed within one hour of labour into a unit of jackets. In this
case, the new equilibrium is represented in Table 1.3.2.
Table 1.3.2 Technological equilibrium, Example 1.3








Jacket 29.72 11 0 0
Cloth 13.56 24 0 0
Wool 1.18 65 100 100
Workers 100 100 100
Income 1.12 1.06 1.00
The new technology changes the specialisation schedule as well as the prices. In particular,
consistent with Theorem 1.3, country 1 now produces all the goods, while countries 2 and
3 move towards the production of the raw material. Hence, changes in offshoring and
outsourcing decisions across a supply chain are also affected by new technologies.
■
As noted in Example 1.3, Theorem 1.3 part (b) provides new insights into two trends
in global supply chains. First, it explains the mechanism by which developed countries
(the most productive ones) focus on high added-value products (Timmer et al., 2014). As
mentioned previously, comparative advantage incentivises countries to produce those goods
in which they have the highest revenue differences. Due to assumption (A6), this is equivalent
to claiming that highly productive countries focus their workforce on those products whose
price is the highest per working unit. Second, the specialisation idea also helps to understand
offshoring phenomena. Baldwin and Venables (2013) documented that countries decide to
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offshore or locally produce goods depending on the costs and market failures. As detailed in
Example 1.3, Theorem 1.3 part (b) complements the previous explanation by describing how
a technological shock that changes the comparative advantage of the countries can reallocate
production between countries.
The following corollaries typify the division of labour between countries and provide the
first comparative static results when the productivity of one country changes.
Corollary 1.1 Let p, w be the price and income vectors of an equilibrium characterised by
the set of basic techniques γ .
(a) Let c > c′′ > c′ such that pT τ(m,c)−wc = pT τ(m,c′)−wc′ = 0. If there exists a good
n such that τ(n,c′′) ∈ γ , then pn = pm.
(b) Let pT τ(m′,c)−wc = pT τ(m,c)−wc = 0, where pm ≤ pm′ . If there exists a good n
such that pm ≤ pn ≤ pm′ , then pT τ(n,c)−wc = 0.
(c) Assume that c exists such that, for all τ(m,c) ∈ γ , it holds that pm = α > 0. If an
increase in kc does not change the basic techniques in the equilibrium, then the shock
only affects wc.
Corollary 1.2 Let p, w be the price and income vectors of an equilibrium characterised by
the set of basic techniques γ . Then, there exists C+1 prices, PC,≤ PC−1 ≤, . . . ,≤ P0 where
P0 = 1, and PC = 0, such that pT τ(m,c)−wc = 0 ⇔ pm ∈ [Pc,Pc−1].
Corollary 1.1 and Corollary 1.2 develop a deeper understanding of Theorem 1.3 part (b)
and describe how countries specialise in price ranges that overlap in at most one value. A
direct implication is that the poorest country (C) always has to produce raw materials, as
they always have the lowest prices in the chain. This result explains the empirical regularity
described by authors such as Felipe et al. (2012), where low-income countries strongly focus
on the production of raw materials and commodities.
In contrast to Costinot et al. (2012), Corollary 1.1 shows that cases exist where pro-
ductivity shocks in particular countries do not induce a ripple effect. For this situation to
occur, the countries must sell all their goods at the same price. Whereas this situation seems
very unlikely, it can represent the situation for many countries that have specialised their
economies in a unique sector.
Complementing the previous results, Proposition 1.2 describes changes in wages and
prices where multiple equilibria exist.
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Proposition 1.2 Consider an equilibrium with a unique distribution of labour x but multiple
sets of basic techniques. Let γ , γ ′ be two sets of basic techniques, and p, w and p′, w′ its
respective price and income vectors. Then:
(a) If for all c it holds that {pm : τ ′(m,c) ∈ γ ′} ⊆ {pn : τ(n,c) ∈ γ}, then p = p′ and
w = w′.
(b) If there is a country c such that {pm : τ ′(m,c) ∈ γ ′} ≠ {pn : τ(n,c) ∈ γ}, γ\γ ′ =
{τ(m,c)}, and γ ′\γ = {τ ′(m′,c′)}, then there exists β ∈ RC, such that for every
country, c, w′c = wc +βc and β
T q = 0.
Whereas Proposition 1.2 is a technical result from the simplex algorithm, it provides one
of the core results of comparative statics in supply chains. It proves that if the portfolio of
a country changes (reflected by a change in basic techniques), then it is possible that the
wage vector does not change. This occurs when the price specialisation in both equilibria
has the same range, as defined in Corollary 1.2. However, if this is not the case, the income
distribution of all countries in the economy will change so that the average wage remains
constant (mean-preserving spread). Example 1.4 shows that Proposition 1.2 together with
Corollary 1.1 describe how shocks in production networks have non-linear effects on the
income relations between countries. For some countries, there are complementarities, and
for others, the increase in productivity affects the others as if they were substitutes.
Example 1.4 (General linear production)
Consider an economy where C = 8 and M = 12. The production network and the productivity
parameters are described in Figure 1.3.3.
Fig. 1.3.3 Economic structure, Example 1.4
This economy consists of a linear production network. The productivity of countries is
assigned values between 30% and 95%. Each country has 100 workers. The numbers in the
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production network are based on ideal techniques. For example, to build one unit of good 1,
under ideal conditions, 0.6 units of good 2 and one unit of labour are needed. Tables 1.3.3
and 1.3.4 present the equilibrium characteristics.
Table 1.3.3 Equilibrium variables, Example 1.4
Workers assigned to each technique
M P
Countries
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 74.39 52 70 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 70.11 0 10 78 10 0 0 0 0
3 83.10 48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 70.11 0 20 22 0 0 0 0 0
5 51.31 0 0 0 48 0 0 0 0
6 44.58 0 0 0 42 0 0 0 0
7 22.50 0 0 0 0 68 1 0 0
8 31.98 0 0 0 0 32 0 0 0
9 17.22 0 0 0 0 0 55 0 0
10 10.69 0 0 0 0 0 3 76 0
11 11.37 0 0 0 0 0 41 0 0
12 3.33 0 0 0 0 0 0 24 100
Workers 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Income 28.29 21.38 14.87 8.36 4.39 2.30 1.31 1.00
Table 1.3.4 Profit per technique, Example 1.4
M
Countries
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 0.00 0.00 -0.40 -0.79 -3.73 -8.55 -14.47 -21.06
2 -0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 -2.54 -6.96 -12.48 -18.68
3 0.00 -0.81 -2.02 -3.22 -6.95 -12.60 -19.32 -26.73
4 -0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 -2.54 -6.96 -12.48 -18.68
5 -5.64 -3.49 -1.75 0.00 -0.80 -3.47 -7.24 -11.70
6 -7.51 -4.74 -2.37 0.00 -0.17 -2.22 -5.37 -9.20
7 -15.54 -10.72 -6.30 -1.88 0.00 0.00 -1.10 -2.88
8 -12.02 -8.08 -4.54 -1.00 0.00 -0.88 -2.86 -5.52
9 -17.99 -12.68 -7.77 -2.86 -0.49 0.00 -0.61 -1.90
10 -21.02 -15.11 -9.59 -4.07 -1.10 0.00 0.00 -0.68
11 -20.71 -14.86 -9.40 -3.95 -1.03 0.00 -0.06 -0.81
12 -25.12 -18.52 -12.32 -6.12 -2.46 -0.68 0.00 0.00
Following Theorem 1.3 part (b), countries organise their production by price and not by
their sequence in the network. In particular, country 1 produces goods 1 and 3, but it does
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not manufacture good 2. Furthermore, and consistent with Corollary 1.1, countries 2, 3, and
4 produce the same good, and the price range of country 3 is a single element. Additionally,
as Corollary 1.2 implies, country 8 manufactures the raw material in equilibrium.
Now consider two scenarios. In scenario 1, the productivity of country 3 changes from
68% to 85%. In scenario 2, the productivity of country 4 changes from 58% to 76%. Figure
1.3.4 presents the corresponding results.
Fig. 1.3.4 Changes in productivity, Example 1.4
Scenario 1 illustrates Corollary 1.1. Given that country 3 produces only two goods at
the same price, small changes in its productivity do not affect the income of other countries.
As the shock increases, there is a discrete change in basic techniques, as Proposition 1.2
predicts.10 Scenario 2 illustrates that even in a simple scenario, a change in productivity can
produce either a decrease in the spread of wages associated with lower inequality (around
kc = 0.62), an increase in the spread of wages associated with greater inequality (around
kc = 0.74), or some intermediate effect (around kc = 0.65). Hence, the production structures
induce non-linear effects between countries, as previously discussed. The last observation
from this example highlights a particular characteristic of country 4. It is the only country
with no product priced at P4 as constructed in Corollary 1.2. Therefore, the countries can
10For comparison purposes, Figures 1.3.4, 1.3.6, and 1.3.8 standardize wC = 1. However, the mean spread
in Proposition 1.2 applies when the standardization is done with p1 = 1. This is the reason why it cannot be
visualized from the graph.
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be partitioned into two groups: A = {1,2,3,4}, B = {5,6,7,8} such that there is no good
produced by the countries of both groups at the same time. As the next subsection describes,
this characteristic determines whether it is possible to describe how shocks spread along the
production network.
■
By adding assumptions (A5) and (A6), the current model clarifies the price formation
and specialisation mechanisms. In particular, it highlights four of their characteristics. First,
the price of a product depends solely on its production structure and is independent of the
producer. Second, countries organise themselves to produce within ranges of output prices.
Third, the least productive country always manufactures raw materials. However, the order of
production along the supply chain depends on the available techniques. Fourth, productivity
shocks in a country do not necessarily induce changes in the income of other countries.
Nevertheless, infinitesimal shocks can produce discrete jumps in the income distribution
when they induce a change in the basic techniques.
1.3.4 Linked Economies and Cascade Effects
This last subsection defines a special case of the model that makes it comparable with the
current research that models trade in linear supply chains. This is a two-step comparison.
First, it adds an assumption that is common to most of the theoretical models of trade and
supply chains and explores its implications for price formation and inequality mechanisms.
Second, it describes what additional constraints are used in the models that define supply
chains as linear input-output structures and explains the implications of these restrictions.
A very common assumption in the literature that bridges trade and production networks
is that labour intensity decreases from upstream to downstream. Assumption (A7) formalises
this concept.
Assumption A7 Increasing standardisation of processes: ∀i : τi < 0 ⇒ |τi| ≥ 1.
Whereas the assumption is restrictive, it has been used in seminal papers on trade, such as
Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), to focus their results on production structures when
complexity increases along the supply chain. The following results use assumptions (A1) to
(A7) to characterise the market.
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Theorem 1.4 (Price ordering) Let p, w be the price and income vectors of an equilibrium
characterised by the set of basic techniques γ .
(a) m → m′ ⇒ pm′ > pm.
(b) If {τ(m,c),τ(m′,c′)} ⊆ γ and there is a path from m to m′, then c ≥ c′.
Theorem 1.4 shows that under assumption (A7), countries organise themselves along the
supply chain in what Costinot et al. (2012) referred to as vertical specialisation. Moreover,
Theorem 1.4 proves that this result is not constrained to linear supply chains and holds in any
acyclical production network where assumption (A7) holds. The next example illustrates the
way in which countries allocate their production under this assumption.
Example 1.5 (Non-linear production)
Consider an economy where C = 11 and M = 16. The production network and the productiv-
ity parameter are described in Figure 1.3.5.
Fig. 1.3.5 Economic structure, Example 1.5
This economy has a rich production structure, including both sequential and parallel tasks.
The productivity of the countries is evenly assigned between 60% and 95%. Additionally,
each country has 100 workers. Here, every technique requires one unit of each input and one
unit of labour. For example, to produce one unit of good 1 under ideal conditions, one unit of
goods 2, 3, and 8 are needed along with one unit of labour. Tables 1.3.5 and 1.3.6 present the
equilibrium characteristics.
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Table 1.3.5 Equilibrium variables, Example 1.5
Workers assigned to each technique
M P
Countries
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1 41.48 42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 1.66 0 0 0 0 0 14 0 4 0 45 0
3 33.27 45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 12.57 0 39 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 3.80 0 0 0 0 61 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 16.21 13 36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 12.57 0 25 28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 1.66 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 63 0 0
9 1.66 0 0 0 0 0 0 34 0 0 0 59
10 9.25 0 0 61 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
11 6.32 0 0 0 72 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
12 3.80 0 0 0 28 32 0 0 0 0 0 0
13 1.66 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 55 41
14 1.66 0 0 0 0 0 0 66 0 0 0 0
15 3.80 0 0 0 0 7 86 0 0 0 0 0
16 1.66 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 96 37 0 0
Workers 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Income 2.82 2.26 1.82 1.55 1.42 1.29 1.23 1.17 1.12 1.06 1.00
Table 1.3.6 Profit per technique, Example 1.5
M
Countries
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1 0.00 -0.88 -1.88 -3.05 -4.36 -5.66 -7.05 -8.43 -9.81 -11.19 -12.57
2 -1.25 -0.74 -0.36 -0.15 -0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3 0.00 -0.59 -1.31 -2.19 -3.22 -4.24 -5.34 -5.34 -7.53 -8.63 -9.72
4 -0.13 0.00 0.00 -0.16 -0.47 -0.77 -1.15 -1.15 -1.91 -2.29 -2.67
5 -0.88 -0.45 -0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.07 -0.07 -0.22 -0.30 -0.37
6 0.00 0.00 -0.13 -0.42 -0.85 -1.28 -1.78 -1.78 -2.79 -3.30 -3.80
7 -0.13 0.00 0.00 -0.16 -0.47 -0.77 -1.15 -1.15 -1.91 -2.29 -2.67
8 -1.25 -0.74 -0.36 -0.15 -0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
9 -1.25 -0.74 -0.36 -0.15 -0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
10 -0.36 -0.12 0.00 -0.05 -0.24 -0.43 -0.69 -0.69 -1.22 -1.48 -1.74
11 -0.61 -0.27 -0.05 0.00 -0.09 -0.18 -0.34 -0.34 -0.66 -0.82 -0.98
12 -0.88 -0.45 -0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.07 -0.07 -0.22 -0.30 -0.37
13 -1.25 -0.74 -0.36 -0.15 -0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
14 -1.25 -0.74 -0.36 -0.15 -0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
15 -0.88 -0.45 -0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.07 -0.15 -0.22 -0.30 -0.37
16 -1.25 -0.74 -0.36 -0.15 -0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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According to Theorem 1.3, goods 5, 12, and 15 have the same production structure,
ergo, the same price at equilibrium. Additionally, according to Theorem 1.4, in each path
from a raw material to the final good, all the participating countries are organised by their
productivity, e.g. τ(9,11),τ(5,5),τ(4,2),τ(9,1), and τ(1,1).
Fig. 1.3.6 Changes in productivity, Example 1.5
Consider two scenarios. In scenario 1, the productivity of country 4 changes from 81%
to 88%. Meanwhile, in scenario 2, the productivity of country 5 changes from 78% to 85%.
Figure 1.3.6 presents the results.
Scenario 2 reflects Corollary 1.1. Given that country 5 only produces goods 5 and 12,
which have the same price, small shocks in its productivity do not affect the income of
other countries. Then, as the productivity change increases, a change in the basic set of
techniques arises, represented as discrete jumps. In contrast, scenario 1 shows that even
under assumption (A7), a change in productivity can decrease (around kc = 0.8.3) or increase
(around kc = 0.85) the spread of income. This highlights the emergence of income inequality
in response to changes in productivity are structure-dependent. Furthermore, as in the
previous example, no product is priced at P4. This means that the countries in this economy
can be partitioned into two groups, A = {1,2,3,4}, B = {5,6,7,8,9,10}, where there is no
common production between the groups.
■
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Examples 1.4 and 1.5 suggest that non-linear spillovers are related to the fact that
countries can be partitioned into two groups. To better understand this role, Definition 1.2
formalises this concept, and the rest of this section explains how this condition determines
that positive productivity shocks generate only downstream spillovers and reduce the income
spread between countries.
Definition 1.2 (Linked economy) Given a set of basic techniques, an equilibrium generates
a linked economy if p, w satisfy that for each country c, a good m exists, and a country c′ ̸= c
such that pT τ(m,c′)−wc′ = pT τ(m,c)−wc = 0.
As the previous examples showed, linked economies are not the general case. However,
under assumption (A7), there is an empirical motivation. Given that the countries are verti-
cally organised along any path of the supply chain, when a country improves its productivity,
it stops producing some inputs and focuses more on goods with higher value. However, the
country is still capable of producing the discontinued inputs competitively, and sometimes
residual production continues. Hence, for that good, both the new and the former producers
will have 0 profit, which by construction is a linked economy. This characteristic coin-
cides with the empirical observations of Timmer et al. (2014) about production reallocation
between countries, and therefore, it is relevant to study them as a special case.
Corollary 1.3 Consider an economy that satisfies assumptions (A1) to (A7) in which ∀m<M,
m+1 and labour are the only inputs for the production of m. Then, in equilibrium, any basic
set of techniques describes a linked economy.
Corollary 1.3 shows that the discrete version of the model presented by Costinot et al.
(2012) is a linked economy. Hence, the next theorem shows how the price formation
mechanisms described by these authors can be extended to any other linked economies.
Definition 1.3 (Price-adjusting algorithm) Let γ be a basic set of techniques, wC = α > 0,
and s =C.







Note: If m is a raw material, pm = 1ks ws.
2. Iterate step 1 until ∀m such that τ(m,s) ∈ γ , pm has been defined.
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3. Let Ps = max{pm : τ(m,s) ∈ γ}, ws−1 = ws +Ps(ks−1 − ks).
4. Iterate from step 1 replacing s for s−1.
5. Iterate step 4 until s = 1.
Theorem 1.5 Consider an economy that satisfies assumptions (A1) to (A7).
(a) The price-adjusting algorithm is well defined.
(b) If, in equilibrium, the set of basic techniques γ defines a linked economy, then the price-
adjusting algorithm determines the prices and wages of the economy. In particular, Pc
corresponds with the notation of Corollary 1.2.
The price-adjusting algorithm is a cornerstone in linked economies. Theorem 1.5 presents
it as a constructive algorithm to find the prices and income vectors of an economy. It
implicitly proves that productivity shocks in a country will only affect downstream countries
and products.11 Therefore, similar to the results of Acemoglu et al. (2012) and Costinot et al.
(2012), in linked economies, productivity shocks flow downstream.
Proposition 1.3 Consider a linked economy defined by the basic set of techniques γ . Con-
sider an increase in the productivity of country c ̸=C such that k′c = βkc in which the basic
techniques are the same in both equilibria. Let, p, w and p′, w′ be the variables associated
with the equilibrium before and after the change, where both are normalized to wC = 1.
Then:
(a) If there are m, n such that {τ(m,c),τ(n,c)} ⊆ γ and pm ̸= pn, then
i w′c′ = wc′ if c
′ > c.
ii w′c = wc +(1−β )kc.




c′′ < wc′′ |.
(b) If the productivity shock occurs in country C, c′ < c′′ <C, then w′c′ < wc′ and |w
′
c′ <
wc′|> |w′c′′ < wc′′ .
Complementing Theorem 1.5, Proposition 1.3 details how productivity shocks spill over
the chain. A positive productivity shock in a country that produces goods with at least two
different prices (otherwise Corollary 1.1 applies) will reduce income inequality (measured
11For the algorithm, the equilibrium is standardized with wC = α instead of p1 = 1.
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by the range of the income distribution) as long as the basic techniques do not change.
However, if the techniques change, Corollary 1.1 and Theorem 1.5 describe how this induces
a mean-preserving spread in which the income of all the countries that are upstream of the
first basic technique to change moves in the same direction and proportion.
Example 1.6 (Simplified linear production)
Consider a linear production where for each unit of output, only one unit of input is needed.
This is shown in Figure 1.3.7.
Fig. 1.3.7 Economic structure, Example 1.6
From Corollary 1.3, this equilibrium is always described by a linked economy. Tables
1.3.7 and 1.3.8 specify the equilibrium of this economy.
Consider two scenarios. In scenario 1, the productivity of country 2 changes from 68%
to 85%. In scenario 2, the productivity of country 4 changes from 58% to 76%. Figure 1.3.8
presents the results.
Scenario 1 and scenario 2 are consistent with Proposition 1.3. Because the economy is
linked, productivity changes that do not change the set of basic techniques do not reduce the
range of income among countries. However, as Corollary 1.1 states, a shock that changes the
basic techniques, such as the one that occurs in scenario 1 (k2 around 0.8), can also increase
the range of income among countries. In particular, this last observation demonstrates that
considering a discrete framework provides cases in which the effects of a productivity change
in inequality are qualitatively the opposite of those obtained in a continuous framework.
■
To summarise this last subsection, when the model includes assumption (A7), it restricts
the price formation mechanism and determines two economic patterns. First, countries
organise themselves so that more productive countries produce downstream products. Second,
an increase in the productivity of any country other than country 1 reduces the range of wages
(i.e. reduces the inequality) among countries.
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Table 1.3.7 Equilibrium variables, Example 1.6
Workers assigned to each technique
M P
Countries
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 210.28 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 181.64 21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 154.44 22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 128.59 23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 104.04 14 11 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 80.72 0 30 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 60.73 0 35 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 43.59 0 24 18 0 0 0 0 0
9 28.90 0 0 55 0 0 0 0 0
10 17.67 0 0 27 52 0 0 0 0
11 9.09 0 0 0 48 81 0 0 0
12 3.33 0 0 0 0 19 100 100 100
Workers 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Income 18.12 8.46 4.41 2.77 1.93 1.62 1.31 1.00
Table 1.3.8 Profit per technique, Example 1.6
M
Countries
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 0.00 -9.86 -25.34 -43.23 -61.91 -81.12 -100.34 -119.55
2 0.00 -7.21 -20.02 -35.25 -51.27 -67.83 -84.39 -100.94
3 0.00 -4.68 -14.97 -27.67 -41.17 -55.20 -69.23 -83.26
4 0.00 -2.28 -10.17 -20.47 -31.57 -43.20 -54.83 -66.46
5 0.00 0.00 -5.61 -13.63 -22.45 -31.80 -41.15 -50.50
6 -2.17 0.00 -3.45 -9.30 -15.95 -23.14 -30.32 -37.51
7 -4.02 0.00 -1.59 -5.59 -10.38 -15.71 -21.04 -26.37
8 -5.61 0.00 0.00 -2.41 -5.61 -9.35 -13.09 -16.82
9 -8.34 -1.36 0.00 -1.04 -2.88 -5.26 -7.63 -10.00
10 -10.43 -2.41 0.00 0.00 -0.80 -2.13 -3.46 -4.79
11 -12.82 0.00 -0.80 0.00 0.00 -0.54 -1.07 -1.61
12 -14.96 -5.60 -1.87 -0.54 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Fig. 1.3.8 Changes in productivity, Example 1.6
1.4 Conclusions
Supply chains are a central element in today’s economy. However, theoretical research that
bridges production networks and trade has been very limited. This paper takes a step back
from the current modelling strategies, and by extending a Ricardian framework, it offers a
new way to understand the interactions between these two fields.
This model relies on six assumptions that recreate an environment that is consistent with
reality and that highlights the main price formation mechanism in a supply chain. Moreover,
this paper shows that the current modelling strategies in the literature can be viewed as
instantiations of this model.
Regarding the main outcomes of the model, it described the mechanisms that determine
the allocation of countries along supply chains and how the production structure translates
productivity differences into inequality at the income level of the workers in each country.
Furthermore, it explains how changes in the productivity of a country affect all the other
countries via production linkages and highlights the cases in which these shocks can in-
crease and decrease inequality. Finally, as the model is set up under a perfect competition
paradigm, it contributes to disentangling the effects of market dynamics and power relations
in economies where production is ruled by global supply chains.

Appendix to Chapter 1
Appendix 1.A Math Notation
This section defines the technical notation that the paper uses in the main text and in the
proofs. The notation used in the proofs of Section 1.B, that is not mentioned in this section,
was explicitly defined in the main text.
Vectors
Let x,y ∈ Rn:
• All vectors are represented as column vectors.
• xi is the i-th component x.
• x−i is a vector of Rn−1 obtained by removing the i-th component x.
• x ≪ y ⇔∀i : xi < yi.
• x < y ⇔ (∀i : xi ≤ yi ∧∃ j : x j < y j).
• x ≤ y ⇔ (x < y∨ x = y).
• e(i) is the i-th canonical vector. I.e. e(i)i = 1 and ∀ j ̸= i, e(i) j = 0.
• I is a vector with all its components equal to 1.
• O is a vector with all its components equal to 0.
Matrices
Let A ∈ Rn×m:
• AT is A transposed.
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• Ai j is the element at row i and column j, Ai. is the i-th row of a matrix, and A. j is the
j-th column.
• A−i. is a matrix in R(n−1)×m formed by removing the i-th row of A. In a similar way,
A.− j is defined as (AT− j.)
T .
• I denotes an identity matrix (of the appropriate dimensions).




∈ Rn×(m+k) denotes a matrix that has m+ k columns,
the first m coincide with the columns of A, while the last k coincide with the columns












Lemma 1.1 Let Ξ be the set of production techniques in the economy. Define the production
set as P(q) := {y|∃x ∈R|Ξ| : x ≥O|Ξ|×1∧y = A(Ξ)T x∧q ≥ I(Ξ)T x} and the efficient frontier
as E(q) := {y ∈ P(q)|¬∃y′ ∈ P(q) : y′ > y}.
Properties of P(q):




(d) If y ∈ E(q), then there exists x ≥O|Ξ|×1 such that A(Ξ)T x = y and I(Ξ)T x = q.
(e) ∃y ∈ E(q) such that ∀x ∈ E(q),y1 ≥ x1 and y−1 =O(M−1)×1.
Proof:
Part a:




ξc = Ξ. Assumption (A3) implies that for every country c, there exists
xc >OM×1 such that A(ξc)T xc ≫OC×1.
1.B Proofs 35




















Hence, x satisfies the following properties:
x ≥O|Ξ|×1
I(Ξ)T x = q
A(Ξ)T x ≫OM×1
Therefore,
A(Ξ)T x ∈ P(q)
Finally, OM×1 ∈ P(q) because x =O|Ξ|×1 also satisfies the conditions of the set. Thus,
OM×1 is a strict subset of P(q).
Part b:













Thus, for all α ∈ [0,1], αx+(1−α)x′ satisfies the following properties:
• αx+(1−α)x′ ≥O|Ξ|×1
• A(Ξ)T (αx+(1−α)x′) = αy+(1−α)y′ ≥OM×1
• I(Ξ)T (αx+(1−α)x′) = αI(Ξ)T x+(1−α)I(Ξ)T x′ ≤ αq+(1−α)q = q
Hence, αy+(1−α)y′ ∈ P(q)
Part c:









. Hence, to show that P(q) is compact,
it is enough to prove that the set is closed.
Let {yi}∞i=1 a sequence of elements in P(q) such that yi → y. Then, there exists a
sequence of {xi}∞i=1 such that A(Ξ)T xi = yi. Due to the linearity of the problem, xi → x,
36 On Global Supply Chains and Inequality
where A(Ξ)T x = y. Furthermore, for all i, xi ≥O|Ξ|×1 and I(Ξ)T xi ≤ q. Then, it holds that
x ≥O|Ξ|×1 and I(Ξ)T x ≤ q. Hence, y ∈ P(q). Ergo, P(q) is closed.
Part d:
If y ∈ P(q), then there exists x ≥O|Ξ|×1 such that A(Ξ)T x = y and I(Ξ)T x ≤ q. Assume
that I(Ξ)T x < q. Therefore, there exists t >O|Ξ|×1 such that I(Ξ)T x+ t = q. Thus, ∃tc > 0
which implies that country c has idle workers. However, due to assumption (A3), c can use
the spare workers to create a positive quantity of a set of goods without any net negative
production. When this is done, the overall production is greater than y. Hence, y /∈ E(q).
Contradiction.
Part e:
From parts (a), (b), and (c), and Weierstrass theorem, there exists y ∈ E(q) such that for
all z ∈ E(q), y1 ≥ z1. By construction, there exists an x ∈ R|Ξ| such that A(Ξ)T x = y.
Assume that y−1 ̸=O(M−1)×1. Then, there exists an element i > 1 such that yi > 0, which
implies the existence of a technique j in country c that produces good i and employs x j > 0
workers.
Therefore, if country c reduces the production of i by min{yi,x jA(Ξ) ji} units, the overall
production of good 1 does not change. From assumption (A3) these idle workers can be
allocated to increase the production of all goods, in particular good 1. Thus, y did not
maximize the production of good 1. Contradiction.
■
Lemma 1.2 R, as defined in Theorem 1.1, has full row rank.
Proof:
Step 1: The first M−1 rows are linearly independent.
Define ξc as in the proof of Lemma 1.1. Based on the proofs of Arrow (1951), assumption








Therefore A(Ξ) is invertible.
Step 2: The last C rows of R are linearly independent.
Each column in I(Ξ) is a canonical vector. Hence, all the rows of I(Ξ)T are linearly
independent.
Step 3: The first M−1 rows in R are linearly independent to any of the last C rows.
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Assume there exists y ̸= O(M−1)×1 such that yT A(Ξ)T.−1 = I(Ξ)T.c. In particular, this
means that
A(ξc).−1y = IM×1
From Step 2, A(ξc) is invertible. Then, t = A(ξ )−1IM×1 ≫ 0 (Arrow, 1951).





This last result contradicts the fact that A(ξc) is invertible. Hence, the first M−1 rows in R
are linearly independent to any of the last C rows.
Step 4:




Proof of Theorem 1.1
From Lemma 1.1 parts (a) and (c), there is a vector x that maximizes the production of the
final good. Furthermore, Lemma 1.1 parts (d) and (e) implies that A(Ξ)T.−1x =O(M−1)×1 and
I(Ξ)T x = q. Hence, all the constraints of the linear program bind at the optimum.
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions state that x solves the linear program if and only




≫ 0 and a vector of reduced costs











The fundamental theorem of linear programming states that the solutions of the linear
program are (generically) extreme points of the bounded polyhedron created by the con-
straints, or (non-generically) lie on a face of it. Hence, for any solution, there are at most
M+C−1 variables different than 0; in the linear program jargon, these are called the basic
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variables. Thus, their correspondent techniques will be known as basic techniques and will
be identified with γ .
Given that R is full row rank (Lemma 1.2), its columns can be ordered into two matrices:















































λ = (BT )−1A(γ).1
As it was mentioned before, in the optimization program all the constraints bind in the
optimum. Therefore, all intermediate goods and labour market clear (then, by Walras Law,
the final good market also clears); i.e. it satisfies conditions (3), (4), and (5) of the equilibrium
conditions.









Thus, for all the basic techniques, the profit is 0. By definition, these are a superset of those
techniques which are active in the equilibrium. Hence, condition (2) of the equilibrium is
satisfied.
Finally, for the remaining techniques
NT λ + sN = A(Ξ\γ).1 ⇒ A(Ξ\γ)p+ sN = I(Ξ\γ)w ⇒ A(Ξ\γ)p ≤ I(Ξ\γ)w
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Consequently, all the techniques that are not part of the basic techniques have non-positive
profit (which satisfies condition (1) of the equilibrium).




and w define the vectors of quantities, prices, and wages that
satisfy all equilibrium conditions. To prove the other direction of the implication, notice that
if x, p, and w satisfy all the equilibrium conditions, they also meet KKT conditions. Ergo, x
is a solution of the optimization program.
■
Proof of Theorem 1.2
Part a:
The fact that τ(m,c) ∈ γ implies that pT τ(m,c) = wc and pT τ(m,c′) ≤ wc′ . There-
fore, pT (τ(m,c′)− τ(m,c)) ≤ wc′ −wc. On the other hand, assumption (A4) implies that
pT (τ(m,c′)− τ(m,c)) = pm(τ(m,c′)m − τ(m,c)m). Thus,
wc′ −wc ≥ pm(τ(m,c′)m − τ(m,c)m)
Part b:
Following the same derivations as part (a), if pm(τ(m,c′)m − τ(m,c)m)≤ wc′ −wc and
pm′(τ(m′,c′)m′ − τ(m′,c)m′)≥ wc′ −wc, then pm(τ(m,c′)m − τ(m,c)m)≤ pm′(τ(m′,c′)m′ −
τ(m′,c)m′).
Thus,




{τ(m,c),τ(m,c′)} ⊆ γ implies that pT τ(m,c) = wc and pT τ(m,c′) = wc′ . Therefore,
pT (τ(m,c′)− τ(m,c)) = wc′ −wc. Ergo, wc′ −wc = pm(τ(m,c′)m − τ(m,c)m).
■
Proof of Theorem 1.3
Part a:
Step 1: All raw materials have the same price.
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Let m,m′ be raw materials such that {τ(m,c),τ(m′,c′)} ⊆ γ and assume that pm > pm′ .
From equilibrium conditions (1) and (2), it holds that kc pm −wc = 0 and kc′ pm −wc′ ≤ 0.
Symmetrically, kc′ pm′ −wc′ = 0 and kc pm −wc ≤ 0. However, the previous equations also
imply that, kc′ pm −wc′ > 0. Contradiction. Hence, both goods have the same prices.
Step 2:
Consider two goods a,b that have the same production structure but different prices.
Given that the two networks are isomorphic, x ∈ Nodes(Prod(a)) requires the existence of





and let m′ ∈ Nodes(Prod(b)) such that Prod(m) = Prod(m′). Without loss of generality, as-
sume that pm > pm′ . Let c,c′ be two countries such that, in equilibrium {τ(m,c),τ(m′,c′)} ⊆
γ .
Given that m,m′ have isomorphic production structures, for every n → m, it holds that
rd(n) < rd(m). Thus, by construction, all the correspondent inputs of m and m′ have the
same price. Ergo, in equilibrium, pT τ(m,c)−wc = 0 and
0 ≥ pT τ(m,c′)−wc′ = pT τ(m,c)− pmkc + pmkc′ −wc′
Also,
0 = pT τ(m′,c′)−wc′ = pT τ(m,c)− pmkc + pm′kc′ −wc′ < pT τ(m,c)− pmkc + pmkc′ −wc′
Contradiction. Thus, in equilibrium, isomorphic structures have the same prices.
Part b:










Ergo, pm ≤ pm′ .
■
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Proof of Theorem 1.4
Part a:









Hence, pm′ > pm.
Part b:
If m → m′, then pm′ > pm. Due to Theorem 1.3, this observation implies that pm′ > pm ⇒
c ≥ c′. Therefore, if there is a path from m to m′ such that m → ma1 → ·· · → man → m′ and
for all i, τ(mai,cai) ∈ γ , then c ≥ ca1 ≥ ·· · ≥ can ≥ c′.
■
Proof of Theorem 1.5
Part a:
To prove that the algorithm is well defined, it is sufficient to show that it defines w
and p. For this purpose, assume there is a set of goods A = {m : m is not priced} and
m′ ∈ argmin{rd(m) : m ∈ A}.
If τ(m′,C) ∈ γ , then step 1 of the algorithm and the fact that wC is given imply that
∃n → m′ such that n is not priced, which leads to a contradiction because rd(n) < rd(m′).
Hence, as all the prices of goods produced by C are defined. This implies that wC−1 is also
defined.
The previous result shows that all goods that C produce are priced. Moreover, notice that
if all the prices of the goods produced by c+1 are defined, then wc is also defined. Having
these two observations in mind, assume that for all c′ > c, and for all n such that τ(n,c′) ∈ γ ,
pn is defined. Therefore if m ∈ A, m has to be produced by a country c∗ ≤ c. Then, the fact
that there is a good m′ that is not priced implies that ∃n′ → m′ such that n′ is not priced or
wc is not defined. But due to the algorithm, wc is defined. Also, as in the previous case,
rd(n′)< rd(m′) implies that pn′ is defined. Ergo, m′ has to be defined. This means that A = /0.
Following the inductive process, the algorithm is well defined.
Part b: Proof by induction
Define w′, p′ as the equilibrium wages and prices. The normalization implies w′C = wC =
α .
Base Case: Country C:
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By construction wC = w′C.
Let M = {m : τ(m,C) ∈ γ ∧ pm ̸= p′m} and m′ = argmin{rd(m) : m ∈ M}. From step 1 of
the algorithm, pm′ = 1kc (wc +∑n→m′ |A(τ(m
′,c))n|pn) = 1kc (w
′
c +∑n→m′ |A(τ(m′,c))n|p′n) =
p′m′ . The second equality comes from the fact that rd(n)< rd(m
′) implies that pn = p′n. Thus,
M = /0.
Induction step:
Assume that for all c′ > c and for all m such that τ(m,c′) ∈ γ , wc′ = w′c′ and pm = p
′
m.
Given that the economy is linked, there exists m such that






m(kc − kc+1) = wc+1 + pm(kc − kc+1) = wc
where the second equality is due to induction hypothesis.
Furthermore, let M = {m : τ(m,c) ∈ γ ∧ pm ̸= p′m} and m′ = argmin{rd(m) : m ∈ M}.












The second equality comes from the fact that rd(n)< rd(m′). Therefore, M = /0. Thus,
by induction principle, w = w′ and p = p′.
Finally, by the construction of the algorithm and the fact that it is an equilibrium vector,




Proof of Proposition 1.1
This proof uses the notation of the proof of Theorem 1.1.
Part a:












. Ergo, wc = ∂Ω∂qc .
Part b:











Hence, given a set of basic techniques, the prices are uniquely determined and are
independent of the labour quantities.
■
Proof of Proposition 1.2
Both parts of the proof are based on the simplex algorithm for dynamic programming.
Therefore, the vernacular used is associated with the pivoting technique used in the book
Applied Linear Programming (Bradley et al., 1977).
Part a:
The fact that {pm : τ ′(m,c) ∈ γ ′} ⊆ {pn : τ(n,c) ∈ γ} implies that for every τ ′(m,c) ∈ γ ′
exist τ(m′,c),τ(m′′,c) ∈ γ such that pm′ ≤ pm ≤ pm′′ . From Corollary 1.1, this signifies that
∀τ ′(m,c) ∈ γ ′, pT τ ′(m,c)−wc = 0. Then, from Theorem 1.1, p,w are the price and income
vectors of γ ′.
Part b:
To simplify notation, denote the position of τ(m,c) as the first vector of the basic







Hence, let z ∈ RC be the last C components of [B−1]1., Then zT q = 0.
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Let s(m′,c′) = pT τ ′(m′,c′)−wc′ . Due to the steps of the simplex algorithm, when one




































Proof of Proposition 1.3
Part a:
Given that the basic techniques are the same, i) is a direct consequence of the pricing
algorithm; ii) is as well a consequence of step 3 of the algorithm.
For iii), an inductive process is followed both at the good and at the country level.
Base case: Price updating for country c.
Consider a good m such that τ(m,c) ∈ γ and pm > max{p j : τ( j,c+1) ∈ γ}.













Furthermore, for all its inputs |p′n − pn|= 0 < |p′m − pm|.
Induction step: Good level
Assume that for all the prices updated in c, up till the i-th iteration, j → k ⇒ |pk − p′k|>
|p j − p′j| and pk > p′k.




















And given that pn − p′n ≥ 0, then








((wc + kc)+ ∑
n→m
|A(τ(m,c))n|p′n)
As all the terms are positive, |pm − p′m|> |pn − p′n|. Then, by induction hypothesis, all
the prices updated by c, follow this inequality. Now consider country c−1. From the price
adjusting algorithm
w′c−1 −wc−1 = w′c −wc + p′m(kc−1 −βkc)− pm(kc−1 − kc)
= (1−β )kc +(p′m − pm)kc−1 + pmkc − p′mβkc < 0
Induction Step: Country level
Assume that, if k was updated in any iteration between the first iteration of C and the i-th
of c′, it holds that j → k ⇒ |pk − p′k|> |p j − p′j| and p′k < pk. Also assume that w′c′ < wc′ .
Let m′ be updated in the i+1 iteration of country c′. Then, by induction hypothesis
pm′ − p′m′ =
1
kc′
(wc −w′c + ∑
n→m
|A(τ(m,c))n|(pn − p′n))> 0
Furthermore, as all the terms are positive, ∀ j → m : |pm − p′m|> |p j − p′j|. Then, by the
induction principle, this condition holds for all the iterations of c′.
From the step 3 of the algorithm, and the induction in prices, wc′−1 −w′c′−1 = wc′ −w
′
c′ +
(PC′ −P′C′)(kc−1 − kc)> 0. Thus, by the induction principle, ∀c
′ < c,w′c′ < wc′ .
Finally,
(wc′−1 −w′c′−1)− (wc′ −w
′
c′) = (PC′ −P
′
C′)(kc−1 − kc)> 0
⇒ |wc′−1 −w′c′−1|> |wc′ −w
′
c′|
Thus, iii) is proven via the double induction in prices and countries.
Part b:
Repeat the proof of part (a) considering the fact that wC −w′C = 0 from the normalization
condition.
■
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Corollaries
Proof of Corollary 1.1
Part a:
From Theorem 1.3, price specialisation implies that pm ≤ pn (regarding c) and pn ≤ pm
(regarding c′). Then, pm = pn.
Part b:
Assume that pT τ(n,c)−wc < 0. Thus, in equilibrium there exists c′ such that pT τ(n,c′)−
wc′ = 0. If c′ > c, then pm(kc′ − kc) ≤ wc′ −wc and pn(kc − kc′) < wc −wc′ . Therefore,
pn(kc − kc′)< wc −wc′ ≤ pm(kc − kc′). Thus, pn > pm.
But, from Theorem 1.3, pn = pm′ . Contradiction (the proof is symmetric if c′ < c).
Part c:
Define p′,w′ such that p = p′, w−c = w′−c, and w
′
c = wc +α(kc′ − kc) > wc. By direct
calculation, p′,w′ satisfy the new equilibrium conditions. Ergo, the only value that changed
after the shock was wc.
■
Proof of Corollary 1.2
Define P′c = min{p|pT τ(m,c)−wc = 0} and P
′′
c = max{pm|pT τ(m,c)−wc = 0}. Theorem
1.3 implies that P
′′




c−1, then define Pc−1 as P
′











c ]⇒ pT τ(m,c)−wc = 0
and by Theorem 1.3,
pm ∈ R\[P′c,P
′′
c ]⇒ pT τ(m,c)−wc < 0
■
Proof of Corollary 1.3
From Theorem 1.4, all the goods in this economy have different prices. Thus, consider c < c′
and m such that {τ(m,c),τ(m,c′)} ⊆ γ . Corollary 1.1 states that, for all c < c′′ < c′ and for
all m′ such that pm′ ̸= pm, it holds that pT τ(m′,c′′)−wc′′ < 0.
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Every country has to produce something (to clear its labour market) in the equilibrium.
Therefore, the previous observations imply that τ(m,c′′) ∈ γ . Furthermore, assumption (A7)
and Theorem 1.2 signify that ¬∃m,m′,c,c′ such that {τ(m,c),τ(m,c′),τ(m′,c),τ(m′,c′)} ⊆
γ . Hence, for each c, there can be at most two goods that are produced by other countries:
one is shared with c+1 and the other one is shared with c−1. The exception of this rule are
countries 1 and C, which only have one good in common with other countries.
Yet, Theorem 1.1 indicates that there are exactly M+C−1 basic techniques. Thus, the




On the Role of Unequal Treatment in
Collective Agreements
2.1 Introduction
Solving collective action problems is crucial to the survival of many communities, therefore
cooperation rules frequently emerge in societies to incentivise individuals to produce common
goods (Ostrom, 2000). The current literature in this area evaluates such rules according to
their capacity to produce collective goods and to maximise the community’s overall welfare.
However, these evaluations have produced several economic puzzles, and this paper focuses
on four of them.
The first puzzle states that individuals are more likely to shirk from collective agreements
when commitment is not enforced. However, agreements without commitment are recurrent
in many communities. Several authors, such as Dasgupta (2009), have used the theory
of repeated games to explain that any agreement that provides better conditions than the
outcomes that individuals can obtain in autarky will be supported by communities where
people continuously interact and monitor each other.
The second puzzle states that communities do not exhibit the welfare-maximising agree-
ments predicted by the repeated games theory with perfect monitoring. To reduce the gap
between the models and reality, authors such as Townsend (1994) have explained that private
information creates stronger deviation incentives under welfare-maximising solutions, and
therefore, the lack of complete information implies that welfare-maximising agreements are
not supported in equilibrium. Nonetheless, even in small communities where perfect informa-
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tion is a reasonable assumption and where individuals constantly interact, such agreements
still do not maximise the welfare (Bardhan, 2000).
The third puzzle states that individual income heterogeneity can be either a barrier or
a facilitator of collective agreements. Heterogeneity can be a barrier by creating different
deviation incentives for different individuals. However, heterogeneity can also facilitate
collective agreements when the groups that have an interest in the agreements can compromise
with the other groups (Dayton-Johnson and Bardhan, 2002). In contrast to the previous
puzzles, the models used to understand the relationship between heterogeneity and the
viability of collective agreements presume that individuals can commit to cooperate (e.g.
Munshi and Rosenzweig (2016)) or that income heterogeneity also implies hierarchical
power structures (e.g. Baland and Platteau (1999)).
The last puzzle states that most collective agreements lead to unequal treatment in favour
of wealthy groups in society, and at the same time, the agreements manage to reduce the
utility differences among their members. To explain this puzzle, authors such as Krueger
and Perri (2006), have assumed that individuals are identical, and examine how collective
agreements reduce the dispersion of consumable income that individuals obtain.
Thus far, there are multiple theoretical solutions to explain each of the aforementioned
puzzles. However, the premises used for each model are different and sometimes incompati-
ble. For example, some puzzles assume the existence of commitment mechanisms, while
others assume their absence; some study homogeneous individuals, while others require
heterogeneity among them; and some study individuals with the same level of decision
power, while others require social structures. Although each solution provides valuable
insights, it is important to link these ideas within a unified framework of assumptions to
better explain these puzzles. In the real world, the four puzzles discussed can be present in a
single community; thus, one set of assumptions about the community should be able to solve
all the puzzles. As such, the objective of this paper is to present this unified framework of
assumptions.
“Collective action problems” is a broad term that incorporates multiple types of agree-
ments that require cooperation among members of a community. Due to the large variety
of topics covered under this label, this paper narrows the scope and focuses on two types of
agreements that encompass a significant number of the relevant collective action problems
studied in the literature: club good agreements and common pool agreements. In the club
good case, individuals dedicate a fraction of their income to the common good, which gen-
erates equal benefits for each community member when the good is non-rival or is evenly
distributed when the good is rival. In the common pool case, individuals dedicate an equal
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fraction of their income to the common good, and the members then divide the benefits in a
way that is not necessarily equal. These archetypal agreements are flexible structures that
can describe risk-sharing agreements, public good projects, or social production schemes.
This paper represents both agreements as stochastic games played for infinite periods,
where agents can stop cooperating in any period. To analyse these games, the current study
takes a new approach that focuses on the rules (i.e. game parameters) that support cooperation
for the most impatient members of the community (i.e. rules that are robust to the discount
factor). These rules have not yet been studied in the literature, but they are central to unifying
the previous puzzles into a single framework. On the one hand, such rules can emerge in
scenarios where welfare-maximising rules are not an equilibrium of the game. On the other
hand, such rules elucidate how collective agreements balance the rent-seeking behaviour of
wealthy individuals with the redistribution of the interests of poor individuals in efforts to
support cooperative games. Using this methodological approach, the paper explains why
rules that minimise deviations are likely to occur in multiple communities and how these
rules provide simultaneous answers to the four puzzles as well as providing new insights into
the mechanisms that keep communities cooperating in collective agreements.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2.2 positions the current model in
the economic development literature. Section 2.3 describes the two types of collective
agreements. Section 2.4 theoretically characterises the robust rules in each type of agreement
and explains the previous puzzles within this unified framework. Section 2.5 presents a
comparative statics analysis of scenarios with heterogeneous communities to explore the
economic mechanisms that agreements use to promote cooperation in a community and to
contrast welfare-maximising agreements with deviation-minimising agreements. Section 2.6
discusses how reasonable and useful the agreements presented in this paper are to understand
how collective agreements work and provides a guideline for future work in this area. Section
2.7 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
This paper lies at the intersection of two questions at the heart of development economics: 1)
which mechanisms allow individuals to participate in collective action problems, and 2) how
does inequality affect the existence of collective goods?
Regarding the first question, individuals frequently coordinate to produce goods despite
strong incentives to free ride (Coleman, 1988). Dasgupta (2009) suggested five reasons
why cooperation occurs: mutual affection, a pro-social disposition, credible threats, external
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enforcement, and long-term relationships. The first two reasons provide a trivial solution
to the problem: people help others because they care about them. However, this argument
applies to specific scenarios and does not explain cooperation amongst selfish agents. The
next two reasons, credible threats and external enforcement, provide explanations that
include cooperation among selfish individuals; however, they still depend on the existence of
institutions (such as law enforcement agents) that are not available in many communities.
The last reason explains how the repeated nature of interactions between agents induces
commitment, thus allowing cooperation to emerge. This idea appeared in seminal papers
such as Thomas and Worrall (1990), Coate and Ravallion (1993), and Kocherlakota (1996),
who demonstrated that selfish individuals contribute to risk-sharing agreements without
enforcement. These papers show that under the infinite game paradigm, collective agreements
are prone to having multiple equilibria, and the authors only focused on the equilibria that
composed the Pareto frontier. More recent papers, such as that of Genicot and Ray (2003),
extended the literature by refining the set of equilibria to those that are coalition-proof, but
they still focus on welfare-maximising solutions.
The second question investigates the effects of heterogeneity on collective agreements.
Cardenas (2005) showed that assuming individuals with different utility functions, costs,
wealth levels, or outside options leads to a diverse range of conclusions. For that reason, the
current study considers that individuals are heterogeneous because the income they receive
in each period follows an idiosyncratic distribution. For comparison purposes, individuals
are identical in every other aspect.
Under this framework, several authors, such as Alesina and La Ferrara (2000), Bardhan
(2000), Bowles and Gintis (2002), and Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson (2002), have argued
that the effect of inequality is ambiguous, but in general, it seems to reduce the possibility of
cooperative solutions. The theoretical models used to explain these observations either pre-
sume that rules treat everyone equally (e.g. La Ferrara (2002)) or that agents are homogenous
(e.g. Baland and Platteau (2007)), and in most cases, there is external enforcement so that
agents cannot refuse their responsibilities. The main exception is Munshi and Rosenzweig
(2016), who built a model similar to the common pool agreement presented in Section 2.3.3,
whereby i) heterogeneous agents design a risk-sharing agreement that distributes benefits
unevenly among agents, and ii) the unequal treatment provides different incentives to agents.
While the authors merged unequal treatment rules and heterogeneous agents in the same
framework, they also assumed that the community is capable of enforcing the agreements.
Because the goal of this paper is to solve the four puzzles within a unified framework, the
model constructed in Section 2.3 does so by extending the idea of Munshi and Rosenzweig
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(2016) to club goods and common pool agreements and embedding it in a repeated game
framework. In this way, enforcement mechanisms do not need to be assumed. However, in
contrast to the previous literature, this research uses welfare-maximising rules as a benchmark
and then elaborates on the concept of robust rules that provide theoretical explanations of the
empirical puzzles.
2.3 Collective Agreements
This section models two types of collective action problems in an infinite period game
framework. Although the agreements have different mechanisms, they have the same
mathematical structure, which facilitates comparisons between them. The first part of this
section presents the notation common to both the club good and common pool agreements.
The remaining parts of the section explain the specificities of each case as well as the
situations in which they are represented.
2.3.1 General Environment
Collective agreements in this paper are structured around four functions: individual utility (u),
the income distribution before the collective agreement ( f ), the collective good production
function (g), and the net income allocation after the agreement (Γ).
Regarding the utility function, there are n individuals identified with subindices i ∈
{1, . . . ,N} who live for an infinite horizon. The utility function u(c) : R+ → R+ is common
for all agents. Individuals are risk averse (i.e. u′(c) ≥ 0,u′′(c) ≤ 0), have a utility of 0
whenever consumption is zero (i.e. u(0) = 0) , and exhibit satiation (i.e. lim
c→∞
u(c) < ∞).
Finally, individuals have a time discount factor δ ∈ (0,1), which depicts their impatience.
Individuals are heterogeneous in their income realisation. Each individual is identified
with an income parameter ri, such that 0< r1 ≤ r2 ≤ ·· · ≤ rN <∞. In each period t, individual
i receives a random amount of perishable income Yit (Yt is a random vector that describes




f is a continuous probability density function with support R+ such that if X follows an
f (x) distribution, then E[X ] = 1 and Var[X ] = σ2. The perishable income distribution is
independent across members of the community and independently and identically distributed
across time. Finally, yit is the realised income of individual i in period t, and yt represents the
realised income vector of the community in period t.1
1In general, the realization of the random variable is denoted with lowercase letters.
54 On the Role of Unequal Treatment in Collective Agreements
The income characterisation has two implications. First, the income distribution of
individuals with higher income parameters dominates first-order stochastically those with
lower parameters; ergo, higher values of ri are associated with wealthier people. Second,
E[Yit ] = ri and Var[Yit ] = r2i σ2. The first part shows that wealthier individuals have more
desirable income distributions, while the second part suggests that individuals are not able
to diversify their income sources. Although extreme, the second feature aims to represent
small communities with few income sources, whereby rich and poor individuals differ in
the amount of income sources but not in their variety. This in turn generates a parsimonious
model that avoids diversification strategies that shadow the cooperation mechanisms. To
illustrate a scenario in which this feature applies, consider a small agrarian community
where farmers have few types of crops. In this case, rich and poor individuals have different
amounts of land, but the crops they produce are probably similar, ergo their diversification
portfolios are similar despite differences in wealth.
There is a collective good with a production function g : R+ → R+ that is increasing and
concave. When there is no investment, the production is 0 (i.e. g(0) = 0). The collective
action problem emerges because it is not profitable for any single individual to invest (i.e.
∂ (g(x)−x)
∂x < 0), but there are gains if everyone in the community contributes (i.e.
∂ng(x)−x
∂x ≥ 0).
These conditions are summarised as 1n ≤ g
′(x)< 1.
Finally, consider a net income allocation function Γ(y,a, p)i : R+× [0,1]n ×∆n → Rn+
such that




a jy j) (2.1)
where Γ describes the net consumable income that each agent has under an agreement type.
It is composed of three parts: first, the income realisation of the period (yi), second, the
investment of the individual in the collective good (aiyi), where ai represents the percent-
age of income that the individual contributes, and finally, the income obtained from the
collective good, which is a function of the investment of all the members of the community
(ping(∑Nj=1 a jy j)), where pi represents the share that goes to individual i. When the collec-
tive good is equally distributed among the members of the community, the third component
becomes g(∑Nj=1 a jy j).
The functions {u, f ,g,Γ} are not independent of each other. Indeed, they need to satisfy
two assumptions.
Assumption A1 E[u(Γ(Y,a, p)i)] exists.
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Assumption (A1) states that individuals can calculate the expected utility of the agree-
ment.
Assumption A2 ∀p ∈ ∆n,∀a,a′ ∈ [0,1]n such that ∀a ≥ a′ where ai = a j > a′i = a′j and
pi = p j, the following inequality holds:
|E[u(Γ(Y,a′, p)i)−u(Γ(Y,a′, p) j)]|> |E[u(Γ(Y,a, p)i)−u(Γ(Y,a, p) j)]|
Assumption (A2) claims that if two individuals who are investing the same share of their
income increase it by the same fraction, then the difference in their expected utility decreases.
In other words, if the community contributes more to the common good, the expected utilities
of its members becomes more similar. Assumption (A2) holds for any CARA and bounded
HARA functions. It is noteworthy that these families of risk-averse utility functions are the
most common in the literature on collective agreements. All the proofs presented in this
model take as given these two assumptions.
2.3.2 Club Good Agreements
Club good agreements (CGAs) describe a setting in which a common good benefits all the
members of society equally, and the community is capable of excluding those who did not
participate in its production. As such, individuals invest a fixed fraction of their income and
receive the same benefit from the collective good. There are two ways to interpret this fact:
either the collective good is non-rival, or the community divides it evenly among its members.
Finally, collective goods require a minimum expected level of inputs to be worthy. Therefore,
the expected contributions need to be at least k. Naturally, ∑Nj=1 r j ≥ k so that the problem is
feasible.
CGAs describe a wide range of collective action problems. For example, they can
represent a risk-sharing agreement where everyone receives the average of the resources
pooled by the community. They can also represent a community tax scheme to provide a
common good, such as in La Ferrara (2002). In that case, k represents the expected flow of
income that the policy-maker requires for the common good provision to be justified.
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Under these definitions, CGAs are represented as a net income allocation function
Γ(y,a, 1nI) : R
n








a jy j) (2.2)
The agreement is characterised by a = (a1, . . . ,an). Henceforth, (a, 1nI) is known as the
allocation rule, where valid rules require that ∑Nj=1 a jr j ≥ k.
For illustration purposes, if a community participates in the club good agreement de-






In contrast, the utility of those individuals that do not participate is u(yit). By construc-
tion, the investment in the collective good provides positive externalities to the group, but
individuals have incentives to reduce their contribution. Hence, the community designs the
following mechanism:
At the beginning of each period, individuals observe the income realisation of the
members of the community and decide accordingly whether to participate in the collective
agreement.2 Individuals who contribute in one period can also participate in the agreement
in the following period. Those who refuse to invest lose their chance to participate in the
collective agreement in that period as well as in subsequent stages. This mechanism induces
a stochastic game that repeats itself for infinite periods and therefore has multiple equilibria.
This paper focuses on the cooperative equilibrium induced by a grim trigger strategy. The
strategy states that in the first period, everyone participates in the collective agreement, and
for period t > 0, an agent participates if and only if all the agents participated in the previous
period.3
2Coleman (1988), Fafchamps (1992), Ostrom (2000), and Bowles and Gintis (2002) highlight that individuals
in small communities have high monitoring capacities of the actions of their neighbours, and this is one of
the main reasons why they are able to support many collective agreements. Thus, this feature of reality is
represented by the assumption.
3This paper presents a grim trigger strategy because it allows the model to focus on the implications of
heterogeneity without mixing its effects with the implications of more complex strategies. Naturally, these
results can be extended to other strategies, but the lost in parsimony does not compensate the gains in intuition.
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The following Bellman equations summarise the one-shot deviation principle:4
The utility of individual i when he refuses the agreement U iR(yt):
U iR(yt) = u(yit)+δE[U iR(Yt+1)]
where E[U iR(Yt)] =
δ
1−δ E[u(Yi)].
The utility of individual i when he accepts the agreement U iA(yt):


























The present trade-off quantifies the difference between the utility of participating and
the utility of leaving the agreement during the period of the decision. The future trade-off
quantifies the difference between the expected utility of participating and the expected utility
of leaving the agreement in a generic future period. Hence, it reflects the future implications
that the current decision to participate will have on the utility of the individual.
From Lemma 2.2 in Appendix 2.B, PTi(yt ,a, 1nI) has a lower bound, and from assumption
(A1), FTi(a, 1nI) exists. Thus, as long as FTi(a,
1
nI) is positive, there exists δ
∗ : ∀δ ≥
δ ∗,U iA(yt)−U iR(yt)≥ 0. In other words, for any δ ≥ δ ∗, the individual has no incentive to
leave the agreement. Therefore, this strategy is a subgame perfect equilibrium if FTi(a, 1nI)>
0 and δ is high enough.
2.3.3 Common Pool Agreements
Common pool agreements (CPAs) describe a setting in which the community decides how to
allocate a collective good among its members. In each period, individuals first pool an equal
fraction (τ) of their income into the production of the collective good, and the community
4This methodology is consistent with the works of Thomas and Worrall (1988), Coate and Ravallion (1993),
Kocherlakota (1996), and Ligon et al. (2002).
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then allocates the benefits among its members. For consistency with the club good agreement
assumptions, this setting assumes that τ ∑Nj=1 r j ≥ k.
This model generalises Munshi and Rosenzweig (2016) model and encompasses a wide
range of collective action problems. It can represent a risk-sharing agreement in which
the common good is the sum of the individual incomes as well as other scenarios such as
communal crops and shared irrigation systems, similar to Bardhan (2000) and Mukhopadhyay
(2008). In contrast to club good agreements, the good produced under a CPA can be unevenly
allocated among the population.
To make both arrangements comparable, the production function of the collective good
is n times the production function g. Thus, a net income allocation function for a CPA is
characterised by Γ(y,τI, p) : Rn+× [0,1]×∆n → Rn+ such that





This agreement is characterised by p= (p1, . . . , pn) and τ . Hence, (τI, p) is the allocation
rule. This notation allows both agreements to be instances of equation (2.1).
If a community participates in the common pool agreement described by (τI, p), the
utility derived by the i-th individual in period t is represented by equation (2.5).
u(Γ(y,τI, p)i) (2.5)
Analogous to a CGA, the community designs a mechanism to guarantee the participation
of its members with a grim trigger strategy. The following Bellman equations describe the
one-shot deviation principle:
The utility of individual i if he rejects the agreement U iR(yt):
U iR(yt) = u(yit)+δE[U iR(Yt+1)]
where E[U iR(Yt)] =
δ
1−δ E[u(Yi)].
The utility of individual i if he accepts the agreement U iA(yt):
U iA(yt) = u(Γ(yt ,τI, p)i)+δE[U
i
A(Yt+1)]
where E[U iA(Yt)] =
δ
1−δ E[Γ(Y,τI, p)i].
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The difference between these utilities has two elements that have the same interpretation
as in the previous case:
Present trade-off:
PTi(yt ,τI, p) = u(Γ(yt ,τI, p)i)−u(yit)
Future trade-off:
FTi(τI, p) = E[u(Γ(Y,τI, p)i)−u(Yi)]
As in the previous case, the grim trigger strategy is a subgame perfect equilibrium if
FTi(τI, p)> 0 and δ is high enough.
2.4 Efficiency vs. Robustness
The studies by Elbers et al. (2004) and Mulder et al. (2009) showed that inequality in small
communities is the norm rather than the exception. This section proves that this asymmetry
among individuals creates differences between rules that maximise the aggregate welfare and
rules that minimise the deviation incentives of the participants. The first part of the section
defines welfare-maximising agreements and uses them as a benchmark scenario to compare
rules that minimise deviation incentives. The second part defines robust rules as those that
minimise the deviation incentives of impatient individuals and shows how these rules explain
the four puzzles that drive this paper.
Definition 2.1 (Admissible rules) A rule (α,β ) is admissible if for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,N}, it
holds that FTi(α,β )≥ 0 and ∑Nj=1 α jr j ≥ k.
Definition 2.1 assigns a name to those rules that are a subgame perfect equilibrium for a
high enough value of δ and that satisfy the minimum contribution condition. These are the
rules that have the potential to become norms, which makes them the focus of this research.
2.4.1 On Efficiency
Club good and common pool agreements have multiple admissible rules. This phenomenon
has been well studied by authors such as Fafchamps (1992), Sethi and Somanathan (1996),
Ostrom (2000), and Dasgupta (1995). They concluded that the rules chosen by a society
depend on historical processes as well as the power relations among its decision-makers.
However, the economic literature frequently focuses on welfare-maximising solutions. In this
context, maximising the welfare is equivalent to maximising the sum of future trade-off values
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(these values are a monotonous transformation of the ex-ante benefits of the agreement). For
this paper, rules that maximise the welfare are called efficient because they are not Pareto
dominated, and when the community is studied as a corporation, they maximise the overall
generated benefit.




Based on the previous definition it is possible to obtain the first result on collective
agreements.5
Theorem 2.1 (Efficient rules) For both CGA and CPA, FTN(I, 1nI)> 0 if and only if (I,
1
nI)
is the efficient rule.
Theorem 2.1 proves that as long as the wealthiest individual (N) finds the rule admissible,
an efficient rule treats all community members equally. Furthermore, consistent with the
Borch (1962) rule, the marginal utility of each individual is the same, independent of the
income draw. Finally, FTN(I, 1nI)> 0 is easily achieved when individuals have a high degree
of risk aversion or low heterogeneity (low ri variance). For that reason, and because it
provides a clear benchmark for the utilitarian solution, the remainder of this article assumes
(unless stated otherwise) that FTN(I, 1nI)> 0 and the efficient rule — also called egalitarian
rule — is (I, 1nI) for both CGAs and CPAs.
Theorem 2.1 explains why the literature has focused on equal treatment rules. As long as
the income heterogeneity within the population is low enough, welfare-maximising collective
agreements are fully specified.
2.4.2 On Robustness
Is it reasonable to choose an egalitarian rule? Due to income heterogeneity, the exit options
are different for each participant. Thus, the expected future trade-off in a collective agreement
is not the same for everyone, and heterogeneity creates differentiated incentives for people
to leave the agreement, i.e. the minimum required changes between individuals. Moreover,
there are cases where the community might prefer to design agreements that allow the lowest
discount rates. For example, if the community has no information about the discount rate
before designing the rules, they might prefer rules that have the highest likelihood to be
5All the lemmata as well as all the proofs of the lemmata, theorems, and propositions are presented in
Appendix 2.B.
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supported in equilibrium. This decision implies that the community is willing to gain stability
in exchange for efficiency. Another explanation for why communities implement robust
rather than efficient rules is the path dependency of the agreements. Fafchamps (1992) and
Sethi and Somanathan (1996) discussed how rules appear randomly, and if individuals are
not willing to deviate, these rules might become norms. From this perspective, if there is
an unexpected change in the discount rate of some individuals, efficient rules might have a
greater chance of disappearing than other rules do. Motivated by the previous discussion,
robust rules are defined as rules that can be sustained at equilibrium for the smallest possible
δ .6
Definition 2.3 (Worst present trade-off) For a rule (α,β ), define the worst present trade-
off as Mi(α,β ) = liminf
y∈Rn+
PTi(y,a,β ).
Definition 2.4 (Robust rules) For a rule (α,β ), let




(α,β ) is robust if it is admissible and for all admissible rules: (α ′,β ′), Ds(α ′,β ′) ⊆
Ds(α,β ).
Definition 2.3 specifies the scenario in which the present trade-off of an individual is
the lowest. Regarding Definition 2.4, if Mi(α,β )+ δ1−δ FTi(α,β )< 0, then individual i will
leave the game after some period, and cooperation cannot be a subperfect game equilibrium.
Thus, robust rules are equilibrium rules for a large range of δ . Furthermore, robust rules
differ from efficient rules because their focus is on preserving the stability of the agreement





FTi(α,β )≥ 0 ⇔ δ ≥
1
1− FTi(α,β )Mi(α,β )
Hence, a robust rule (α,β ) is a solution to the following problem:










where the conditions over S depend on the type of agreement.
6The definition presented here extends that of Kalai and Stanford (1988).
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Proposition 2.1 ∀ f ,g,u:
(a) It is possible that there is no egalitarian rule.
(b) In a CGA, if there is an egalitarian rule, then there is a robust rule.
(c) In a CPA, there is a robust rule independent of the existence of egalitarian rules.
Proposition 2.1 proves that depending on the context (defined by f ,g,u), it is sometimes
impossible to find egalitarian rules that are subgame perfect equilibria. However, part (b)
states that if those rules exist, it is also true that robust rules exist for a club goods agreement.
Moreover, part (c) claims that independent of the existence of egalitarian rules, robust rules
always exist for common pool agreements. Hence, in every scenario in which an egalitarian
rule emerges, it is plausible that a robust rule also emerges. However, there are contexts in
which robust rules can emerge but egalitarian rules cannot. Thus, Proposition 2.1 implies that
robust rules are more likely to emerge in a society. Finally, these rules are subgame perfect
equilibria in which they exhibit cooperation among individuals with limited commitment,
therefore satisfying the first puzzle.
To simplify the mathematical notation in the characterisation of robust rules, a new
assumption is stated.
Assumption A3 Let ri > r j and define


















If airi ≤ a jr j then E[u(Yi)]−E[u(Yj)]≤ T (ai,a j)−T (a j,ai).
Assumption (A3) defines T (ai,a j) as the measurement of the expected complementary
effect that individual j has on individual i’s investment decision. Then, it states that if
a wealthy individual is expected to invest less than a poor individual, then the difference
between their utility without agreement is smaller than the difference between their expected
complementarities.7
7Assumption (A3) holds for functions such as constant absolute risk aversion, hyperbolic absolute risk
aversion, and constant relative risk aversion, but the proof is case specific. For simplicity, instead of proving it,
it is taken as given in Theorem 2.2.
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Theorem 2.2 For a CGA
(a) If (a, 1nI) is robust, then k = ∑
N
i=1 airi and if ri > r j, then ai < a j or a j = 1.
(b) Given assumption (A3), if (a, 1nI) is robust, then ri > r j implies that airi ≤ a jr j.
For a CPA
(c) If (τI, p) is robust, then ri > r j implies that pi > p j and τ = k(∑Ni=1 ri)−1.
(d) If (τI, p) is robus, then for all i, j, −FTj(τI,p)M j(τI,p) =−
FTi(τI,p)
Mi(τI,p) .
Theorem 2.2 is composed of two parts: the first part describes club good agreements, and
the second part describes common pool agreements. Regarding CGAs, part (a) reveals that
wealthier individuals contribute lower percentages of their income to the common good, while
poor individuals contribute all their income. In contrast, part (b) states that the expected value
of the contribution of the rich has to be higher than the contribution of the poor. Regarding
CPAs, part (c) states that richer individuals obtain higher shares of the collective good, and
part (d) claims that robust agreements balance all the incentives, such that all individuals
have a common lowest δ . Finally, parts (a) and (c) express that in both cases, individuals will
not contribute as much as they can to the collective good and that the agreements provide
preferential treatment to wealthier individuals.
To provide a better understanding of the previous theorems, Example 2.1 constructs
efficient and robust agreements for a three-agent scenario.
Example 2.1 (CARA agents; part 1)
There is a community with three individuals. Their utility function is u(x) = 100(1− e−2x),
a member of the CARA family. Income follows an exponential distribution with individual
parameters r1 = 1− t,r2 = 1,r3 = 1+ t where t ∈ [0,1). Regarding the collective good
function, there are two scenarios. In the first scenario, the function represents a risk-sharing
agreement defined by g(x) = x/3. In the second scenario, there is a positive externality in
which the function is g(x) = x/2. Finally, k = 1. This formulation satisfies assumptions (A1),
(A2), and (A3), making the example ideal for illustration purposes.
Figure 2.4.1 shows the different robust agreements for values of t ∈ [0,1). Consistent
with Theorem 2.2 parts (a) and (c), wealthier individuals have favourable rules. Moreover, in
club good agreements, once inequality is high enough, the poorest individuals contribute all
their income to the collective good.
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Fig. 2.4.1 Robust rules
Figure 2.4.2 analyses the expected contributions of each person under a club good
agreement. As stated in Theorem 2.2 part (b), the wealthiest individual contributes more than
the poor individual. Thus, Figure 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 represent the balance between levels and
percentages of contributions.
Fig. 2.4.2 Expected contribution
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Fig. 2.4.3 Minimum δ per individual
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Figure 2.4.3 focuses on the minimum δ that each individual requires. Following Theorem
2.2 part (d), common pool agreements are able to balance the incentives of all the individuals
in order for them to have the same δ . Club good agreements do the same until poor individuals
contribute all their income to the collective good. From this point onwards, the deviation
incentives of other agents grow steeper as inequality increases, while the deviation incentives
of the poorest individuals decrease. Finally, for an egalitarian agreement, rich individuals
will have higher incentives to deviate, and in the risk-sharing case, the richest individual
reaches δ = 1 at around t = 0.65, which implies that egalitarian agreements are not feasible
beyond this level of inequality.
Fig. 2.4.4 Total welfare and minimum δ for the community
Finally, Figure 2.4.4 visualises Theorem 2.1 and Proposition 2.1. For both cases, the
egalitarian rule produces higher total welfare for the community. However, as soon as the
richest individual finds that the agreement not admissible, the egalitarian agreement stops
being an option for the community. In contrast, both CPAs and CGAs are still valid options.
■
Example 2.1 displays the implications of the theorems at the abstract level. However,
these results also provide new insights into the puzzles described in the introduction. First,
under risk-sharing agreements, the community might avoid full risk sharing even with perfect
monitoring. This result complements the theoretical framework developed by Kocherlakota
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(1996) and Ligon et al. (2002) as well as the empirical observations of Townsend (1994),
Udry (1994), and Fafchamps and Lund (2003). These authors explained that communities do
not pool as much risk as expected, and they explained the difference via moral hazard and
asymmetric information. They claimed that agents have limited information, and therefore it
is not prudent to share all their income, as other agents can take advantage of the different
signals that each agent receives. Complementing that approach, Theorem 2.2 proves that if
an agreement was chosen for its robustness, full risk-sharing is not an option; by default,
income correlates with consumption. Furthermore, Theorem 2.2 suggests that this correlation
is stronger for people with higher income. Thus, this model explains the second puzzle,
which asks why, in cases where egalitarian agreements are plausible, people might still follow
norms that are not welfare maximising and in which their consumption is correlated with
their income.
Second, people may support social norms in a community that preserves inequality. Scott
(1977) explained that solidarity within peasants emerges from subsistence needs and not from
optimal production solutions. Therefore, some communities are willing to accept inequality
as long as it improves their living standards. Theorem 2.2 claims that when the priority is
having the participation of all members of the community, inequality is the norm. In this
case, richer individuals contribute to the collective good with a lower fraction of their income,
and consequently, their consumption is structurally higher.
In general, robustness implies tolerance for rules that favour the richer people in society.
In accordance with this conclusion, several authors such as Wade (1987), Baland and Platteau
(1999), and Elbers et al. (2004) empirically found that wealthy agents are usually engaged in
the creation and maintenance of collective agreements. These authors claimed that wealth
differences implied bargaining power differences, and therefore, the wealthy members of a
community can preserve unequal treatment in their favour. However, Theorem 2.2 provides
an alternative yet complementary explanation by highlighting that even if every member has
the same bargaining power, differential treatment emerges by changing an efficient-oriented
agreement into a robust-oriented agreement. Thus, related to the third and fourth puzzles,
unequal treatment does not need to be a consequence of power relations, but it can emerge
from the objective of the community.
Third, as illustrated in Figure 2.4.1, if inequality is high enough, the poorest individual
will dedicate all his income to the community. Hence, contrary to Olson (1971) theory, this
model shows that there are agreements where poor people are entirely devoted to the project,
and the incentives are structured in such a way that they have no deviation incentives. Indeed,
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as Figure 2.4.3 shows, wealthier individuals will have more incentives to deviate than poorer
individuals.
Finally, regarding the role of inequality as a barrier to or facilitator of collective agree-
ments (i.e. the third puzzle), Theorem 2.2 and Example 2.1 provide two insights. First, robust
agreements are supported by less patient individuals. Hence, inequality helps to reduce
people’s deviation incentives. Second, as Figure 2.4.3 explains, under egalitarian agreements,
inequality increases deviation incentives. However, under common pool agreements, this
effect is non-linear, and sometimes, higher inequality can reduce the minimum δ required by
the community. In this way, the current model explains the paradox of the third puzzle by
describing the impatience level required by the type of agreement that the community wants
to implement. Thus, some level of inequality can provide the conditions for more robust
agreements in which the community can participate. However, depending on the conditions
of the problem, an increase in heterogeneity can also increase δ .
While robust rules provide explanations for the first three puzzles, it is not clear why a
community will actively look for a policy that creates structural inequality in the consumable
income of individuals. One way to answer this question is that the community may not have
been able to decide. Most likely, the rule appeared, and its repetition made it a norm. Another
way to approach this problem is to realise that inequality at the utility level is more critical
for policy-making decisions than is inequality at the income level. Hence, the remaining
portion of this section describes the performance of robust rules under the utility approach.
Definition 2.5 (Equality promotion policies) Let EUi be the expected utility of individual
i. Consider a policy P such that the expected utility after implementation is EU ′i . Then, P




max{EU ′i ,EU ′j}
min{EU ′i ,EU ′j}
Although there are many definitions of inequality, Definition 2.5 provides a widely
accepted measure of a reduction in inequality that is useful to explain the effects of robust
rules on inequality at the utility level.
Proposition 2.2 In CGAs and CPAs, robust agreements are policies that promote equality.
It is evident that efficient agreements promote the highest equality levels, as members of
the community have the same expected utility. Proposition 2.2 shows that even though robust
agreements preserve structural inequality at the income level, they also promote equality at
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the utility level. Furthermore, because they are an equilibrium of the game, they are better
than the state of no cooperation. Hence, these rules also improve the living conditions of
each member. Thus, robustness is an alternative explanation for the fact that even with
heterogeneous agents and limited commitment contracts, income inequality is higher than
consumption inequality (Krueger and Perri, 2006). Furthermore, this result lends theoretical
support to one of the main observations by James Scott about the peasants in South-East
Asia: “Village egalitarianism in this sense is not radical; it claims that all should have a place,
a living, not that all should be equal” (Scott, 1977, p.74).
Together with Theorem 2.2, Proposition 2.2 reveals the central mechanism that induces
stability among these agreements. Robust rules manage to balance rent-seeking behaviour
from the rich (i.e. their unequal treatment) with redistribution incentives from the poor (i.e.
the inequality reduction). This result is capable of explaining the empirical observations of
Marchiori (2014), who suggested that collective agreements are affected by two forces: effort
augmenting and effort mixing. The effort-augmenting force is associated with agreements
that have differentiated rules that favour some agents in society, and the effort-mixing force
is associated with the need for balance in agreements. Thus, Theorem 2.2 and Proposition
2.2 conceptualise these forces.
This section illustrated how robust rules produce an alternative explanation for the fourth
puzzle. In addition, robust rules are equilibria of the game in more scenarios than efficient
rules are. Moreover, these rules can appear in communities where decision-makers have
no information about the δ of their members or under scenarios that δ can suffer a shock.
Hence, it is reasonable to argue that robust rules are likely to become norms in a community.
Theoretical models are not sufficient to learn about the generation of norms in a com-
munity. History-dependent events can create an infinite number of rules. Nevertheless,
due to their favourable characteristics, robust agreements are likely to emerge in a society.
In conclusion, this section explained within a unified framework how the robust approach
provides insights into the four puzzles, what the mechanisms are underlying these rules, and
why these rules are observed in the field.
2.5 CGAs vs. CPAs
Sometimes the community cannot decide on the type of agreement it wants to adopt. For
example, even if a good has a rival nature, it does not mean that it is socially acceptable for
some people to receive higher benefits than others. However, assuming that both agreements
70 On the Role of Unequal Treatment in Collective Agreements
are possible, understanding their differences can provide a better understanding of the
mechanisms underlying them.
The criteria to compare the agreements are changes in the deviation incentives, changes
in the overall welfare, and changes in the individual welfare. Proposition 2.3 presents these
comparisons.
Proposition 2.3 Consider an infinitesimal mean-spread deviation of a homogeneous popu-
lation where ∀i : ri = c+∆ri and ∑Ni=1 ∆ri = 0, for a fixed c > 0. Then:

































(b) The overall welfare of CPAs does not change, while for CGAs, the change is non-
negative.
(c) In CPAs, the change in the future expected trade-off of all the members with ri ≥ c is
non-positive, and for all members with ri ≤ c, the change is non-negative. In CGAs,
the change of the future expected trade-off is non-positive for all members with ri ≥ c
and some members with ri < c.
(d) In CPAs, the change in the expected utility of all members with ri ≥ c is non-negative
and for all the members with ri ≤ c, the change is non-positive. In CGAs, the change
in the expected utility is non-positive for all members with ri ≤ c and some members
with ri > c.
(e) In risk-sharing scenarios (i.e. g(x) = x/n) both models have the same behaviour for
parts (c) and (d).
For a better understanding of the mechanisms underlying Proposition 2.3, Example 2.1 is
continued, and each graph is described in terms of the theoretical result.
Example 2.2 (CARA agents; part 2)
This example is the continuation of Example 2.1. Figure 2.4.4 shows that robust rules for
club good agreements provide higher total welfare but are bounded by higher δ . This result
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is explained by Proposition 2.3 parts (a) and (b). Part (a) explains that in many conditions,
and in particular for risk-sharing agreements (ng′( kcn ∑
N
j=1Yj)−1 = 0), club goods require
higher values of δ (i.e. are less robust), while part (b) shows that their total welfare is higher.
Fig. 2.5.1 Future trade-off
Complementing this analysis, Figures 2.5.1 and 2.5.2 represent Proposition 2.3 part (c)
and (d), respectively. Figure 2.5.1 shows that as inequality increases, the future trade-off
improves for the poorest individual, while it deteriorates for the richest individual. In a
seemingly contradictory result, Figure 2.5.2 reveals that the expected utility declines for
the poorest individual and increases for the richest. This paradox is the essence of the
rent-seeking vs. re-distribution trade-off that the robust rules balance.
These four results describe the differences between the incentive mechanisms underlying
the two types of collective action problems. Club good agreements create ex-ante unequal
treatment (contribution side), while common pool agreements create ex-post unequal treat-
ment (distribution side). This difference allows common pool agreements to be more effective
at adjusting the incentives of each member of the community and a lower δ to be obtained.
By contrast, club good agreements set the contribution levels according to the incentives
of each individual; thus, individual utilities are less penalized by the contributions. Both
agreements depict that the poorest individual is compensated with a better future trade-off
and that the richest individual is compensated with a better expected utility. Therefore, poor
people participate in the agreement because it is better than staying in autarky, and this benefit
increases as inequality increases (due to re-distribution benefits). For rich people, as they
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Fig. 2.5.2 Expected utility
become richer, their future trade-off is less compelling, but the agreements offer them higher
expected utility to incentivize their participation (rent-seeking incentives). Common pool
agreements divide rich and poor depending on their difference from the average individual.
Instead, club good agreements provide fewer incentives to average individuals, except for the
risk-sharing case, as Proposition 2.3 part (e) claims.
■
Proposition 2.3 highlights the incentive structure that robust rules use to promote par-
ticipation. For example, for low inequality levels, robust rules preserve the total welfare as
agreements become more robust. Regarding the third puzzle, the previous idea explains that
inequality can be beneficial for agreements because it reduces the deviation incentives (i.e.
reduces the δ required to coordinate) while still providing the same welfare level. However,
as heterogeneity increases, this result becomes weaker as non-linear effects appear.
In conclusion, Section 2.4 and Section 2.5 showed that robust rules provide new insights
that can explain the four puzzles stated in the introduction and why such rules are likely to
be present in communities. Finally, there is no absolute advantage between common pool
and club good agreements. Deciding between the two is equivalent to deciding between
robustness and efficiency. Under general conditions, club good agreements generate higher
total welfare but are less robust than common pool agreements.
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2.6 Discussion and Future Work
This section discusses three topics related to the use of robust agreements to describe
real scenarios: i) the prevalence of robust agreements in society, ii) the veracity of group
coordination in network contexts, and iii) the effect of the market structure on the stability of
agreements. This section then concludes with suggestions for future extensions of the current
model.
Are robust agreements common in society?
The previous sections proved that robust rules explain several empirical observations. Given
that these agreements require lower patience levels at equilibrium, they should be more
common than egalitarian agreements: heterogeneous agents are more likely to deviate from
agreements that treat everyone equally (Abramitzky, 2008). Nonetheless, as stated in the
third puzzle, heterogeneity sometimes works as a barrier to the creation of agreements.
While robust agreements explain the different scenarios that appear in reality, the theo-
retical construction is not able to determine whether the barrier effect is stronger than the
facilitator effect without a specific context. However, experimental and field work provide
some additional insights into the previous puzzle. In a review of experiments in this field,
Cardenas (2005) showed that it was challenging for individuals to postulate differential
treatment rules. As such, unless they emerge naturally, they are not the first option for
policy-makers. Additionally, Baland and Platteau (2007) and Ruttan (2008) provided some
examples of successful unequal treatment agreements. However, the authors emphasised
that rules are community-specific and that their implementation is unlikely to be transferable
to other societies. In theory, while differential treatment agreements should be regularly
observed, it is still essential to understand the context of each community to determine
whether such treatment is plausible for its members.
Is group coordination a realistic assumption in network contexts?
Both club good and common pool agreements are mechanisms by which a community
coordinates towards a common goal. This assumption is realistic when society is working
towards a common good (e.g. an irrigation system (Bardhan, 2000), a common field (Wade,
1987), or a common forest (Naidu, 2009)). However, authors such as Bates (1990), Fafchamps
and Lund (2003), Bramoullé and Kranton (2007), and Bloch et al. (2008) have suggested that
in cases with risk-sharing and other resource-pooling mechanisms, the relationship is not
74 On the Role of Unequal Treatment in Collective Agreements
with the community but between individuals. Therefore, the shares that individuals receive
depend on their position in the network. Nonetheless, authors such as Jackson et al. (2012)
and Ambrus et al. (2014) have explained that both in theory and in the field, the most stable
networks have members that have strong regular connections with all the other members of
the same cluster. Therefore, under models such as that of Bramoullé and Kranton (2007),
where the agents cannot distinguish who receives the benefit, a regular network implies that
all individuals receive the same share of the common good, i.e. CGAs.
The previous argument supports the fact that club good agreements are more common
than common pool agreements. Furthermore, the expected even distribution of benefits in
such network agreements explains why different communities tolerate people that hide their
“share-able income”. For example, Bates (1990), Fafchamps (1992), and Di Falco and Bulte
(2011) documented cases in which some community members found ways to reduce the
resources they were pooling, such as buying non-shareable assets, placing only a portion of
their income in the pool, or hiding a proportion of their income. Implicitly, these practices
are equivalent to a robust rule in club good agreements. Hence, even in agreements ruled by
approximately regular network interactions, it is possible to observe club good agreements in
the field. In contrast, common pool agreements require community coordination and do not
seem to be feasible in network contexts.
Are robust agreements stable vis-à-vis markets?
The rise of markets plays a central role in the collective agreements literature. Munshi and
Rosenzweig (2007) gathered empirical evidence on how new market structures increase
individuals’ outside options, thus making them more prone to deviate. Continuing on this
topic, Gagnon and Goyal (2017) studied how the nature of the interaction between the market
and community agreements (whether a social agreement complements or substitutes for
market effects) can affect their stability. From the lens of the “substitution effect”, individuals
who benefit less from the community are prone to leave. In another analysis, Banerjee and
Newman (1998) argued that in heterogeneous communities, both the richest and the poorest
individuals are more likely to leave the network and take higher risks in the market because
markets improve the outside option for the richest and offer new opportunities for the poorest.
As these models suggest, markets increase the outside options for some agents within
the community. If a shock is unexpected, the effect of the market represents a decrease in
the future trade-off or a decrease in the worst-case present trade-off. Theorem 2.2 implies
that robust agreements resist these shocks better than any other rule. Alternatively, if the
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community anticipates a shock generated by the market and can renegotiate the agreement, the
new agreement is likely to improve the treatment of agents who have better outside options.
Hence, heterogeneous communities that manage to preserve their collective goods are
expected to exhibit unequal treatment after a market shock. While the relationship between
market interactions and communities might not be causal, it does reflect a survivorship bias
associated with a preference for robustness in the community.
Future work
In the search for a parsimonious model, the current paper strongly relied on three premises:
independent income distributions, simple rules, and perfect information among community
members.
The independence among individuals in the distribution of income suggests that income
follows a Poisson-like process across individuals. This assumption is realistic for multiple
cases. For example, in agricultural villages where the land is homogeneous and the amount
of grain obtained is proportional to the amount of rain that the crop receives, the Poisson
process of rainfall guarantees the independence of production between individuals. Thus,
this assumption can be reasonable for spatially closed communities, such as those observed
in Fafchamps and Gubert (2007). Another way to obtain independence among individuals
occurs when the people in the agreement are strategically chosen to have independent sources
of income. Luke and Munshi (2006) presented an example of this situation. In their study,
communities encourage exogamous marriages so that the family linkages are not correlated.
Hence, individual independence is a valid assumption for many scenarios. In contrast, time
independence is a stronger assumption. For example, if the income of a hunter-gatherer
community is the amount of game collected, the number of animals around the village is
likely to present a serial correlation. Thus, it is appropriate to extend the current work to
cases where income is serially correlated because such cases might offer different insights
regarding the income stream behaviour and history-dependent agreements in a heterogeneous
agent context.
Regarding simple rules, because it is already difficult for individuals to construct unequal
treatment rules under experimental conditions, more sophisticated rules will be very unlikely
to emerge in reality (Kalai and Stanford, 1988). However, as Kocherlakota (1996) and Ligon
et al. (2002) showed, history and state-contingent agreements can improve the efficiency of
agreements. Hence, it is worth studying the robustness of agreements under more elaborate
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rules that can provide better insights into history and state-contingent contracts and how they
are affected by a robustness approach.
Finally, with respect to perfect monitoring, it is plausible that everyone in a small com-
munity is aware of the realities of other members. However, as the population size increases,
this assumption becomes less likely. In that case, the network perspective mentioned previ-
ously becomes more relevant. Even if the network is regular, the flow of information might
only be local, as in Bloch et al. (2008). Therefore, future work should include the network
component to help explain how the incentives of community members to monitor each other
allow agreements to exist.
2.7 Conclusions
The economic theory of community agreements has been heavily influenced by a utilitarian
approach in which ideal policies maximise the overall welfare of the community. However,
these are not the only rules that can emerge in communities. The results revealed in the
previous sections present a case for policies that follow a Rawlsian approach in which
communities develop rules that reduce the deviation incentives for individuals who are
more likely to deviate from collective agreements. This change of perspective provides a
unified framework to explain some of the central puzzles that link inequality and collective
agreements.
Robust agreements are not only theoretical constructions: they do exist in many commu-
nities. However, in contrast to other mechanisms such as equally distributed full risk-sharing
arrangements, robust agreements are difficult to generalise because they are context-specific.
Nevertheless, the primary results from this paper can be extended to guide policies that
balance the trade-off between stability and efficient agreements.
Appendix to Chapter 2
Appendix 2.A Math Notation
This section defines the technical notation that the paper uses in the main text and in the
proofs. The notation used in the proofs of Section 2.B, that is not mentioned in this section,
was explicitly defined in the main text.
• Rn+ is an n-dimensional vector where each component is in [0,∞).
• O is a zero vector of appropriate size.
• I is a one vector of appropriate size.
• ∆n is an n-dimensional simplex.
• E is the expected value function.
• If A is a matrix, AT is its transpose.
Appendix 2.B Proofs
Lemmas:
Lemma 2.1 If ri > r j, then Yi first orders stochastic dominates Yj.
Proof:
The cumulative probability function of Yi and Yj are F(
yi
ri
) and F(y jr j ). As F is increasing,
∀x ∈ [0,∞), F( xri )≤ F(
x
r j
). Hence, Yi first orders stochastic dominates Y j.
■
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Lemma 2.2 PTi(yt ,α,β ) has a lower bound.
Proof:
By definition, u is bounded. Let M be a constant such that ∀x : M > u(x). Then, for every
individual i, it holds that PTi(yt ,α,β )>−M.
■
Lemma 2.3 Let h1(x) be an increasing convex function such that h1(x) = 0 ⇔ x = 0 and let
h2(x) be a positive concave function such that h2(0) = 0. Then,
h2(x)
h1(x)
is decreasing for x > 0.
Proof:
From the conditions of h1, for all λ ∈ (0,1), λh1(x)≥ h1(λx)≥ 0, and from the conditions


















































































Proof of Theorem 2.1:
The first direction of the proof: “if the efficient rule for the CGAs and CPAs is (I, 1nI)⇒
FTN(I, 1nI)> 0” is trivial: The counterreciprocal states that if FTN(I,
1
nI)≤ 0, then the rule
(I, 1nI) is not admissible because the wealthiest individual has incentives to deviate. Hence,
the rule cannot be efficient.
The proof of the other direction is independently done for each model.
CGA:
Step 1: Define F (a) = ∑Ni=1 FTi(a,
1
nI) and prove that F (a) is concave.
This proof requires two parts. The first part proves that for all yt , and for every individual
i, Ci(a,y) = u(Γ(y,a, 1nI)i)−u(yi) is concave. Once this is proven, the second part states that
F (a) = ∑Ni=1E[Ci(a)] is concave because the expected value preserves concavity on a.
Without loss of generality, the first part of the proof is done for i = 1. The proof for the
other values of i is identical.
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g′′(∑Nj=1 a jy j)
≥ 0.
Thus, as B and D are positive semidefinite, then H(−C1(a,yt)) is positive semidefinite.
Ergo, C1(a,y) is concave in a. Thus, F (a) is concave.
Step 2:
Notice that, FTN(a, 1nI) > 0 and, because YN first order stochastically dominates Yi,
E[u(YN)−u(Yi)]≥ 0. Thus, FTi(a, 1nI) = FTN(a,
1
nI)+E[u(YN)−u(Yi)]> 0.


















































From step 1, F (a) is concave. Moreover, a = I satisfies all the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker




F (a) is a global maximum. Ergo, (I, 1nI) is efficient.
CPA:
Let τ = 1 and consider p ̸= 1nI and a permutation π : {1, . . . ,N}→{1, . . . ,N} such that for






i=1 pπ(i) = 1.
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Proof of Theorem 2.2:
This proof relies in the characteristics of Mi(α,β ). Therefore, these characteristics are
presented and then the theorem is proven.
































where y∗i is the income that minimises PT (y,α,β ). Furthermore, is clear that Mi(α,β )≤ 0,
and Mi(α,O) = 0.
From the definition of Mi(α,β ), if αi = α j and βi = β j then Mi(α,β ) = M j(α,β ).
Moreover, if α is parametrized as an increasing linear function of t,




















































From the definition of M, it is also clear that FTi(O,β ) = 0. Using these results, the
proof of the theorem goes as follows.
Part a:



































































M j(a, 1n I)
, and given that FTj(a, 1nI)> FTi(a,
1
nI), a j <
1, and −Mi(a, 1nI) =−M j(a,
1
nI)> 0, a marginal increase in a j will increase the utility of all
the others without decreasing the utility of FTj(a, 1nI) enough for it to become the minimum
or 0. Thus (a, 1nI) was not a robust rule.
For the case where a j ̸= ai, assume that a j < ai. Notice that −
FTj(a, 1n I)
M j(a, 1n I)
is decreasing in a.
Hence, consider two rules (a, 1nI), and (a
′, 1nI), and where for all k ̸= i it holds that a
′
k = ak










Henceforth, reducing the contribution of j improves the ratio for all the other individuals and
does not reduce the minimum ratio. Hence, (a, 1nI) cannot be robust.
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Finally, consider a robust rule (a, 1nI) and assume that k < ∑
N
k=1 αkrk. Define αi(t) =
ait. From the proof of Theorem 2.1, for all i, FTi(a, 1nI) > 0 and for the range t = [0,1],
FTi(α(t), 1nI) is positive, concave, and it is only 0 when t = 0. Moreover, based on the results
at the beginning of this proof, −Mi(α(t), 1nI) is increasing and convex, being 0 only when




is decreasing in t. Thence, (a, 1nI) cannot be a
robust rule because the rule (α(t), 1nI) where t
∗ is such that k = ∑Nk=1 αk(t






By replicating the last part of the proof of part (a) it is enough to prove that if (a, 1nI)
is robust then it is not possible that airi = a jr j. As in the previous case, this is proven by
contradiction.
Step 1:
Given that M j(a, 1nI)> Mi(a,
1



























, proving that a was not robust.















∣∣∣Yi = yi,Yj = y j]+T (ai,a j)−E[u(Yi)]
Ergo, FTj(a, 1nI)−FTi(a,
1
nI) = T (a j,ai)−T (ai,a j)+E[u(Yi)]−E[u(Yj)]≤ 0. Hence, due
to step 1, (a, 1nI) is not robust.
Part c:
Step 1: τ = k(∑Nk=1 rk)
−1
By contradiction, assume a robust rule (τI, p) and k < τ ∑Nj=1 r j. Analogous to part (a),
for every individual i, FTi(τI, p)> 0, and for the range τ = [0,1], FTi(τI, p) is concave and
positive where only FTi(0I, p) = 0. Also, −Mi(τI, p) is is increasing and convex, where it is
only 0 when τ = 0. Hence, from Lemma 2.3, −FTi(τI,p)Mi(τI,p) is decreasing in τ . Thence, (τI, p)
cannot be a robust rule because the rule (τ ′I, 1nI) where τ
′ = k(∑Nk=1 rk)
−1 has a higher value
of −FTi(τI,p)Mi(τI,p) .
Step 2:
If p is such that pi = 0,FTi(τI, p)< 0. Therefore, p is not robust.
Step 3:
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Let (τI, p) be a robust rule. Assume that ri > r j and pi = p j. From the smoothing
condition,∣∣∣E[u(Γ(Y,τI, p)i)−u(Γ(Y,τI, p) j)]∣∣∣< ∣∣∣E[u(Γ(Y,O, p)i)−u(Γ(Y,O, p) j)]∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣E[u(Yi)]−E[u(Y j)]∣∣∣
Given that Yi first order stochastically dominates Yj, then E[u(Yi)]> E[u(Yj)]. Therefore,






























To understand the previous result, consider that FTj(τI, p)> FTi(τI, p) and −Mi(τI, p) =
−M j(τI, p)> 0. Moreover p j > 0. Therefore, a marginal decrease in p j that is equivalent
to an increase in the share (pi) of all the other individuals will increase their utility without






and is still an admissible rule. Thus, the original rule
was not robust.
Part d:
Assume the existence of individuals i, j such that −FTi(τI,p)Mi(τI,p) <−
FTj(τI,p)
M j(τI,p) . From step 2
of part (c), p j > 0. Hence, a marginal decrease in p j compensated with an increase of pi
will increase the utility of all the others without decreasing the utility of j enough to make
FTj(τI, p) the minimum. Ergo, this change increases the minimum and is still an admissible
rule. Thus, the original rule cannot be robust.
■
Propositions:
Proof of Proposition 2.1:
Part a:
For part (a) it is enough to provide an example of a situation where (I, 1nI) is not admissi-
ble.
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Let n = 2, u(x) = 1− e−ρx, g(x) = 12x, and f (x) = 1− e
−x, i.e. a community of two
constant absolute risk-averse agents whose income follows an exponential distribution and













Thus, if 2(r2−r1)r1r2 > ρ , then the second individual has a negative future trade-off. Ergo, the
rule is not admissible.
Part b:
If (I, 1nI) is admissible, then Ds(I,
1
nI) ̸= /0. Given that the set of rules (a,
1
nI) is defined
in a compact (a ∈ [0,1] such that ∑Ni=1 airi ≥ k), by Wiestrass Theorem, there exists (a′, 1nI)
admissible such that Ds(a, 1nI)⊆ Ds(a
′, 1nI) for all a ∈ [0,1].
Part c:




, and define v(x) = u(rix) and Xi = Yiri . By construction ∀i : Xi ∼











































The first inequality comes from the definition of g(x), and the second comes from Jensen’s
Inequality. The previous result implies that for every individual i, FTi(I, p)> 0. As there is
an admissible rule, and given that all the functions are continuous and τ and p are defined
in compacts (τ ∈ [k(∑Nk=1 rk)−1,1] and p ∈ ∆n), Wiestrass Theorem states the existence of
(τ ′I, p′) admissible such that Ds(τI, p)⊆ Ds(τ ′I, p′) for all τ ∈ [k(∑Nk=1 rk)−1,1] and p ∈ ∆n.
■
Proof of Proposition 2.2:
CGA:
Let (a, 1nI) be a robust agreement in a smoothing context.







M j(a, 1n I)
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M j(a, 1n I)
and ai ̸= 1, then a marginal decrease








. Thus, (a, 1nI) was not robust.
If ai = 1, then mimicking the proof of part (c) of Theorem 2.2 it follows that for all j < i,
and unless a j = 1, if ai ≥ a j, then (a, 1nI) is not robust.
Step 2: FTi(a, 1nI)≤ FTj(a,
1
nI) for all i > j.
Form Theorem 2.2 part (a), if ai = a j = 1, then FTi(a, 1nI)≤ FTj(a,
1
nI).






M j(a, 1n I)
. Hence, M j(a, 1nI)≤ Mi(a,
1









≤ 1; and due to the first order stochastic








where FTi(a, 1nI)+E[u(Yi)] is the expected utility of individual i after the agreement. Thus,
(a, 1nI) promotes equality.
CPA:
Let (τI, p) be a robust agreement.
Step 1: ∀i ̸= j, −FTi(τI,p)Mi(τI,p) =−
FTj(τI,p)
M j(τI,p) .
Theorem 2.2, part (d).
Step 2: FTi(τI, p)≤ FTj(τI, p) for every i > j.
Given that −FTi(τI,p)Mi(τI,p) = −
FTj(τI,p)
M j(τI,p) , and M j(τI, p) ≤ Mi(τI, p) < 0, if pi ≥ p j, then
FTi(τI, p)≤ FTj(τI, p).
Step 3:
From the previous step, FTi(τI,p)FTj(τI,p) ≤ 1. Also, from the first order stochastic dominance of







where FTi(τI, p)+E[u(Yi)] is the expected utility of individual i after the agreement. Thus,
(τI, p) promotes equality.
■
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Proof of Proposition 2.3:












































































































































The previous derivations will be use in the following proofs:
Part a:
Given that in both cases infinitesimal deviations are considered, the relevant functions
are approximated by a first order Taylor expansion, centred on ( kcnI,
1
nI) (which is the robust
rule of an homogeneous population). For heterogeneous populations, robust agreements are
denoted in a way such that for every individual i, ai = kcn +∆ai and pi =
1
n +∆pi (τ is not
relevant as the shock is a mean-spread). Therefore, a Taylor expansion of order 1 on r,a, and
p can be done. Using Lemma 2.4 on the expansion, the following equations are obtained:







































































Because the Taylor expansion is centred in an homogeneous case, all the values that are























































































































8During this proof M′(α,β ) is a short notation for dMdα or
dM
dβ . The right option is clear by context, and
whereas this is an abuse of notation it helps to reduce the size of the equations.
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M j(a, 1n I)
)






















































































































































Using the same notation as in the previous case,
CGA:










































































































































































































































































ς ≤ 0. Then ∆ri ≥ 0














































































> 0. Thus, ∆FTi( kcnI, p)
decreases when ∆ri increases, and ∆FTi( kcnI, p) has the opposite sign of ∆ri.
Part d:
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increases when ∆ri increases. Moreover, using the same






























































































































On the Influence of Economic Journals
3.1 Introduction
Many economists studying market efficiency have explored whether the organisation of
economic research itself is efficient and, if not, how it can be improved. One aspect of the
organisation of economic research that has attracted a lot of attention recently is the impor-
tance given to publications in top journals, in particular to the so-called "Top 5": American
Economic Review, Econometrica, Journal of Political Economy, Review of Economic Studies,
and Quarterly Journal of Economics. At many departments, publishing in Top 5 journals
is an important factor, if not a requirement, for tenure or promotion. This issue has raised
concerns that the economic profession focuses too much on publishing in these journals.
Furthermore, authorships and editorships of the top journals have been dominated by U.S.
elite schools, which raises concerns about market power and its implications on the efficiency
of research production (Fourcade et al., 2015).1
The reigning discussion motivates obvious questions, such as: How important are these
top journals? Do the Top 5 journals indeed stand out from other top journals? And, has it
always been like this, or have the "Top 5" emerged? Even more importantly, is it possible to
say something about the causes of the excessive influence of the Top 5 journals?
Regarding the first two questions, one way to analyse them is through citations. While
having its measurement drawbacks, citations proxy for influence and are widely measurable
and reported. The first step of this paper is then to perform a comprehensive citation analysis,
1For more insights about these issues, the 2017 AEA Annual Meeting had a panel discussion on this
topic: "Publishing and Promotion in Economics: The Curse of the Top Five", which can be viewed at https:
//www.aeaweb.org/conference/webcasts/2017.
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considering trends in journal influence of the Top 5 journals in comparison to other important
economic journals.
This analysis leads to the following results. First, the Top 5 journals outpaced the other
journals in the 1980s and 1990s in terms of journal influence. To illustrate, comparing the
Top 5 journals to a set of Tier 2 journals, namely Economic Journal, International Economic
Review, and Review of Economics and Statistics, articles in the Top 5 journals received on
average 68% more citations than Tier 2 journals in 1980. This influence gap widened, such
that in 1999 Top 5 articles received on average 350% more citations than Tier 2 journals.
Trends for other top field journals are similar.
However, the second finding is that this widening of the influence gap stopped in 2000,
and, since then, it has partially reversed for some journals. For example, in 2017, the average
Top 5 article received 100% more citations than an article in a Tier 2 journal, reversing the
influence gap to the level of 1983.
Taking a closer look at the rebound after 2000, this paper obtains a surprising third
finding: when individual top field journals are considered, the influence measures of these
journals have converged. For example, in 2000, the Journal of Econometrics received almost
three times as many citations as the Journal of Development Economics. In contrast, in 2017,
the Journal of Development Economics has surpassed the Journal of Econometrics in the
citation rankings, and the Journal of Development Economics now receives around 35%
more citations than the Journal of Econometrics.
The second and third findings are surprising and raise questions about the perceived
stability of the outperformance of the Top 5 journals. Moreover, they foment the question of
what caused these reversals and convergence in trends.
The second part of this paper considers a theoretical model of a two-sided journal market.
In this model, journals act as platforms connecting authors that want to publish their ideas
and readers that want to read good ideas. Journals act as screening devices on the quality of
an author’s ideas, such that authors not only care about publishing in a journal with a large
readership but also in a journal that publishes high-quality ideas. Similarly, readers value
journals that publish many high-quality ideas, such that journals indeed prefer to publish as
many good ideas as possible. However, each journal faces a space constraint, such that it
decides to set a quality threshold in order to constrain the number of submissions within its
capacity.
This model considers competition between one general interest journal, attracting readers
from many fields, and many field journals that specialise in a single field. Upon analysing the
model, the first observation is that there are multiple equilibria that differ in the hierarchy of
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the journals. In some fields, the general interest journal is the top journal and the field journal
is the second, whereas in other fields, the field journal is the top journal and the general
interest journal is the second. The existence of multiple equilibria can be understood as a
bandwagon effect with respect to quality, that is if the best researchers from a particular field
publish in journal A then it becomes more attractive to publish in journal A, such that journal
A is able to select to publish the best ideas from the field.
Second, the model shows that the ambiguity in equilibria disappears when the number of
authors in the fields and the size of the readership of the general interest journal are large
enough. In that case, the benefits of publishing in the general interest journal are so large that
the general interest journal is the top journal in all fields.
Third, considering comparative statics, the influence of a journal decreases when the
journal is able to publish more articles, and the influence of the field journals converge with
an expansion of those fields in which the general interest journal has the highest influence.
This third group of findings suggests potential mechanisms for the observed trends in
the citation patterns. Therefore, the final part of the paper returns to the citation data to
see if these mechanisms are empirically plausible. Here, the paper indeed finds a negative
relation between journal space and journal influence. Moreover, Top 5 journals reduced
the number of articles in their journals in the 80s and 90s, whereas the other top journals
increased the number of articles in their journals in the same period. This fact mimics the
trends observed in the impact factors, which makes changes in journal capacity a plausible
explanation to the average changes in journal influence. Similarly, fields that used to have
a relatively low impact factor, such as development economics and urban economics, have
expanded significantly in recent years, which could explain the convergence of impact factors
of all fields in the data.
This paper makes the following contributions. It is the first to make a comprehensive
comparison between the Top 5 journals and other top journals. This covers and extends
previous research, and allows it to obtain new findings regarding journal influence since
2000, and the role of journal space and field sizes in explaining these trends. Concerning
previous research, Ellison (2002b) already noted that in the 1980s and 1990s second tier
generalised interest journals and top field journals had lost influence relative to Top 5 journals
in terms of the impact factor, which estimates the number of citations that the average journal
article receives. Card and DellaVigna (2013) performed an extensive citation analysis of the
Top 5 journals from the 1970s, and noted an increased number of submissions and lower
acceptance rates in the Top 5 journals. However, they did not compare the Top 5 journals to
other journals.
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Second, this paper makes a contribution to the theoretical literature on the market of aca-
demic journals as two-sided platforms. In standard platform competition models (Armstrong,
2006; Rochet and Tirole, 2003), platforms compete for quantity, that is, number of sellers or
buyers. For the model presented in Section 3.3, journals also have a screening role, such that
they also compete for the quality of submissions. McCabe and Snyder (2005) and Jeon and
Rochet (2010) modelled the quality aspect of journals. They focused on open access pricing
in a model with a single monopolist journal. While the model presented in this paper does
not consider pricing, it does take into account competition between multiple journals with
respect to the quality threshold strategy. Thus, it is possible to obtain results regarding the
interaction of journals with respect to their influence. McCabe and Snyder (2016) offered a
model with multiple academic journals that compete for quality and quantity. In their model,
journals compete in prices but do not decide on a quality threshold. In the model presented
here, competition is exactly in terms of the quality threshold, which explains why journals
interact with respect to journal influence, i.e. this approach links the model with the main
variable of interest of the empirical analysis.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 presents the empirical trends on journal
influence since 1980. Section 3.3 constructs the theoretical model and derives the main
theoretical results. Section 3.4 links the model back to the empirics, giving a potential
explanation for the trends observed in Section 3.2. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Trends in Journal Influence
This section presents the main empirical trends of the impact factors of economic journals.
First, it describes the datasets studied, and then it displays the trends associated with the
influence gap between Top 5 and other top economic journals.
3.2.1 Data Sources
The key objective of this paper is to investigate the evolution of the influence top eco-
nomic journals have had in academia. In this case, influence is studied via citation-based
measurements.2
2Traditionally, influence has been considered to be a function of the level of citations that a paper, author,
or journal receives. Underlying this perspective is the idea that citations reflect the way in which researchers
validate the quality of ideas that an article contains (Posner, 2000). However, with the emergence of new social
networks where authors divulge research, several authors such as Konkiel (2016) proposed new approaches to
measuring the influence of a paper including papers’ outreach in social and specialised media. While these new
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The citation data used for the following analysis comes from Web of Science. Web
of Science is an information system containing more than 20,000 journals, books, and
conference proceedings that included over 80 million records of the most relevant journals
(Clarivate Analytics, 2018). Moreover, out of the 45 ranking papers reviewed and presented
by Bornmann et al. (2017), 26 studies used Web of Science as the primary source of
information. Hence, economists widely regard it as a reliable source of information for this
type of studies.
In this paper, top journals are classified into general interest and Top Field (top field-
specific) journals. Within the general interest journals, there are Top 5 and Tier 2 (second-tier
general interest journals). Except for Top 5, there are no well-defined criteria separating the
other groups. For comparability purposes, the journals in Tier 2 and Top Field were chosen
based on Ellison (2002b). This categorisation gives a set of 16 top journals: five Top 5, three
Tier 2, and eight Top Field journals. Table 3.2.1 presents the journals in each group.3
Table 3.2.1 Top journal groups
Category Journals
Top 5
American Economic Review, Econometrica, Journal of Political Eco-
nomics, Quarterly Journal of Economics, and Review of Economic
Studies.
Tier 2 Economic Journal, Review of Economics and Statistics, International
Economic Review.
Top Field
Journal of International Economics, Journal of Econometrics, Journal
of Economic Theory, Journal of Urban Economy, Journal of Monetary
Economy4, Rand Journal of Economics5, Journal of Public Economics,
and Journal of Development Economics.
Given the list of top journals, and based on the data available on Web of Science, two
datasets on citations were created. The first dataset, hereafter known as Top-Journals dataset,
considers all the articles and proceedings papers published between 1970 and 2017 in each of
approaches mark a step forward towards understanding outreach in a world dominated by the internet, such
measurements are new and are thus not available for this paper’s relevant period of study.
3In recent years, new influential journals such as the American Economic Journal and the Journal of the
European Economic Association have emerged. Nevertheless, they have not been operating long enough and
therefore it is not possible to measure accurately the influence they have had on economic research.
4Also covers its predecessor Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy.
5Also covers its predecessor Bell Journal of Economics.
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the aforementioned 16 journals. Top-Journals dataset includes all citations from the universe
of Web of Science that each item received every year following its publication date.
The Top-journals dataset does not contain information on individual citations, however.
Therefore, a second dataset was created, hereafter known as the 100-Journals dataset. This
dataset includes information on individual citations by building on a universe of 100 journals
(including the 16 previously mentioned). While it is not the complete universe of economic-
relevant journals, the sample is large enough to cover the journals that account for the most
significant share of citations that top journals receive. Moreover, there is no official list
that states what are the relevant economic journals. As such, this paper selects the journals
from the "Simple Rank" list of "All Years" published by IDEAS/RePEc.6 For each of the
journals in this list, the 100-Journals dataset includes, per article and proceedings paper, how
many references it has, and what articles they are mentioning. The data was retrieved from
https://ideas.repec.org/top/ in May 2018, and the complete list is in Appendix 3.A.
In contrast to the Top-journals dataset, the 100-Journals dataset tracks which journals are
citing each of the top journals and in what year they are citing them.
3.2.2 Journal Influence
The impact factor, first described by Garfield (1955, 1972), has been the primary indicator of
a journal’s influence. This measurement has been used to rank journals by several authors in
economics, such as Liebowitz and Palmer (1984), Laband and Piette (1994), Kalaitzidakis
et al. (2003), and Engemann and Wall (2009). Analytically, the p-years impact factor (IF pi,t)








where ci,s,t is the number of citations that the articles of journal i published in year s received
from articles published in any journal in year t; and ni,s is the number of articles that journal
i published in year s. This measure derives its popularity from its natural interpretation and
wide availability. Intuitively, a journal that gets more citations per article is more influential
in the field than a journal that receives fewer citations. Moreover, since the late 1970s, Social
6IDEAS is a web portal run by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and uses the
RePEc (Reseach Papers in Economics) database to rank economic journals, among other objectives. Dedicated
exclusively to economic research, IDEAS currently has over 2,500,000 items of research, and it is therefore
considered a focal point for many economists. Due to its broad coverage and relevance in economics, IDEAS
was considered the primary reference to identify the universe of journals.
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Science Citation Index (SSCI) has provided a large sample of citation data that facilitates its
calculation (Liebowitz and Palmer, 1984).
Following Ellison (2002b), this paper calculates the p-year impact factor ratio (IFRpi,t) of






This measure is used to track the evolution of the influence gap between a particular
journal and Top 5 across the period of study. While many papers and bibliometric sources
calculate the 2-year impact factor, Engemann and Wall (2009) claimed that two years
is considered a very short period to measure influence. For this reason, as well as for
comparability with Ellison (2002b), this article studies influence based on the 10-year impact
factor ratio of a journal.7
Figure 3.2.1 uses the Top-Journals dataset to present the evolution of the average impact
factor ratio of Tier 2 and Top Field journals relative to Top 5. This figure reveals two trends.
First, it displays a dramatic decline in the impact factor ratio of Tier 2 and Top Field journals
in the period from 1980 until 1999 relative to the impact factor of the Top 5 journals. In
particular, the impact factor ratio of Tier 2 to Top 5 dropped from 0.59 to 0.22, while that of
Top Field to Top 5 declined from 0.81 to 0.34. To illustrate these numbers, while the average
article in a Top 5 journal received around 68% more citations than the average Tier 2 article
in 1980, Top 5 articles received on average about 350% more citation than Tier 2 articles in
1999! Similarly, articles in Top 5 journals received around 23% more citations than those in
Top Field journals in 1980, however, on average they received about 200% more citations
than Top Field articles in 1999. These numbers show that Top 5 journals simply started to
jump out in the 1980s and 1990s, explaining why the label "Top 5" appeared in around the
year 2000.
However, Figure 3.2.1 depicts a reversal of this trend after 2000. By 2017, the impact
factor ratio of Tier 2 was 0.49, which means that Top 5 articles received over a 100% more
citations than Tier 2 articles, almost as high as in the mid-1980s. Top Field journals also
closed the influence gap although their impact factor ratio did not improve as much as Tier






. There are two main differences with the standard definition. First, he considered articles
that were published on the reference year. Second, due to the lack of data, he estimated the number of articles
published during the t years preceding year p in journal i (n∗i,p) based on the growth of articles of American
Economic Review.
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Fig. 3.2.1 Influence gap
2. By 2017, their impact factor ratio was 0.39, which means that Top 5 articles received
on average over 150% more citations than Top Field articles, almost as high as it was in
the mid-1990s. Moreover, 2010 was the first time since 1980 that Tier 2 journals received
more citations per article than Top Field. The trends after 2000 are remarkable and against
common perception, as they show that Top 5 journals are becoming considerably less central,
and researchers are attaching more importance to other top journals in more recent years.
As fields in economics are not homogeneous, it is important to take a closer look at the
impact factor ratio of individual field journals to analyse the diversity of Top Field journals.
Prior to 2000, the impact factor ratio of all top field journals decreased and no trends in
dispersion were seen. For this reason, this part focuses on the dynamics after 2000. Based
on the Top Journals dataset, Figure 3.2.2a calculates the impact factor ratio of each Top
Field journal after 2000. This figure reveals that the impact factor ratios of the field journals
have experienced a remarkable convergence; the impact factor ratio of those fields with low
impact factors is increasing, while the ratio of those fields with initially higher impact factor
is decreasing. The only exception is the Journal of Economic Theory, which has experienced
a continuous decline.
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(a) Impact factor ratio per journal
(b) Change in influence
Fig. 3.2.2 Influence gap of Top Field journals
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Figure 3.2.2b highlights the convergence as those journals with low influence at the
beginning of the period show a strong positive change, while those with initially high
influence show a strong negative change. The figure shows a scatter plot of the change
in impact factor ratio from 2000 to 2017 (y-axis: IFRi,2017 − IFRi,2000) against the impact
factor ratio of 2000 (x-axis: IFRi,2000). The figure also shows the best linear fit. The
corresponding slope of the regression line is significantly negative, even including the outlier
for Journal of Economic Theory (β̂ =−1.311, s
β̂
= 0.297, p = 0.004). Excluding the outlier,
the significance is even stronger (β̂ =−1.458, s
β̂
= 0.093, p = 0.000).8
The evidence presented in this section reveals three important trends about the influence
of top journals in economics. First, prior to 2000, Top 5 journals demonstrated a sharp
increase in their influence and distanced themselves from other top journals. Second, after
2000, Tier 2 journals significantly reduced the influence gap with Top 5 journals. In contrast,
Top Field journals kept the influence difference stable. Finally, due to the heterogeneity
among economic fields, a closer look at the dynamics of Top Field journals reveals that after
2000 those journals with initially low influence are becoming more relevant, while those
with initially high influence are fading out, thus creating a convergence in the influence gap
among the fields.
The previous observations relied on the impact factor ratio as a measurement of the
influence of a journal. Although quite popular, the impact factor ratio does have some
weaknesses. In particular, it does not consider the citations’ sources, the number of self-
citations, and the change in the number of references per article in a journal. To prove that the
results are robust to these considerations, Appendix 3.B.1 replicates the previous exercises
using article influence, a measurement formalised by Thompson Reuters. Appendix 3.B.1
shows that these results are robust to the way influence is measured.
Finally, this section investigates further the citations between the top journals in the 100-
Journals dataset. To be consistent with the timespan of the impact factor, the analysis only
considers citations between articles that differ at most ten years from the year of publication
and divides them based on their source: the same journal (journal self-citations), Top 5, Tier
2, Top Field and other journals. Table 3.2.2 shows the results.
Table 3.2.2 shows that the number of references has grown across all the top journals.
Moreover, the number of references from Top Field to Top 5 journals changed from 2.491 in
the 2000s to 3.160 in the 2010s, an increase of 27% in one decade. This evidence suggests
that the average field researcher is citing more Top 5 journals.
8As the sample size is small and as the Breusch-Pagan test does not detect significant heteroskedasticity,
normal OLS standard errors are reported, rather than robust standard errors.
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(a) Citation Network 1980
(b) Citation Network 1990
Fig. 3.2.3 Journals’ citation network before 2000
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(a) Citation Network 2000
(b) Citation Network 2010
Fig. 3.2.4 Journals’ citation network after 2000
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Table 3.2.2 Evolution of references
Average number of references
Citations from Citations to 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009 2010-2017
Top 5 Self-citations 1.48 1.513 1.488 1.69
Top 5 2.246 2.436 2.329 3.061
Tier 2 0.384 0.305 0.407 0.504
Top Field 1.342 1.263 1.208 1.505
Other journals 6.639 7.701 8.095 10.073
Tier 2 Self-citations 0.817 0.667 0.665 0.686
Top 5 2.945 2.803 2.913 3.415
Tier 2 0.243 0.224 0.309 0.395
Top Field 1.252 1.312 1.362 1.807
Other Journals 6.556 7.407 8.647 10.568
Top Field Self-citations 1.62 1.611 1.575 1.946
Top 5 2.462 2.648 2.491 3.160
Tier 2 0.427 0.379 0.506 0.645
Top Field 0.505 0.599 0.646 0.737
Other journals 6.084 7.391 8.121 10.244
Note: Citations from the same group of journals exclude journal self-citations, that is,
from and to the same particular journal, as those appear under self-citations.
However, the share of citations towards Top 5 decreased from 43% in the 1980s to 37.4%
during 2010-2017. Thus, authors publishing in Top Field journals are citing more Top 5
journals, but they are also looking for new sources of ideas in journals that have not been
traditionally at the top of their fields.
Table 3.2.2 also shows that Top Field journals have a strong tendency for self-citations.
During the 1980s, more than a quarter of the citations were self-citations. This tendency
has reduced to a fifth in 2010-2017; albeit still at high levels. Complementing the previous
observation, the share of citations that goes to themselves or Top 5 was above 70% in the
1980s, and although it declined by half in 2010-2017, it still means that their primary sources
of ideas are Top 5 and themselves. In contrast, self-citations in Top 5 have been around a
fifth throughout the study period. However, the references to Top 5, including themselves,
represent more than half of their sources. Thus, from the perspective of Top 5, most of their
ideas come from their group. Finally, for Tier 2, the core of their references comes from Top
5 and Top Field. In the 1980s, these two groups represented two-thirds of Tier 2’s references.
While these numbers increased in absolute numbers, their share halved after 2010. Therefore,
as in the case of Top Field, Tier 2 authors are reading more of these journals, but they are
also reading more new sources. While the scope of this paper is limited to traditional top
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journals due to data availability and comparability purposes, Table 3.2.2 strongly advises
that it is essential to extend these results as new data emerges to incorporate the rise of new
top journals.
Figures 3.2.3 and 3.2.4 aggregate the previous information and display how top journals
organised themselves in a core-periphery citation network. In these figures, the colours of
the edges are associated with the share of references that the source journal dedicates to the
target journal. Also to keep the graphs as clean as possible, the edges that represent less
than 5% of the citations of the journal were not included. These graphs highlight how Top 5
journals actively cite each other. In contrast, Top Field and Tier 2 have a few citations among
themselves. This evidence suggests that, within a field, authors mostly recognise their own
top journal and a group of general interest journals, i.e. the Top 5, but there is almost no
recognition for the work in other fields. This observation is the core concept underlying the
model presented in the next section.
3.3 Publication Platforms Model
This section presents a theoretical model of journals as platforms matching readers and
authors. Section 3.4 uses this model to describe how changes in the publication capacity of
journals, the number of authors in economics, and the number of people reading general
interest journals explain the evolution of the three trends developed in Section 3.2.
3.3.1 General Environment
There are F = {1,2, . . . ,F} fields of research in economics. For each field f ∈ F , there
is a single journal f and a continuum of authors of measure n f > 0, also referred to as
the field size. These authors are also the readers of the papers published in journal f . In
addition, there is a general interest journal g that attracts readers from all fields. In particular,
a fraction α f > 0 of the mass of authors in field f ∈ F reads the general journal, such that
the readership of the general journal is ng = ∑ f∈F α f n f . The cases where α f ≥ 1 represent
those fields where the authors of a field read the general interest journal more than their
own field journal. Finally, the next section will also consider a special case of the model
where F = 1. This case represents a single discipline (e.g. economics) with two journals, for
which the journal g has a wider readership than journal f , and it will be used to represent a
simplified market with Top 5 and Tier 2 journals. In this way the model is able to study both
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the dynamics between Top Field journals and Top 5, as well as the dynamics between Tier 2
and Top 5, described in Section 3.2.
In general, within each field f , author i is endowed with an original idea of value
vi ∈ [0,∞). The mass of authors with an idea of value vi is n f h(vi), where h(vi) is a probability
density function.9 The cumulative distribution associated with h(v) is denoted by H(v), and
h(v) is assumed to be positive for each v ∈ [0,∞) and its hazard rate, h(v)1−H(v) , is assumed to
be decreasing.10
Authors write papers about their ideas and decide to submit them to either the field journal
f , the general interest journal g, or not to submit at all.
There are many authors and, due to capacity constraints, journals are not able to accept
all submissions. For that reason, they put requirements on the quality of their published
articles to ensure that the number of submissions does not exceed the capacity.
These observations are modelled as follows. Regarding the capacity, journal j ∈F ∪{g}
can publish at most a mass of κ j articles, where ∀ f ∈ F ,κ f +κg ≪ n f . In other words, the
mass of authors in any field is greater than the publication capacity of the field and general
interest journal combined. To keep the model parsimonious, the publication capacity of each
journal is exogenous. Regarding the publication requirements, each journal j ∈ F ∪{g}
chooses a threshold t j ∈ [0,∞). The journal directly accepts those submissions that meet the
quality threshold, vi ≥ t j. For those submissions that do not meet the threshold, vi < t j, the
journal requests a revision from the author and then the paper is accepted. This revision does
not increase the value of the paper, but it does impose a cost c(t j − vi) on the author where
c(·) is a convex function such that c(0) = 0, c′(x)> 0, and c′′(x)> 0.11
This setup is in line with Ellison (2002a) q,r-theory of academic publishing, which
postulates that an article’s quality is determined by two dimensions, q and r, where q reflects
the contribution of the main idea and r the value of robustness checks, typically involved in
revisions. Journals accept papers that lack quality in dimension q only if they compensate
in dimension r. The assumption that the revision does not increase the value of the paper is
9The words value and quality are used interchangeably in this paper.
10A decreasing hazard rate holds for many well known distributions that can represent high degrees of
skewness such as the exponential, power-law, Weibull, Gamma, and half-normal distribution. As citations are
known to follow a highly skewed distribution (Price, 1965), this assumption is likely to hold for academic
publications.
11In this model, journals do not reject submissions, but instead set the threshold for publication high enough
to ensure that submissions do not exceed the journal’s capacity, see Equations (3.1) and (3.2) in Section 3.3.1.
A model in which journals do not request revisions, but either reject or accept papers is a special case in which
the cost function c(0) = 0 and c(x) = ∞ for x > 0.
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made for tractability of the model, and highlights the value that the innovative part of the
paper (q) has over the robustness and revision part (r) for influence purposes.
The game has two stages. In the first stage, each journal j ∈ F ∪{g} chooses a threshold
t j ∈ [0,∞) simultaneously with all other journals, where t := (t1, . . . , tF , tg) denotes the vector
of thresholds of all journals. In the second stage, all authors in all fields observe t, and
simultaneously decide to which journal they wish to submit their paper: the field journal f ,
the general interest journal g, or not to publish at all. Hence, the strategy of an author of
field f with an idea of quality vi, is a function of t, denoted by d f (vi|t) ∈ { f ,g, /0}, where
d f (vi|t) = /0 describes the choice not to publish at all.
The remainder of this subsection defines the payoff function of the journals and the
authors. For that purpose, the following definition is presented:






:= E[v|d f (v|t) = j] =
∫
∞
0 v1d f (v|t)= jh(v)dv∫
∞
0 1d f (v|t)= jh(v)dv
where 1 is the indicator function (1A = 1 if A is true, and 0 otherwise).
Definition 3.1 states that the influence of a journal is equivalent to the expected value
of the ideas it contains. For this definition, influence is a field-dependent variable. This
feature aims to describe that different fields have different standards. In particular, the general
interest journal can be very influential for a field and not influential for other fields. This
difference depends on the quality of articles that it contains from each field. Finally, journal
influence is constructed to be the theoretical equivalent to the impact factor as both indicators
attempt to measure the average value of an article in a journal. However, impact factor uses
citation counts to proxy influence, as the real value of an article is unobserved.
In general, higher quality ideas provide more benefits to the journal. These economic
benefits may come from each time an article gets viewed. More articles provide more views
than less articles, and high-quality articles generate more views than those with low quality.
Therefore, this model assumes that journals want to maximise the number of articles it
publishes times the journal influence subject to the capacity constraint; i.e. journals want to
have as many good articles as possible.
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shortcut notations. Anticipating the authors’ submission decisions d(·) in stage 2, each field
journal f ∈ F solves:





f (t) subject to A
f
f (t)≤ κ f (3.1)
Let R(t− f ) be the reaction function of field journal f , that is the choice of t f that solves
Problem (3.1) given t− f , where t− f is the vector of all thresholds except journal f .







g (t) subject to ∑
f∈F
A fg(t)≤ κg (3.2)
Expression (3.2) shows that the general interest journal receives benefits from all the
articles it publishes, independent of their field. Its corresponding reaction function is denoted
by R(t−g).
In the second stage, each author i of field f observes the thresholds t and decides whether
to publish in the corresponding field journal, the general interest journal, or not to publish at
all. The utility of an author depends on publishing in journals with:
1. Larger readership: Authors prefer journals that are read by more authors as their ideas
can have greater impact.
2. Higher prestige: Authors prefer journals that, on average, publish better articles in
their field because that provides a quality reference of their work.
These preferences naturally lead to the following utility function for authors. The utility of
publishing in f is:
U f (vi|t) = n f I ff (t)− c(max{t f − vi,0})
The utility of publishing in g is:
Ug(vi|t) = ngI fg (t)− c(max{tg − vi,0})
And the utility of not publishing is:
U/0(vi) = 0
Hence, for both field and general interest journals, the utility is the product of the readership
of the journal and its influence, minus the cost of obtaining the publication.
Given the previous three publication alternatives, the author’s utility maximisation prob-
lem is:
max
j∈{ f ,g, /0}
U j(vi|t) (3.3)
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and the corresponding reaction function is
p f (vi|t) = argmax
j∈{ f ,g, /0}
U j(vi|t) (3.4)
For analytic simplicity, authors are assumed to have a tie-breaking rule: their first
preference is to publish in a field journal, their second is to publish in a general interest
journal, and their third preference is not to publish.
Summarising, the model presents journals as platforms connecting authors and readers.
While the reader side is fixed (i.e. a field journal is read by a single field, and the general
interest journal is read by a fraction of all fields), the author side is explicitly developed. Note
that the decision by an author to use a journal (i.e. submit a paper) creates an externality on
other users (i.e. authors). This is a typical characteristic of models of platform competition.
However, the nature of the externality in this model is different as it depends on the quality
of the user’s product; that is, users with high-quality ideas impose a positive externality on
the other platform users, and users with low-quality ideas (lower than the platform average)
impose a negative externality on the other platform users.
As a consequence, journals compete for the authors with the best ideas by setting their
thresholds strategically. There is vertical competition between the field and general interest
journal. Moreover, as the general interest journal is common to all fields and strategically
interacts with all field journals, it indirectly creates horizontal competition between field
journals.
3.3.2 Equilibrium Analysis
This subsection characterises the equilibrium of the game and provides illustrative examples
of the comparative statics.
Definition 3.2 (Equilibrium) The equilibrium is defined by a vector t ∈ RF+1+ and a set of
functions d f (v|t) such that ∀ j ∈ F ∪{g}:
t j ∈ R(t− j)
and ∀ f ∈ F and ∀t ′ ∈ RF+1+
d f (v|t ′) = p f (v|t ′)
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Definition 3.2 is in fact the definition of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game.
While easy to describe, the current game produces multiple sets of equilibria. Example 3.1
illustrates two of them.
Example 3.1 (Multiple equilibria)
Consider a setting with F fields, each with a mass of n f = 100 authors. The quality of
ideas in each field is distributed as h(x) = e−x (i.e. exponential distribution with λ = 1).
The readership share of the general interest journal is α f = 0.05, independent of the field.
All journals j (field and general interest) have a publication capacity of κ j = 20. Finally,
the cost function of revising a paper is given by c(x) = x2. The game contains multiple
(a) Top Field Preferred (b) General Interest Preferred
Fig. 3.3.1 Authors decisions
equilibria. This example focuses on two symmetric equilibria where the authors’ decision
rule is independent of their field. Figure 3.3.1a shows that in the first equilibrium, denoted
as "Top Field preferred", authors with the highest quality ideas publish in field journals,
authors with middle-quality ideas publish in general interest journals, and those with the
lowest quality ideas do not publish at all. In this example, this equilibrium exists in games
where the number of fields is less than 33. Beyond this number, the readership of the general
interest journal becomes so large that authors would always prefer submitting their paper
to the general interest journal rather than the field journal due to the potential outreach they
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could have. Figure 3.3.1a illustrates that, as the number of fields increases, the range of
quality of papers submitted to field journals does not change, while the quality of the papers
submitted to general interest journals witnesses a sharp reduction in its variance.
Figure 3.3.1b presents the second equilibrium, denoted as "General Interest Preferred".
The second equilibrium displays a situation where authors with the highest quality ideas
publish in the general interest journal, and next group of authors publishes in the field
journals, and those with lowest quality ideas do not publish. In contrast to the previous case,
this equilibrium only exists when the number of fields exceeds 10. For smaller numbers,
the readership of the general interest journal is very small, and due to the limited outreach,
authors would always prefer the field journal. In this equilibrium, as the number of fields
rises, the mass of authors that may submit their paper to the general interest journal expands
as well. This means that the general interest journal is able to increase its threshold and
publish higher quality ideas. This, in turn, leads authors who cannot meet the thresholds of
the general interest journal to submit their paper to the field journals.
Fig. 3.3.2 Thresholds and authors benefits
Figure 3.3.2 describes the journal’s equilibrium thresholds, t f and tg, as well as the
benefits, n jI
f
j (t), that all authors receive for publishing in journal j ∈ { f ,g}.12 Under the
12By symmetry, journal influence I fj (t) is the same for all fields f ∈ F .
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"Top Field Preferred" scenario, the threshold of the field journal remains roughly constant as
well as the benefits that it provides, while the threshold and benefits of the general journal
augments until they become similar to the field journal. Beyond that point, the equilibrium
does not hold anymore. In the "General Interest Preferred" scenario, thresholds and benefits
of both journal types increase, although the change in the threshold and benefits of the general
interest journal outpaces that of the field journal.
Fig. 3.3.3 Influence and influence ratio
Figure 3.3.3 concludes this example by showing the influence (I fj (t) for j ∈ { f ,g}) and
the influence ratio (I ff (t)/I
f
g (t)) of journals in both equilibria. Consistent with the previous
figures, the influence of the field journal in the "Top Journal Preferred" equilibrium is
independent of the number of fields, while the influence of the general interest increases with
the number of fields, albeit keeping a gap with the field journal. Meanwhile, in the second
equilibrium, both journals witness an increase in influence, although the influence of the
general interest journal grows faster than that of the field journal. In both cases, the influence
ratio decreases.
■
Example 3.1 shows that the game described in the previous section is prone to a multi-
plicity of equilibria that generates different, and sometimes contradictory, predictions. The
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fact that there are multiple equilibria can be understood considering the strategic comple-
mentarities between journals and top authors, i.e. those with the highest vi. These strategic
complementarities create an anti-coordination game between the field journals and the gen-
eral interest journal. In particular, the journal that the top authors choose has the highest
influence and is therefore able to set a high-quality threshold. This again incites top authors
to submit their paper to the top journal whilst discouraging low-quality authors to submit
their work there, thus reinforcing the influence gap. These incentives force the alternative
journal to set a lower threshold and become second tier relative to the top journal.
What is interesting, though, is that the "top journal" could very well be the field journal
instead of the general interest journal. In fact, the example shows that the "Top Field
Preferred" is the only symmetric equilibrium if there are less than ten fields, since the
readership of the general interest journal is too small in that case to attract the top authors,
even if the quality of the journal is high. On the other hand, if the number of fields exceeds
32, then the only symmetric equilibrium allocates the general interest journal as the top
journal; in that case, the effect of the broad readership of the journal dominates.13
Naturally, whether multiple equilibria can be sustained or not depends on the readership
of the different journals. However, the next theorem shows that when the game presents a
large number of fields, as well as a large number of authors, the aforementioned ambiguity in
equilibria disappears.
Theorem 3.1 ("General Interest Preferred" equilibrium) Consider the game described





> n f > n, then there exists
a unique equilibrium, characterised by a threshold vector t and set of author submission
functions d f (·|·), such that ∀ f ∈ F :
tg > t f
Moreover, for each field f ∈ F there are two quality values c1, f ≥ c2, f ≥ 0, such that:
d f (v|t) =

g if v > c1, f
f if c2, f ≤ v ≤ c1, f
/0 otherwise.
Theorem 3.1 proves that, if the size of the fields is large enough and the readership of the
general interest journal is substantially larger than the readership of individual field journals,
then the equilibrium exists and is unique. Remember that ng = ∑ f∈F α f n f , then the last part
13For some in-between parameter values there are also asymmetric equilibria in which the field journal is the
top journal in some fields, but the second journal in other fields.
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of the condition holds if the number of fields (F) or the fraction of readers of the general
interest journal (α f ) is large enough.
Central to the proof of uniqueness is the fact that the readership of the general interest
journal is larger than the readership of each field. To understand this concept, assume that the
influence of the general interest journal was lower than the field journals’ influence. However,
the outreach of the general interest journal, as measured by its readership, outweighs its
influence. Hence, the best authors prefer the general interest journal and submit their papers
there, and this in turn makes the general interest journal more attractive for the other authors
and more influential than field journals. Thus, at the end of the process, the general interest
journal has a higher influence than the field journals.
Beyond uniqueness, this scenario exhibits positive assortativity between the quality of
the original idea and the influence and thresholds of the chosen journals. As it occurred
in the "General Interest Preferred" case in Example 3.1, the equilibrium mechanisms sort
authors into three groups depending on the quality of their ideas. The general interest journal
is the most attractive as it has higher readership. Because of this, individuals with the
highest quality of ideas prefer the general interest journal to field journals, and due to their
submissions, this journal becomes even more attractive than field journals. However, its
capacity constraint prevents it from accepting all applications, which then drives the journal
to implement a higher threshold. The field journal also places a threshold, but not as high as
that of the general interest journal, which in turn attracts those authors with high-quality ideas
who are not willing to pay the costs demanded by the general interest journal. This process
allocates authors in each field into three groups: i) Authors above the first cut (vi > c1, f )
have very high-quality ideas, and their expected benefits outweigh the cost of publishing
in the general interest journal; ii) authors of qualities between the first and the second cuts
(c2, f ≤ vi ≤ c1, f ) publish in the field journal as they have good ideas, but are not willing to
endure the costs demanded by the general interest journal; iii) authors with ideas below the
second cut (vi < c2, f ) prefer not to publish because journals demand too much effort from
them.
The model presented in this section has three groups of parameters: field size (n),
journals capacity (κ), and readership shares from each field to the general interest journal
(α). Example 3.2 displays how changes in these parameters affect the model’s equilibrium
which then helps identify the mechanisms underlying the empirical trends of Section 3.2.
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Example 3.2 (Changes in parameters)
Consider a setting with 2 fields, each with a mass of n f = 1000 authors. The quality of the
ideas in each field distributes h(x) = e−x (i.e. exponential distribution with λ = 1). The
readership share of the general interest journal is α f = 0.7 for both fields. Field journal
1 and the general interest journal have a publication capacity of κ1 = κg = 20, while field
journal 2 has a publication capacity of κ2 = 30. Finally, the cost function of revising a paper
is given by c(x) = x2. The following exercises present the changes in equilibrium as certain
parameters change.
The first exercise changes the general interest journal capacity (κg) from 20 to 40. Figure
3.3.4 shows that when the capacity of the general interest journal increases, thresholds
decrease and influence ratio increases. The underlying intuition is that when a general
interest journal’s capacity increases then it is willing to publish more ideas, and consequently
reduces its threshold. To keep some of their authors, field journals are now pressured to
reduce their thresholds. However, by increasing its publications, the general interest journal
accepts ideas of lower quality and reduces its influence. Meanwhile, field journals will also
have to accept ideas of lower quality, albeit to a lesser extent. This difference between the
journals allows the influence ratio to increase.
(a) Change in thresholds (b) Change in influence
Fig. 3.3.4 Changes in general interest journal capacity (κg)
The second exercise changes the size of field 2 (n2) from 750 to 1500. Figure 3.3.5
presents the influence ratios of the two field journals converge as the size of field 2 increases.
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Meanwhile thresholds all rise, although the change in the threshold of field 1 is minimal
compared with that of the other two thresholds. This scenario illustrates how the general
interest journal creates dependencies between fields. In this case, the increase in the number
of authors of field 2 boosts the competition for publishing and allows field 2 journal and the
general interest journals to increase the standard quality they are willing to accept. At the
same time, authors in field 1 who want to publish in the general interest journal suffer from
an increase in the threshold and so decide to move towards the field journal. As a result,
field 1 journal now has to increase its threshold to satisfy its capacity constraint. Regarding
influence, the general interest journal faces more demand from a field. Hence it can choose
better articles in both fields. As it becomes more selective, the influence ratio against field
1 decreases. In contrast, field 2 becomes more attractive as its field now has more research
taking place, so it can reduce the influence gap. Therefore, the influence ratio increases.
(a) Change in thresholds (b) Change in influence
Fig. 3.3.5 Changes in field 2 size (n2)
The last exercise changes the readership share of the general journal in each field (α f for
both f = 1,2) from 0.7 to 1. Figure 3.3.6 shows that the influence ratio of the field journals
converges as α f increases. However, the mechanism behind the convergence is different
from that in the previous exercise. In this case, the positive change in α f augments the
benefits from publishing in the general interest journal and thus increases the number of
submissions to the general interest journal. To cope with its capacity constraint, the general
interest journal increases its threshold.
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As the threshold of the general interest journal increases, authors in each field face a
higher cost of publishing a paper in the general interest journal. On the other hand, the
benefits of publishing in the general interest journal are increasing as the readership of
the general interest journal augments. As such, the difference between these magnitudes
then determine what happens to the submission decisions of the authors and the threshold
decisions of the field journals.
In the example, for the field where the general interest journal had the highest influence
(i.e. field 2), more authors prefer to publish in the general interest journal, and therefore,
the average quality of papers submitted by field 2 authors decreases and the influence of the
general interest journal in field 2 is reduced. In contrast, for authors from field 1, the cost
of publishing in the general interest journal increases more than the benefits, and so several
field 1 authors move from the general interest journal towards the field journal. Therefore,
the influence of the general interest journal increases in field 1 as it retains better quality
ideas. This dynamic reduces the influence ratio (I11 (t)/I
1
g (t)) of field 1. However, noting the
scale of the y-axes in Figure 3.3.6, the changes in the thresholds and influence are very small
in contrast to those observed in the previous case.
(a) Change in thresholds (b) Change in influence
Fig. 3.3.6 Changes in readership (α)
■
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3.4 Comparative Statics
This section applies the model developed in the previous section to explain the mechanisms
driving the three empirical trends evidenced in Section 3.2. These trends are:
1. A sharp widening of the influence gap between Top 5 and Tier 2 and Top Field journals
between 1980 and 1999.
2. A significant reduction in the influence gap between Tier 2 and Top 5 and the stabiliza-
tion of the influence gap between Top Field and Top 5 between 2000 and 2017.
3. Convergence in the influence gaps among the Top Field journals between 2000 and
2017.
The following subsections study each of these trends from a theoretical perspective (vis-à-
vis the model discussed in Section 3.3) and examine how changes in model’s parameters
explain the evolution of the influence gap. The comparative statics are not exhaustive as
they focus only on the changes that are considered relevant to the empirical observations.
However, Lemma 3.6, Lemma 3.7, Lemma 3.8, and Lemma 3.9 in Appendix 3.D provide a
full characterisation of the comparative statics derived from the model. Finally, this section
measures the influence gap in the following propositions as the difference in influence
between journals and not as the ratio of influence. Although both measures (difference and
ratio) are quite similar, the measure using the difference is preferred as it provides more
general and parsimonious results.
3.4.1 Top 5 and Tier 2 Journals
To obtain a better understanding of the changes of the influence of Tier 2 journals versus
Top 5 journals, consider a simplified version of the model with a single field of size n and
α > 1, and assume that both α and n are large enough to satisfy the conditions of Theorem
3.1. This scenario represents the case where there are two general interest journals, f and g,
but the readership of journal g is larger, ng = αn f , because it is able to attract more readers
outside of the (single) field. Hence, journal g represents the set of Top 5 journals and journal
f represents the set of Tier 2 journals. For clarity, this subsection refers to journal g as the
"Tier 1 journal" and to journal f as the "Tier 2 journal".
For this simplified model, this subsection presents three propositions that explain the
trends associated with Tier 2 journals.
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Proposition 3.1 Consider an increase in the publication capacity of the Tier 1 journal (κg
increases). Then:
(a) The threshold of the Tier 1 journal (tg) decreases.
(b) The threshold of the Tier 2 journal (t f ) decreases.
(c) The difference in influence between the Tier 1 journal and the Tier 2 journal (I fg (t)−
I ff (t)) decreases.
Implicit in Proposition 3.1 is the fact that the Tier 1 journal attracts submissions from the
authors with the best ideas. Hence, an increase in the capacity of the Tier 1 journal allows the
Tier 1 journal to lower its quality threshold in order to attract more submissions. This comes
at the cost of the Tier 2 journal that loses its highest quality submissions. These incentives
force the Tier 2 journal to lower its quality threshold as well. Both journals lose influence,
but the loss of influence of the Tier 1 journal is larger. Hence, the influence gap between the
Tier 1 journal and the Tier 2 journal decreases.
Proposition 3.2 Consider an increase of the publication capacity of the Tier 2 journal (κ f
increases). Then:
(a) The threshold of the Tier 1 journal (tg) increases.
(b) The threshold of the Tier 2 journal (t f ) decreases.
(c) The difference in influence between the Tier 1 journal and the Tier 2 journal (I fg (t)−
I ff (t)) increases.
Proposition 3.2 describes a similar story but from the perspective of the Tier 2 journal. In
this case, the increase in capacity of the Tier 2 journal reduces its influence because it accepts
articles with lower ideas. This change, in turn, incentivises some authors to move from the
Tier 2 journal to the Tier 1 journal. The latter needs to increase its threshold to satisfy its
capacity constraint. As a result, the influence of the Tier 1 journal and the influence gap
between Tier 1 and Tier 2 increases.
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Proposition 3.3 Consider an increase in the field size (the mass of authors n). Then:
(a) The threshold of the Tier 1 journal (tg) increases.
(b) The threshold of the Tier 2 journal (t f ) increases.
(c) The difference in influence between the Tier 1 journal and the Tier 2 journal (I fg (t)−
I ff (t)) decreases.
Adding to the previous propositions, Proposition 3.3 shows that if the size of the field (i.e.
the number of authors) increases, then competition among authors increases and therefore
both journals can demand higher quality ideas. As such, the Tier 2 journal increases its
influence more, and the influence gap between journals becomes smaller.
Now, the above propositions are used to explain the dynamics of the impact factors of the
Top 5 and Tier 2 journals. Remember that, in Section 3.2, the trends associated with Tier 2
were:
1. The influence gap between Top 5 and Tier 2 journals expanded in the 1980s and 1990s.
2. The influence gap partially rebounded in the 2000s and 2010s.
Based on the previous propositions, the first trend might well be explained by the changes
in the publication capacities of these journals. Figure 3.4.1 displays the average number of
articles per journal that each of the top journal groups published. Before 2000, the number of
articles in the average Top 5 journals declined, while the number of articles in the average
Tier 2 journal increased. As a result of these changes, Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 predict an
increase in the influence gap between Tier 2 and Top 5 journals.
After 2000, Figure 3.4.1 shows that the average Top 5 journal increased its publication
capacity. This tendency is consistent with the information presented by Card and DellaVigna
(2013) who explained that Top 5 journals have been systematically decreasing their publica-
tions. However, since the late 1990s, American Economic Review has steadily increased its
number of issues per year and is now responsible for the majority of Top 5 publications. In
the case of Tier 2, the capacity changes are ambiguous. On average, publications increased
by less than those of the Top 5, however the evolution of the publications was very volatile.
Therefore, it is not clear that the effect of the capacity is the only driver of the gap between
Tier 2 and Top 5 journals.
There has been a remarkable surge in economic research since 2000 that can complement
the explanation of the second trend. Figure 3.4.2 uses the Top-Journals dataset and displays
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Fig. 3.4.1 Articles per year
the number of times that top journal articles were cited by any journal from the universe of
Web of Science. Until the end of the 1990s, the number of citations was growing at a stable
pace. However, after 2000, there has been a steep increase in them. The reason behind this
change is twofold: First, people are citing more papers; this trend was reported by Ellison
(2002b) and can explain the growth in citations until 2000. Second, the number of researchers
interested in economics is growing; therefore papers receive more citations. If the second
reason is driving the rise in citations, then Proposition 3.3 suggests that this increase may
have driven the partial comeback of Tier 2 journals after 2000.
Three empirical observations suggest that the number of researchers interested in eco-
nomics is growing.
The first evidence that the number of researchers is growing comes from the growth of
the number of economic students. Based on the study of Siegfried (2017), between 1990 and
2015, the number of economic baccalaureate degrees awarded in the US grew by 57.7%, with
the largest growth episode occurring after 2000. Moreover, the number of PhD students from
public institutions grew by 67%, and the number of PhD students from private institutions
grew by 69%. In a similar topic, Johnston et al. (2014) showed how the number of economic
students in the UK has almost doubled since 2000. The fact that the number of students is
growing by these high rates suggests that the number of researchers is growing in a similar
way.
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Fig. 3.4.2 Citations per year
The second evidence that the number of researchers is growing comes from the number
of authors publishing in economics. Figure 3.4.3 shows that the number of authors who
publish in economics is growing at a faster rate than the number of articles. The data used
for this graph contains information on 646,927 articles published between 1970 and 2011 in
journals listed in EconLit, a bibliography of over 1,000 journals compiled by editors of the
Journal of Economic Literature.14
Note that the number of authors in a field is the number of researchers in a field truncated
by the capacity of the journals in which they can publish. Hence, the fact that the number
of authors is growing can be a consequence of an increase in the field size or an increase
in the number of journals (or in their capacities). However, the fact that the growth of the
number of authors is higher than the growth of the number of articles, and that the difference
significantly increased after the nineties, suggests that there are more papers with multiple
authors. Several authors, such as Card and DellaVigna (2013), have claimed that the intense
competition between authors drives the increase in co-authorship. As the co-authorship
increased more than the capacity of the journals (measured by the number of articles), it is
possible to infer that even when capacity constraints are loosened, the number of researchers
14Econlit dataset is not suitable for the citation analysis performed in Section 3.2. However, its broad universe
of journals makes it a very accurate source to approximate the number of authors and relevant journals in
economics. Hence, it was used in this part of the analysis.
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Fig. 3.4.3 Evolution of articles and authors
interested in the field has increased at a rate that makes competition for publication even
tougher than before.
The third evidence that the number of researchers is growing comes from the way that
old articles are being cited. Figure 3.4.4 uses the Top-Journals dataset to present the life
cycle of citations of articles in 1980 and 1990.15
For each year, all the articles published in top journals were ranked according to the
total citations they have in 2017. Then, these articles were divided into ten groups of equal
size groups. Decile 10 encompasses the 10% of authors that received the highest number
of citations, decile 9 has the next 10% and so on. Figure 3.4.4 plots the average number of
citations that each of the three highest deciles received since the publication date. It also
plots the evolution of the average number of citations of an article.
In theory, the average life cycle of an article resembles the life cycle of a commercial
product. Similar to the logic of the Bass model (Bass, 1969), in the beginning, the article
usually has few citations as it is starting to get known in academia. Once a given number of
individuals knows the content of the research, it appears more often in academic discussions
and starts gaining more citations. Then, the paper becomes less cited as time passes and
new research emerges. Thus, when citations are plotted against years after publication, it
is expected that this curve displays an inverted U-shape. However, Figure 3.4.4 shows that
15This analysis was performed for all the years of the sample, and the results did not change.
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all these groups follow an inverted U-shape until years around 2000. After that, the articles
started witnessing increasing citations again.
Fig. 3.4.4 Citation evolution for 1980 and 1990
This double peak in old cited papers challenges the idea that the increase in the number
of references is enough to explain Figure 3.4.2. If that was the case, new references would
go only to current topics and there is no reason for them to be citing old papers. Unless a
paper is seminal for a field, it is very unlikely that authors keep on citing it after new research
appears. However, it is common for new researchers in a field to read previous literature
and find alternative ways to use old results. From this perspective, Figure 3.4.4 suggests an
influx of new authors into economic research as a reasonable explanation for the double peak
phenomena.
Although none of the previous three observations is conclusive, they strongly advocate
for growth in the profession, especially after 2000. Based on Proposition 3.3, the main
consequences of the increase in the number of authors are the reduction in the influence gap
between Top 5 and Tier 2 journals as well as the increase in the quality requirements of these
journals. Therefore, this mechanism provides a reasonable explanation behind the increase
in Tier 2 journals’ influence after 2000. Moreover, this mechanism also explains that the
slowdown of the publication process (i.e. the rise in the number of revisions and time costs)
can be explained by a change in the structural parameters, and in this way it complements
Ellison (2002b), who claimed that the slowdown was mainly driven by a change in the way
that the editors perceived the publication process.
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3.4.2 Top 5 and Top Field Journals
The observed trends of journal influence for the Top Field journals relative to the Top 5 trends
are:
1. A sharp widening in the influence gap between Top 5 and Top Field journals between
1980 and 1999.
2. A stabilisation of the influence gap between Top Field and Top 5 between 2000 and
2017.
3. Convergence in the influence gaps among the Top Field journals between 2000 and
2017.
The first two trends are similar to the trend of the average influence ratio of the Top 5
versus Tier 2 journals and the explanation is likely to be the same; i.e. the journal capacity
of Top 5 journals changed relative to both Tier 2 and Top Field journals. First, note that
the intuition of the simplified model of Section 3.4.1 still holds. Proposition 3.1 is trivially
generalised to multiple fields (as Example 3.2 suggests). Hence, a decrease in the capacity
of Top 5 journals and/or an increase in the capacities of the Top Field journals lead to a
widening in the influence gaps. Second, Figure 3.4.1 reveals that these trends in journal
capacities have taken place. In 1980, Top 5 journal published on average 80 articles per
year, while the average Top Field journal published around 40 articles per year. These
number had converged by 1999 when both Top 5 and Top Field journals published around
65 articles per year. Hence, it is plausible that changes in journal capacity explained the
observed widening of the influence gap. Appendix 3.B.2 provides further statistical evidence
to confirm that journal capacities and journal influence ratios are indeed negatively related,
also at the individual journal level. Note however, that in contrast to Tier 2, Top Field journals
stabilised after 2000. To explain this, Figure 3.4.1 showed that both the capacity of Top 5
and the capacity of Top Field journals increased. Ergo, these two mechanisms cancelled each
other and induced the stabilization process.
The third trend focuses on the heterogeneity among Top Field journals. To understand
this trend, it is necessary to go beyond the simplified model of Section 3.4.1 into a model
with multiple fields. Hence, the following analysis considers a scenario with F > 1 fields
whereby the size of each field is large enough to satisfy the conditions of Theorem 3.1. For
the purpose of notation, the index of the fields is ordered based on the influence that the
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general interest journal has in each field at equilibrium, i.e.:
I fg (t)≥ I f
′
g (t)⇔ f ≥ f ′
Proposition 3.4 Consider the vector α = {α f } f∈F of fractions of authors in each field f
that read the general interest journal. Consider an increase of α to α ′, such that ∀ f ∈ F :
α ′f ≥ α f and ∃ f ∈ F : α ′f > α f . Then, the threshold of the general interest journal (tg) rises,
and there exists a field f ∗ such that for all f ∈ F :
(a) If f < f ∗, then the threshold of field journal f (t f ) increases, and its influence gap
(I fg (t)− I ff (t)) increases.
(b) If f ≥ f ∗, then the threshold of field journal f (t f ) decreases, and its influence gap
(I fg (t)− I ff (t)) decreases.
Proposition 3.4 explains the dynamics observed in the third exercise of Example 3.2. If
α increases, the general interest journal becomes more attractive to authors, and therefore,
the general interest journal needs to raise its threshold to satisfy its capacity constraint. In
each field, authors face higher benefits and higher costs to publish in the general interest
journals. This trade-off leads towards the convergence of the influence gap. This happens
because, in the fields where the field journal has low influence compared with the general
interest journal, the increase in the benefits of the general interest journal outweighs the costs,
so more authors publish there and therefore drive down its quality. In contrast, in the fields
where the field journal has high influence compared with the general interest journal, the
increase in the thresholds of the general interest journal outweighs the benefits, so several
authors move to the field journal. This incentive structure implies that the general interest
journal has only the best of those articles, then its influence will grow. As mentioned in
Section 3.2, the label Top 5 appeared at the end of the nineties, so it is probable that this
led to the increase in readership of these journals. The information presented in Table 3.2.2
also shows that the average top article is citing more Top 5 papers, which also suggests that
the readership increased. However, the evidence is limited. Therefore, it is not possible to
attribute the convergence of the field gaps solely to the increase in the readership. Moreover,
Example 3.2 showed that the magnitude of the convergence due to changes in this parameter
might be very small. For that reason, the following proposition suggests a complementary
mechanism of convergence based on the change in the size of those fields that had the largest
influence gap.
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Proposition 3.5 Consider an increase in the size of field F in which the general interest
journal has the highest influence (nF ). There exists an α ∈ (0,1), such that, if α f > α for
every field f ∈ F , then the threshold of the general interest journal (tg) increases with nF ,
the influence gap between the general interest journal and field F (IFg (t)− IFF (t)) decreases,
and, for the other journals, there exists a field f ∗ such that for all f ∈ F\{F}:
(a) If f < f ∗, then the threshold of field journal f (t f ) increases, and its influence gap
(I fg (t)− I ff (t)) increases.
(b) If f ≥ f ∗, then the threshold of field journal f (t f ) decreases, and its influence gap
(I fg (t)− I ff (t)) decreases.
Proposition 3.5 formalises the mechanism behind the second exercise of Example 3.2.
It describes how the increase in the size of the field with the highest influence gap, field
F , generates differenciated benefits and costs of publishing in the field journals. As it was
mentioned in Example 3.2, the mechanism differs from the convergence derived from an
increase in readership α f . However, both describe the convergence of the influence ratios of
the different fields and an increase of the quality threshold of the general interest journal.
Proposition 3.5 would provide a plausible mechanism of the empirically observed con-
vergence of field journal impact factor ratios, if the field with the largest influence gap, i.e.
the smallest impact factor ratio, has expanded in recent years. Has this happened?
To address this question, recall that economics is becoming more empirical. Angrist et al.
(2017) showed that during 1980-2000, economic research was predominantly theoretical, but
during the 1990s, empirical methods proliferated and by 2000 they were more frequently
used than theoretical approaches. Moreover, Hamermesh (2013) focused on three of the Top
5 journals and concluded that there was a shift towards empirical research that is partially
due to the emergence of self-collected datasets owing to reduced costs and new technologies.
As a consequence, there has been growing research tackling topics of development, finance,
labour, and other empirical and applied fields (Card and DellaVigna, 2013).
Complementing these observations from the literature, Figure 3.2.2a reveals that the two
field journals with the lowest impact factors were the Journal of Development Economics
and the Journal of Urban Economics. These are precisely the two fields that are empirical in
nature, and that have expanded significantly. Thus, it is likely that the mechanism underlying
Proposition 3.5 applies and contributes to the explanation of the influence gap convergence
between fields.
On a final note, both mechanisms that explain convergence suggest that Top 5 journals
are continuously raising their thresholds, and thus it is becoming more difficult to publish
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in these journals. This observation supports Card and DellaVigna (2013) as these authors
observed that the acceptance rate of papers in Top 5 has been on a trend decline.
3.5 Conclusions
Top 5 journals have been, without doubt, central to economic researchers. However, the
evidence presented in this paper shows that tendencies are changing. Prior to 2000, Top 5
were distinguishing themselves from other top journals by being more selective and filtering
the best articles. In the late 1990s, these tendencies changed and the influence gap between
them and Tier 2 journals started declining. As to Top Field journals, the influence gap stopped
its increasing trend but did not recover. Furthermore, a more detailed study to each of the
members of the Top Field journals shows that after 2000 the influence gap among the Top
Field journals is converging.
The model presented in this paper provides important insights into the mechanisms
underlying these trends. With respect to the influence gap prior to 2000, the model suggests
that it was driven by changes in the journals’ publication capacity. After 2000, the model
explains the gap reduction between Tier 2 and Top 5 and the gap stabilization between
Top Field and Top 5 via capacity changes and an increase in the number of economists.
Finally, the model describes the convergence among Top Field journals in terms of changes
in readership and increase in the size of specific research fields.
Economics is a dynamic research field and, as this paper shows, it is continuously
changing. The current paper provides mechanisms that explain the changes between 1980-
2017. However, the paper does so by focusing on the traditional top journals only. While
new journals have been emerging recently, this paper could not explore them due to their
novelty and thus lack of data relevant to them. However, as new data becomes available, it
will be possible to extend the current research and deepen the understanding of the dynamics
underlying ranking positions.
This research paves the way for two open questions that will be central for the discipline
moving forward. First, while the "Top 5" label emerged by end-1990s due to the enormous
influence this group of journals had, it is not clear how this label will be affected with
the rise of second-tier interest journals. Second, with the emergence of the American
Economic Journals, it is unclear whether these journals should be considered independent
entities or parts of conglomerates. In particular, the creation of many journals linked to
the same brand can be a new strategy of current academic associations, and it is important
to understand the effects that this phenomenon will have on the structure of economic
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publications hereafter. Solving these questions will mark the next step toward understanding
the mechanisms underlying journals’ and academic publications’ decisions, which in the end,
are the generators of knowledge in any research field.
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Appendix 3.B Robustness Analysis
3.B.1 Influence Using Article Influence Score
The impact factor does not take into account the source of the citations. As an alternative,
Pinski and Narin (1976) developed an indicator, called Influence weight, which gives more
weight to citations from journals that themselves have a high Influence weight. Formally, for
journals i ∈ J and j ∈ J , let ci j be the number of references in journal i that cite journal j,
and let si = ∑ j ci j be the total number of references in journal i. Then, the Influence weight






that is, the principal eigenvector of the row-normalized citation matrix C := (ci jsi )i, j∈J .
Normalising this measure by the number of articles ai of a journal, Pinski and Narin (1976)
obtained a measure called Influence Per Publication (IPP), that is, IPPi = IWi/ai. Palacios-
Huerta and Volij (2004) showed that the IPP indicator is the unique indicator satisfying
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invariance axioms of reference intensity and splitting journals, as well as weak homogeneity
and consistency.
The IPP indicator has a practical implementation in the Article Influence Score (AIS)
of the Eigenfactor™ project (Bergstrom et al., 2008). AIS defines the citation matrix in
a similar way as the impact factor, but corrects for journal self-citations and also ensures
that the citation matrix is ergodic, see Bergstrom and West (2008) for details.16 This is the
implementation followed for this study.
As with the Impact Factor, this paper defines elements in the citation matrix C as the
fraction of references in articles published in journal i in year t, that cite articles published
in journal j in year t − 10 to t − 1. This study uses the 100-Journals database, as it is the
only dataset to our consideration that contains individual citations from article to article, see
Section 3.2.1 for a description.
Fig. 3.B.1 Influence gap using article influence
Figure 3.B.1 shows the trends of the ratios of the average AIS of Tier 2 and Top Field
journals relative to the average AIS of the Top 5 journals, corresponding to the plot for
Impact factors in Figure 3.2.1. Figure 3.B.1 shows that the trends observed in Figure 3.2.1
are robust to changes in the influence measure. In both cases, the influence gap between Top
5 and other top journals increased before 2000. After that, the ratio between Top 5 and Tier 2
16Bergstrom and West (2008) define Eigenfactor EFi as the solution to EFi = α ∑ j∈J
c ji
s j
EFj +(1−α) ai∑ j a j ,
similarly to PageRank (Brin and Page, 1998). Whereas West and Bergstrom choose the PageRank value of
α = 0.85, this study sets α = 1, making the measure similar to the Influence weight of Pinski and Narin (1976).
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declined. Contrary to the impact factor measurements, the gap between Top 5 and Top Field
kept growing after 2000.
(a) Article influence per journal
(b) Change in influence
Fig. 3.B.2 Influence gap of Top Field journals using article influence
Regarding the convergence of fields influence after 2000, Figure 3.B.2 shows the the
AIS ratios of the individual field journals relative to the AIS of the Top 5 journals. This plot
is the AIS-equivalent of Figure 3.2.2. This figure, again, displays a strong convergence of
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the AIS ratios after 2000. A scatter plot of change of AIS ratios versus AIS ratios in 2000
reveals a strong and significant negative relationship (β̂ =−0.544, s
β̂
= 0.087, p = 0.001).
Remarkably, the Journal of Economic Theory is not anymore a clear outlier when considering
the AIS measure.
Based on these results it is possible to conclude that the trends presented in the main text
are robust to the measure of influence.
3.B.2 Capacity Effects on Influence
From the theoretical model presented in Section 3.3, the publication capacity (i.e. the number
of articles per year) that Top 5 publish should have a significant effect on the influence ratio.
This section confronts that hypothesis with data from the Top-Journals dataset. The interest
variables are the influence ratio (measured as the impact factor ratio (IFR j,t) as well as the
number of articles that Top 5 published in that year (κg(t)). Due to the panel characteristics
of this exercise, two steps were performed to check whether there is a relationship between
these two variables.
The first step, displayed in Table 3.B.1, confirmed that these variables have unit roots.
This paper uses the Im-Pesaran-Shin test for panel data to verify this hypothesis because it
admits unbalanced panels.
Table 3.B.1 Stationarity tests
Im-Pesaran-Shin





Ho: All panels contain unit roots
Ha: Some panels are stationary
Based on the previous results, the second step replicates a co-integration test to identify
the relationship between a given journal’s capacity and influence. Co-integration was tested
using Kao procedure. This method presumes that the co-integration factor does not depend
on the journal and therefore identifies the overall relationship between capacity and impact.
Table 3.B.2 shows four different versions of the Dickey-Fuller statistical tests.
All the tests support the hypothesis that the variables are co-integrated by having p-values
lower than 10%, albeit to varying degrees of significance. The co-integration coefficient is
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Table 3.B.2 Cointegration tests
Estimator P-Value
Modified Dickey-Fuller t 0.0984
Dickey-Fuller t 0.0000
Unadjusted modified Dickey-Fuller 0.0659
Unadjusted Dickey-Fuller t 0.0000
Ho: No cointegration
Ha: All panels are cointegrated
estimated to be 0.036. Its positive sign points that negative changes in the capacity of the
general interest journal are associated with negative changes in its influence ratio, i.e. the
statistical evidence supports the claim that the negative change in the publication capacity of
Top 5 journals drove the increase in the influence gap.
Appendix 3.C Math Notation
This section defines the technical notation that the paper uses in the main text and in the
proofs. The notation used in the proofs of Section 3.D, that is not mentioned in this section,
was explicitly defined in the main text.
• h(x) is a probability density function with support [0,∞) such that h′(x)< 0.
• H(x) is the corresponding cumulative function.
• S(x) is the corresponding survival function.













Lemma 3.1 If s′(c)≤ 0 for all c, then:
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(c) lim
c→∞
s(c)(q(c)− c) = 1.
Proof:












































































) ≤ 1+ κ1
κ2
Proof:
For this proof, and to simplify notation, the arguments of q and q f are omitted.
Define c1 = H−1(1− κ2n ) and c2 = H












s(c1)(q f − c2)+ h(c1)(c1−c2)H(c1)−H(c2)







































The following lemmas assume the uniqueness conditions of Theorem 3.1 (i.e. large
number of fields and large size of the fields).
Lemma 3.3 Consider three quality levels v1 < v2 < v3. Assume there is an equilibrium of
the game defined by a vector t and a set of functions d f (v|t). Then,
d f (v1|t) = d f (v3|t)⇒ d f (v1|t) = d f (v2|t)
Proof:
There are three cases for this proof.
Case 1: d f (v1|t) = d f (v3|t) = g
Due to the monotonicity of c(x),
Ug(vi|t)−U f (vi|t) = ngE[v|d f (v|t) = g]
− c(max{tg − vi,0})−n fE[v|d f (v|t) = f ]+ c(max{t f − vi,0})
is monotonous in vi. Therefore, if d f (v1|t) = d f (v3|t) = g, then Ug(v1|t)−U f (v1|t)> 0 and
Ug(v3|t)−U f (v3|t)> 0. This implies that Ug(v2|t)−U f (v2|t)> 0 ⇒ d f (v2|t) = g.
Case 2: d f (v1|t) = d f (v3|t) = f
Analogous to the previous proof.
Case 3: d f (v1|t) = d f (v3|t) = 0
For an individual of quality vi, choosing not to publish means:
Ug(vi|t) = ngE[v|d f (v|t) = g]− c(max{tg − vi,0})< 0
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and
U f (vi|t) = n fE[v|d f (v|t) = f ]− c(max{t f − vi,0})< 0
As in the previous case, both functions are monotonous in vi. Hence, if Ug(v1|t), Ug(v3|t),
U f (v1|t), and U f (v3|t) are less than 0, then Ug(v2|t),U f (v2|t)< 0. Thus, d f (v2|t) = 0.
■
Lemma 3.4 Assume there is an equilibrium of the game defined by a vector t and a set of
functions d f (v|t). Then, ∃c1, f ≥ c2, f ≥ 0 such that:
(a) vi > c1, f ⇒ d f (vi|t) = g.
(b) c1, f ≥ vi ≥ c2, f ⇒ d f (vi|t) = f .
(c) vi < c2, f ⇒ d f (vi|t) = /0.
(d) n f (H(c1, f )−H(c2, f )) = κ f .
Proof:
Lemma 3.3 implies that there exist three convex sets of values, one for each choice { f ,g, /0}.
Hence, per field, there exist two values c1, f ≥ c2, f that divide the interval [0,∞) in three
groups, each associated with a decision.
The remainder part is to define which decision corresponds to each set. Regarding the
decision not to publish, based on the proof of Lemma 3.3, Ug(vi|t) and U f (vi|t) are increasing
functions in vi, and by construction, if vi ≥ max{t f , tg}, then Ug(vi|t) and U f (vi|t) are greater
than 0. Thus, for high quality values, an author will always prefer to publish than not to
publish. Ergo, the set with the smallest qualities (i.e. [0,c2, f )) contains all the people not
willing to publish.
Due to the capacity constraint of the field journal, n f (H(c1, f )−H(c2, f )) can not be
greater than κ f . Moreover,
U f (vi|t)−Ug(vi|t) =−(ngE[v|d f (v|t) = g]
− c(max{tg − vi,0})−n fE[v|d f (v|t) = f ]+ c(max{t f − vi,0}))
and
Ug(vi|t) = ngE[v|d f (v|t) = g]− c(max{t f − vi,0})< 0
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are both monotonously decreasing in t f . Thence, if the field journal is not satisfying its
capacity, then it has incentives to reduce the threshold as this will induce more authors to
publish there. Ergo, its benefit increases. As t is already an equilibrium vector, there are no
incentives to deviate. Therefore, the only option is that n f (H(c1, f )−H(c2, f )) = κ f .
Due to Lemma 3.2, ngE[v|d f (v|t) = g]− c(max{t j − vi,0})− n fE[v|d f (v|t) = f ] > 0.
Then, for an individual with quality vi ≥ max{t f , tg}, the general interest journal is strictly
preferred to the field journal. Hence, the only possible order is the one stated by the current
lemma.
■
Lemma 3.5 Assume there is an equilibrium of the game defined by a vector t and a set of
functions d f (v|t). Then, for all f ∈ F it holds that tg ≥ t f . Furthermore,
(a) tg > c1, f .
(b) t f > c2, f .
Proof:
Based on the proof of Lemma 3.4, in equilibrium ngE[v|d f (v|t)= g]−n fE[v|d f (v|t)= f ]> 0.
Hence, if t f ≥ tg then, for all vi, Ug(vi|t)≥U f (vi|t). This implies that no one will choose the
field journal, but this contradicts Lemma 3.4 part (d). Therefore, tg ≥ t f .
Using the notation of Lemma 3.4, assume t f ≤ c2, f . Then, an individual with quality
vi < t f will prefer not to publish.




H(c1, f )−H(c2, f )dx > 0. Moreover, there exists ε > 0 such that
U f (v′i)> 0 for v
′
i = t f −ε . Thus, this individual prefers to publish in the field journal that not
to publish, which is a contradiction with Lemma 3.4. Hence, t f > c2, f . The proof of tg > c1, f
mimics the same steps, and therefore is not repeated.
■
Based on the previous results, if there exist an equilibrium, there exists quantities c1, f
and c2, f such that:












H(c1, f )−H(c2, f )
dx
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Thus, using the notation defined at the beginning of the section, the influence of a journal
can be written as
q(c1, f ) = E[v|d f (v|t) = g] = I fg (t)
and
q f (c1, f ,c2, f ) = E[v|d f (v|t) = f ] = I ff (t)
The proofs of the theorem and the propositions will use these functions to avoid an excess of
notation.
Proof: Theorem 3.1
The proof of this theorem is divided into three parts. The first part defines n. The second
part focuses on identifying an equilibrium of the game. Finally, the third part proves that it is
unique. Then, knowing that there exist a unique equilibrium, Lemma 3.5 explains how the
thresholds are organised, and Lemma 3.4 provides the information about c1, f and c2, f .
Part 1: Characterisation of n.
Central to the proof of uniqueness is the fact that the audience at each field is large and
that there are enough fields such that the audience of the general interest journal is large
compared to the audience of each field journal.
To understand the meaning of "large" in this context, consider equation (3.5).
q(H−1(1− κgn f ))−H
−1(1− κgn f )
1−H(H−1(1− κgn f ))
−
H−1(1− κgn )−H
−1(1− κg+κ fn f )
H(H−1(1− κgn f ))−H(H
−1(1− κg+κ fn f ))
=
q(H−1(1− κgn f ))−H









Due to the concavity of H, and based on Lemma 3.1, when n f goes to infinity equation
(3.5) is greater than 0. Hence, there exists a minimum n1 such that, for all fields, if n f > n1,
equation (3.5) is positive.



















As long as ngn f > 1+
κg
κ f
, Lemma 3.1, implies that, there exists a minimum n2 such that,
for all fields, if n f > n2, equation (3.6) is negative.
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For the rest of the proof it is necessary to have equation (3.5) positive and equation (3.6)
negative. Therefore, the technical requirement behind the theorem is that for each field
n f > max{n1,n2} = n and that there are enough fields or providing enough readers to the
general interest journal such that ngn f > 1+
κg
κ f





> n f > n.
Part 2: Existence.
Consider the following four equations per field:
n f (1−H(c1, f )) = κ fg (3.7)
n f (1−H(c2, f )) = κ fg +κ f (3.8)
n f q f (c1, f ,c2, f )− c(t f − c2, f ) = 0 (3.9)
ngq(c1, f )− c(tg − c1, f ) = n f q f (c1, f ,c2, f )− c(max{t f − c1, f ,0}) (3.10)
The parameters of the game are n f , ng, κg, and κ f . Whereas κ
f
g has not been defined
yet, notice that, if this value is known, equation (3.7) uniquely defines c1, f . Then, equation
(3.8) uniquely defines c2, f . For equation (3.9), the left hand side is a monotonous function
in t f after it is greater than c2, f , therefore it is invertible for these values, i.e. equation (3.9)
uniquely defines t f ≥ 0. Finally, using the previous logic, equation (3.10), uniquely defines
tg ≥ 0.
Let K f (x) : [0,min
f∈F
{n f −κ f }]→ [0,∞), such that tg = K f (κ fg ) satisfy equations (3.7) to
(3.10) when κ fg is given. From the previous results about the way each equation uniquely
determines a parameter, K f (x) is well defined.
Let p∈∆, where ∆ is an n−dimensional simplex, and define κ fg = p f κg. Let Γ(p) : ∆→∆,
where
Γ(p) f =
K f (κg p f )+max{K f (κg p f )−
∑ j∈F K f (κg p j)
F ,0}
∑i∈F (Ki(κg pi)+max{Ki(κg pi)−
∑ j∈F K j(κg p j)
F ,0})
Notice that, if there is a vector p such that m of its entries (S = {π(1),π(2), ...,π(m)})
are 0 (i.e. p f = 0 ⇔ f ∈ S ). Then, for all f ∈ S , it holds that Γ(p) f = 1m .
Given that Γ is continuous and that it goes from a compact into itself, Brower’s Theorem
states that it has at least a fix point. In this context a fix point means that ∀ f , j ∈F ,K f (κ fg ) =
K j(κ
j
g). Let p∗ be a fix point. Then, from equations (3.7) to (3.10), it is possible to define the
values of c1, f , c2, f , t f , k
f
g for each f , and also it is possible to define tg, which my construction
is independent of the field. Furthermore, p∗ guarantees that ∑ f∈F κ
f
g = κg.
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Finally, define t as the vector that include tg and all the different t f , and
d f (vi|t) =
{ g, for vi ≥ c1, f
f , for c2, f ≥ vi ≥ c2, f
/0, for c2, f ≥ vi
As defined above, t and d f satisfy all the incentives and participation constraints. In
particular, from equations (3.9) and (3.10) no individual wants to change its choice. On the
other side, from equation (3.8) and the way κ fg was defined, all the journals are satisfying its
capacity.
Thus vector t and the set of functions d f (vi|t) define an equilibrium of the game.
Part 3: Uniqueness.
Given that equations (3.7) to (3.10) define an equilibrium, Lemma 3.5 guarantees that for
every field f , tg > c1, f and t f > c2, f . Moreover, from equation (3.7),








0 = n f
dq f (c1, f ,c2, f )
dκ fg



















dq f (c1, f ,c2, f )
dκ fg







Therefore, by replacing the values,
3.D Proofs 149




ng(q(c1, f )− c1, f )
n f (1−H(c1, f ))
+
c′(tg − c1, f )
n f h(c1, f )
−
c1, f − c2, f
H(c1, f )−H(c2, f )
(
1−
c′(max{t f − c1, f })
c′(t f − c2, f )
)
+
c′(max{t f − c1, f })
n f h(c2, f )
−
c′(max{t f − c1, f })
n f h(c1, f )
Due to part 1 and Lemma 3.1, (qg−c1, f )(1−H(c1, f ) −
c1, f−c2, f
H(c1, f )−H(c2, f ) > 0, and from Lemma 3.5,
c′(tg−c1, f )
n f h(c1, f )
− c
′(max{t f−c1, f })
n f h(c1, f )
> 0. Ergo, dK f
dκ fg
< 0. This implies that K f (x) is invertible.
Define T (tg) := ∑ j∈F K
−1
f (tg). From the definition of K f (tg), it holds that T (0) =
∑ j∈F n f , limtg→∞
T (tg) = 0 and T ′(tg)< 0. Therefore, for a given κg, there exists a unique tg
that allows the system of equations to have a solution, and as κg is a parameter of the model,
then there exists a unique tg in the game that satisfy all the equations. So any alternative
equilibrium will not satisfy one of these equations:
If equation (3.10) is not satisfied, then ∃ε > 0 such that either an individual with an idea
of quality c1, f + ε will deviate from g to f , or an individual with idea of quality c1, f − ε will
deviate from f to g.
If equation (3.9) is not satisfied, then ∃ε > 0 such that either an individual with an idea
of quality c2, f + ε will deviate from f to /0, or an individual with idea of quality c2, f − ε will
deviate from /0 to f .
If equation (3.8) is not satisfied, then either the field journal is publishing more than its
capacity, so the equilibrium is not possible, or it produces fewer articles than desired, in
which case it would like to deviate to a lower threshold.
If equation (3.7) is not satisfied, then either the general interest journal is publishing more
than its capacity, so the equilibrium is not possible, or it produces fewer articles than desired,
in which case it would like to deviate to a lower threshold.
For these reasons, all equilibria have to bind equations (3.7) to (3.10). However, there is
a unique solution for the system of equations. Hence, the equilibrium is unique.
With the proof of existence and uniqueness, Lemma 3.5 and Lemma 3.4 finish the proof
of the theorem.
■
From Theorem 3.1, the unique equilibrium of the game is characterized by t f , tg, κ
f
g , c1, f ,
and c2, f . The following lemmas describe how these variables change in response to three
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model parameters: αs, ns, and κg. The outcomes of these proofs are the main inputs to prove
Proposition 3.1 to Proposition 3.5.
For these proofs, the following auxiliary variables are defined:
A f =
ng(q(c1, f )− c1, f )
n f (1−H(c1, f ))
+
c′(max{t f − c1, f ,0})
n f h(c2, f )
−
c′(max{t f − c1, f ,0})
n f h(c1, f )
(3.11)
−
c1, f − c2, f
H(c1, f )−H(c2, f )
(1−
c′(max{t f − c1, f ,0})
c′(t f − c2, f )
)+
c′(tg − c1, f )













c′(max{t f − c1, f ,0}) (3.14)
+(1−
c′(max{t f − c1, f ,0})
c′(t f − c2, f )
)(
q f (c1, f ,c2, f )− c2, f








c′(max{t f − c1, f ,0})
c′(t f − c2,s)
)c1, f (1−H(c1, f ))− c2, f (1−H(c2, f ))





c′(max{t f − c1, f ,0})
c′(t f − c2,s)
)




(q(c1, f )− c1, f )+ c′(tg − c1, f )
1−H(c1,s)
h(c1, f )n f





h(c1, f )n f
)
The conditions on the size of each field stated by Theorem 3.1 guarantee that A f > 0.
Therefore, X f ,Wf ≥ 0.
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Lemma 3.6 Consider an equilibrium characterised by t f , tg, κ
f
g , κ f , c1, f , and c2, f , and a
marginal change in κg. Then,
(a) dtgdκg =
−1
∑ j∈F W j
.
(b) dt fdκg =
−1
c′(t f−c2, f )
(
c1, f−c2, f
H(c1, f )−H(c2, f ) +
c′(t f−c2, f )


















From the proof of Theorem 3.1, the equilibrium of the game has to satisfy equations (3.7) to


















( c1, f − c2, f
H(c1, f )−H(c2, f )
+
c′(t f − c2, f )










Finally, ∑ f∈F κ
f
g = κg. Then, ∑ f∈F
dκ fg
dκg

















c′(t f − c2, f )
( c1, f − c2, f
H(c1, f )−H(c2, f )
+
c′(t f − c2, f )
n f h(c2, f )
) Wf
∑i∈F Wi
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and
d(q(c1, f )−q f (c1, f ,c2, f ))
dκg
=−










Lemma 3.7 Consider an equilibrium characterised by t f , tg, κ
f
g , κ f , c1, f , and c2, f , and a
marginal change in αs. Then,
(a) dtgdαs =
∑ j∈F X j
∑ j∈F W j
.
(b) dt fdαs =
−1
c′(t f−c2, f )
(
c1, f−c2, f
H(c1, f )−H(c2, f ) +
c′(t f−c2, f )
n f h(c2, f )
)(
∑ j∈F nsX f W j−∑ j∈F nsX jW f
∑ j∈F W j
)
.






− (c1, f−c2, f )
κ f
)(
∑ j∈F nsX f W j−∑ j∈F nsX jW f




From Theorem 3.1, the equilibrium of the game has to satisfy equations (3.7) to (3.10). When


















( c1, f − c2, f
H(c1, f )−H(c2, f )
+
c′(t f − c2, f )










Finally, ∑ f∈F κ
f
g = κg. Therefore, ∑ f∈F
dκ fg
dκg


















c′(t f − c2, f )
( c1, f − c2, f
H(c1, f )−H(c2, f )
)(





c′(t f − c2, f )
(c′(t f − c2, f )
n f h(c2, f )
)(













(c1, f − c2, f )
κ f
)(
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Lemma 3.8 Consider an equilibrium characterised by t f , tg, κ
f
g , κ f , c1, f , and c2, f , and a
parametrization of the size of all the journals, n f (β ). If there is a marginal change in β ,
then:
(a) dtgdβ =
∑ f∈F (∑ j∈F α j
dn f
dβ )X f+B f
dn f
dβ






























c′(t f − c2, f )
( c1, f − c2, f
H(c1, f )−H(c2, f )
+
c′(t f − c2, f )





c′(t f − c2, f )
(c1, f (1−H(c1, f ))− c2, f (1−H(c2, f ))
H(c1, f )−H(c2, f )
− c′(t f − c2, f )
1−H(c2, f )
n f h(c2, f )





d(q(c1, f )−q f (c1, f ,c2, f ))
dβ
=−













q(c1, f )−q f (c1, f ,c2, f )−
(1−H(c2, f ))(c1, f − c2, f )





From Theorem 3.1, the equilibrium of the game has to satisfy equations (3.7) to (3.10). When























− c′(t f − c2, f )
dt f
dβ
=( c1, f − c2, f
H(c1, f )−H(c2, f )
+
c′(t f − c2, f )





−2q f (c1, f ,c2, f )
+ c′(t f − c2, f )
1−H(c2, f )
n f h(c2, f )
−
c1, f (1−H(c1, f )− c2, f (1−H(c2, f )











q(c1, f )− c′(tg − c1, f )
dtg
dβ






Finally, ∑ f∈F κ
f
g = κg. Therefore, ∑ f∈F
dκ fg
dκg





∑ f∈F (∑ j∈F α j
dn f








∑ j∈F ((∑i∈F αi
dn f
dβ )X f +B f
dn f
dβ )Wj −∑ j∈F ((∑i∈F αi
dn f








c′(t f − c2, f )
(
−
c1, f (1−H(c1, f ))− c2, f (1−H(c2, f ))
H(c1, f )−H(c2, f )
+ c′(t f − c2, f )
1−H(c2, f )
n f h(c2, f )




c′(t f − c2, f )
( c1, f − c2, f
H(c1, f )−H(c2, f )
+
c′(t f − c2, f )
n f h(c2, f )
)dκ fg
dβ
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and
d(q(c1, f )−q f (c1, f ,c2, f ))
dαs
=−













q(c1, f )−q f (c1, f ,c2, f )−
(1−H(c2, f ))(c1, f − c2, f )




Lemma 3.9 Consider an equilibrium characterised by t f , tg, κ
f
g , κ f , c1, f , and c2, f , and a
marginal change in κs. Then,
(a) dtgdκs =
Vs
∑ j∈F W j
.
(b) ∀ f ̸= s, dt fdκs =
1
c′(t f−c2, f )
(
c1, f−c2, f
H(c1, f )−H(c2, f ) +
c′(t f−c2, f )





























































From Theorem 3.1, the equilibrium of the game has to satisfy equations (3.7) to (3.10). When
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Finally, ∑ f∈F κ
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The remainder of this section uses the previous lemmas to prove the comparative static
propositions.
Proof: Proposition 3.1
From Lemma 3.6 part (a), a marginal increase in κg reduces the threshold of Tier 1 journal.
From Lemma 3.6 part (b), the thresholds of Tier 2 journal decreases, so authors to put less
effort to publish an idea of a given quality. Finally, from Lemma 3.6 part (c), the influence














From Lemma 3.9 part (a), a marginal increase in κ f increases the threshold of Tier 1 journal.
From Lemma 3.9 part (d), the thresholds of Tier 2 journal decreases, so authors have to
put less effort to publish an idea of a given quality. Finally, from Lemma 3.9 part (e),











This proposition is a direct implication of Proposition 3.5
■
Proof: Proposition 3.4
This proof shows that the increase of the readership of a single field has the effects described
in the current proposition. After this proof is presented, it is trivial to generalise it to an
increase of the readership vector of several fields. Hence, that part is omitted.
From Lemma 3.7 part (a), a marginal increase in a particular αs increases the threshold
of the general interest journal.
For the second part of the proposition,
∑
j∈F





q(c1, f )c′(tg − c1, j)− ∑
j∈F
q(c1, j)c′(tg − c1, f )
)
where q(c1, f ) is increasing in c1, f and c′(tg − c1, f ) is weakly decreasing in c1, f . From that
observation, ∑ j∈F nsX fWj −nsX jWf ≥ 0 for the field with the highest c1, f (i.e. the highest
q(c1, f )), and ∑ j∈F nsX fWj −nsX jWf ≤ 0 for the field with the lowest c1, f , with equality if
all the fields have the same value of c1, f . Moreover, due to the ordering of f in terms of the
value of q(c1, f ), there exists f ∗ such that for every f ≥ f ∗, ∑ j∈F nsX fWj −nsX jWf ≥ 0, and
for every f ≤ f ∗, ∑ j∈F nsX fWj −nsX jWf ≤ 0.
Based Lemma 3.7 part (b), the previous result implies that f ≥ f ∗ ⇔ dt fdαs < 0 and based
on Lemma 3.7 part (c) and Theorem 3.1, f ≥ f ∗ ⇔ d(q(c1, f )−q f (c1, f ,c2, f ))dαs < 0.
■
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Proof: Proposition 3.5
As in the previous cases, this proof relies on Lemma 3.8. But before its application, it is
important to prove that, when α is large enough, then α f X f +B f ≥ 0. For this purpose,
A f (α f X f +B f ) =α f q(c1, f )+
ng
n f
(q(c1, f )− c1, f )+ c′(tg − c1, f )
1−H(c1,s)
h(c1, f )n f
− (1−
c′(max{t f − c1, f ,0})
c′(t f − c2,s)
)(2q f (c1, f ,c2, f )
+
c1, f (1−H(c1, f ))− c2, f (1−H(c2, f ))
H(c1, f )−H(c2, f )
)





h(c1, f )n f
Therefore,
A f (α f X f +B f )≥ α f q(c1, f )+
ng
n f
(q(c1, f )− c1, f )
−2q f (c1, f ,c2, f )−
c1, f (1−H(c1, f ))− c2, f (1−H(c2, f ))
H(c1, f )−H(c2, f )
Moreover, due to the concavity of H,
E[v|c1, f ≥ v ≥ c2, f ]≤
c1, f + c2, f
2
When this inequality is substituted in the previous equation,
A f (α f X f +B f )≥
α f q(c1, f )+
ng
n f
(q(c1, f )− c1, f )− c1, f +
c1, f (1−H(c1, f ))− c2, f (1−H(c1, f ))
H(c1, f )−H(c2, f )
where Theorem 3.1 guarantees that
ng
n f
(q(c1, f )− c1, f )−
c1, f (1−H(c1, f ))− c2, f (1−H(c1, f ))
H(c1, f )−H(c2, f )
≥ 0
Hence, αFq(c1, f )− c1, f ≥ 0 when αF → 1. Therefore, there exists α , such that for
α > α , α f X f +B f ≥ 0.
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Based on the previous results, the current proposition is a particular case of Lemma 3.8,
in which dnF
β
= 1 and ∀ f < F it holds that dnF
β




BF +∑ f∈F αFX f
∑ f∈F Wf
≥ 0
due to the previous results.
Repeating the proof of Proposition 3.4 for every f ̸= F , it is true that f ≥ f ∗ ⇔ dt fdαs < 0
and f ≥ f ∗ ⇔ d(q(c1, f )−q f (c1, f ,c2, f ))dαs < 0.




q(c1, f )−q f (c1, f ,c2, f )−
c1, f (1−H(c2, f ))− c2, f (1−H(c2, f ))
H(c1, f )−H(c2, f )




where the first inequality uses the concavity of H and the second uses Lemma 3.1.
Therefore, from Lemma 3.8 part (d),
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